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THE POLISH CORRIDOR

+++++++ Frontiers

POMERANIA

EAST PRUSSIA

POLAND

Schneidemühl

Chojnice
(Konitz)

Bydgoszcz
(Bromberg)

Thorn

Warsaw

Grudziadz
(Graudenz)

Marienwerder

Allenstein

Marienburg

Tczew
(Oreschau)


Danzig

Gdynia

Elbing

Königsberg

Vistula R.



THE EASTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY

By RENÉ MARTEL

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FOREWORD

Of the complex problems of the post-war period few are as difficult or as formidable as that presented by the eastern frontiers of Germany.

English public opinion has already become aware of these difficulties through various excellent works, well and honestly documented, among the best of which it is our duty and pleasure to name the recent study by Lieutenant-Colonel Graham Seton Hutchinson, *Silesia Revisited*, 1929, and Sir Robert Donald's *Polish Corridor and the Consequences* (both published in London in 1929). We have ourselves largely made use—as the reader may find by noting our Bibliography and the references made in the text—of English sources of information and of the testimony of British statesmen.

We have, in our historical retrospect, paid special attention to the ideas unfolded by Mr. Lloyd George at the Peace Conference. His views were wise, profound and truly humane. The ensuing course of events has showed, and will again show, their justice and their soundness. If they were misconstrued, or rather, if they were misunderstood, in France in 1919, they have since been re-examined and judged to be right, on the whole, by the best of our thinkers. Let us then render to Mr. Lloyd George the justice which is his due. He was the first to free himself from war-psychosis, and he was ~~the~~ first to have the courage to think and to act with a European outlook.

The purpose of this book is to enlighten public opinion in all countries. A comprehensive work upon the eastern frontiers of Germany—a work essentially dependent on sound documentation—was necessary and indispensable: we have therefore not hesitated to

give a large amount of space to quotations, facts and even to statistics.

We have expounded the various points of view, impartially and without prejudice, making equal use of all available sources and supplementing our information by long and minute inquiries conducted *in situ*; in short, trying to present in the truest light points of view which are often contradictory. It was our desire that this study should sum up both the Polish and the German theses with as much clarity, force and conviction as the best Polish or German works written on the subject.

There remained for us to draw our own deductions. We have expressed them frankly, but without attempting to give the casting vote in these matters, nor to associate ourselves with one or other theory. We have confined ourselves to setting forth the opposing arguments, to explaining their origins; in a word, to understanding them rather than to judging them, still less to approving or condemning them.

But we have not thought ourselves bound to limit our efforts to a simply informative work. It is not sufficient to frame a question of such magnitude; one must seek its solution. This solution cannot be imposed from without; it must emanate from the interested parties, which are—it cannot be too frequently repeated—equally dissatisfied with the present situation. We have no doubt that the necessary agreement will come sooner or later when, in Germany and in Poland, as in Europe generally, men have progressed towards a pacific ideal which will have triumphed over ancient racial prejudice and over age-long hatreds, with their destructive and maleficent influence.

We have faith in the common sense and reasonable-

ness of the various peoples. But in order that they may follow the path to peace and happiness they must be shown the obstacles with which their path is still strewn; doubtless they will avoid them more successfully for being warned, and English public opinion can do much towards this end.

May this work help to bring into closer relation the nations of Europe and to safeguard peace from the dangers with which it is still threatened.

La France ne doit pas songer à faire ce qu'on appelle des alliances ; elle doit être bien avec tout le monde, mais mieux avec quelques puissances. Ce sont les progrès de la civilisation qui seront désormais nos liens de parenté ; nous devons donc chercher à nous rapprocher davantage des gouvernements où la civilisation est la plus avancée ; c'est là que sont nos vraies ambassades de famille.

TALLEYRAND
Congrès de Vienne

THE EASTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY

PART I

HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

To live is necessary for any nation; to live in peace is the essential condition of all progress; but to live in honour is a condition more important than all others.

NITTI

THE present problem of the eastern frontiers of Germany does not reopen the question of all those dispositions which were made in Eastern Europe by the treaties. It does, in fact, concern only partial and localized disputes, in spite of the size and the importance of certain of the disputed areas, such as the Polish Corridor, the Free State of Danzig, the Germano-Polish frontier of the Vistula, and Upper and Lower Silesia. In its present form the problem appeared in contemporary history at a relatively late date, namely, at the end of the Great War, when the unexpected breakdown of the Russian Empire allowed Poland to recover her complete independence. Thus it came to be that the question of Germany's eastern frontiers is linked indissolubly in point of time with the collapse of Russia and the rebirth of the Polish nation.

This is a fact of fundamental importance.

On January 10, 1917, the Powers of the Entente replied in the following terms to President Wilson's request, made on December 18, 1916, that the belligerent nations should make known their purpose in fighting:

"The intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia with regard to Poland have been clearly formulated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to his armies."

Two months later, on March 11, 1917, France and Russia signed their last secret treaty. Russia granted France full freedom in the determination of her eastern frontiers, and in return received from her ally the same facilities regarding the demarcation of her future western border, separating her from Germany and Austria. A week later the Russian Government was overthrown.

Until the end of the war, however, the Poles resident within Poland never contemplated the possibility of turning this stupendous change of fortune to advantage. In Austrian Poland, Professor Ladislas Leopold Jaworski, the leader of the Galician Conservative Party and head of the Historical School of Cracow, confined his demands to the reunion of Russian Poland to the Monarchy.¹

Neither did Maurice Straszewski, another theorist of the Cracow school, lay claim to the Polano-Prussian provinces, but only demanded compensation in regard to the western Russian provinces.

On September 18, 1917, M. Jaworski, at that time President of the Polish Supreme National Council, declared that the proclamations of the two emperors² "make it imperative that Poland should conclude an alliance with the Central Powers and declare war on Russia. When the Poles abandon all hope of assistance from the Entente, then the cause of Poland will make rapid progress."

In 1916, moreover, Baron Battaglia, the deputy, formally relinquished, on behalf of those who con-

trolled the activities of the Polish Supreme National Council, all claims to the Polish territories which formed part of Prussia.³

The *Nowa Reforma*, a Cracow newspaper which was formerly the organ of the Council, and consequently of M. Pilsudski, but which has since adopted an even more pro-German policy, in recalling this renunciation excused the Council's action in the following subtle manner: "This political attitude", it wrote, "had but one peculiarity, namely, that unlike others it did not demand the uncompromising reunification of all Polish territories, but made the one reservation of practicability."

On April 4, 1918, M. Steczkowski's Cabinet was formed. When the Allies fell into step with President Wilson in recognizing that the creation "of a united Polish State, free and independent, and having access to the sea, formed a necessary condition of a just and enduring peace, and of the victory of right in Europe", M. Steczkowski's Government refused its acquiescence to the proposal.

Holding that the Government "could sanely gauge Poland's own peculiar needs", he declared that its intention was to claim "satisfaction for the nation's essential demands, which would then place it in a position to resolve, in collaboration with its neighbours, the Central Powers, those historical problems which it must face in Eastern Europe", and stated that the resolution passed at Versailles "would not disturb the Government's equanimity".

The Council of State unanimously approved these passages which we have quoted from the Prime Minister's declaration.

We may therefore conclude that until the end of the

Great War, New Poland, in full accord with her responsible Government, remained unswervingly loyal to the Central Powers, to whom she did, in fact, owe her existence as a nation; and that she did not for a moment think of reorganizing her western frontiers at the expense of Germany and Austria.

The conception of a strong and independent Poland, having access to the sea and built at the expense of those three Empires which were destined to simultaneous ruin, owed its inception to a handful of Polish patriots who had taken refuge abroad, and in particular to Romain Dmowski, a man of great political genius. We shall see later on to what extent the work of this vigorous personality succeeded in modifying the course of events, and how, by a sustained and astonishing display of intelligence, clear-sightedness and will-power, he turned Poland into a nation despite herself.

A brief retrospective glance is necessary in order to reach a full understanding of the events which we are about to relate.

Before the war, two major trends were manifested among Polish politicians, that of the revolutionaries and that of the opportunists. The revolutionists grouped themselves around Joseph Pilsudski, whose aim was to re-establish a Polish State by means of a fresh national insurrection, directed not so much against the Polish propertied class as against the Russian authorities. A firm friend of Germany, the future Field-Marshal had prepared, ten years before the war, for Poland's intervention at the side of Austria.

"As early as 1905, when a fugitive from Russian prisons, he took shelter in Galicia where he organized Polish volunteer units. In one of his books⁴ Pilsudski writes that the formation of a Polish army, and the

adoption of a policy of *faits accomplis*, appeared to him as the first duty of every Pole the moment war came to be declared.”⁵

A revolutionary and a Socialist, he was before all else a friend of Germany and an enemy of Russia, and he therefore found himself in sympathy with Jaworski. The Supreme National Council, which met at Cracow on August 16, 1914, under the latter's presidency, extended its wardenship to the Polish territories, of which the moral, if not the active, leader was to be Pilsudski.

Meanwhile Romain Dmowski, the leader of the National Democratic Party, speaking on behalf of the opportunists of Russian Poland, extolled an entente with Russia against Germany. His most important book, *Germany, Russia and the Polish Question*,⁶ formed the gospel of the National Democratic Party until the war, and was much discussed in a series of articles which appeared in the *Slowo Polskie* and the *Gazeta Narodowa*.

Above all Dmowski feared for Poland the advance of Germanism:

“It is evident”, he would say, “that if Poland is threatened in the future with the loss of her national existence, *the danger will come to her, not from Russia, but from Germany.*”⁷

Russia, profoundly shaken by the revolution of 1905, had already lost her assimilative powers: “She has, and she will have, too many difficulties, both within and without the Empire, and her political organism is too shaken and enfeebled, for the former system again to become possible, despite the worst intentions of those who govern.”⁸

Polish autonomy within the framework of the Russian

Empire thus satisfied Dmowski, who believed that the interests of the two Slavonic peoples lay in a common understanding directed against their mutual enemy—Teutonism.

He therefore thought it necessary, first of all, to “overthrow this Russian political system, which is but a clumsy imitation of Prussia’s anti-Polish policy. It is thus in the interests not only of Poland, but of all the peoples which are menaced by German penetration, and therefore equally in the interest of Russia herself, to effect a radical change in the relation between Poland and Russia.”⁹

Dmowski had developed most of these ideas over ten years previously when, between 1895 and 1905, he was editing in Lemberg the *Przegląd Wszechpolski* (*Pan-Polish Review*) in conjunction with Poplawski, another theorist of opportunist tendencies. Even to-day it is interesting to look through the pages of this forgotten publication. One finds in it the uncompromising and imperialistic creed to which this formidable fighter remained unswervingly faithful at the time of the Peace Conference. For the Polish State to be secure, Dmowski affirmed, it must include within its boundaries not only Posnania and West Prussia, but also the whole of East Prussia and the greater part of Silesia. These ideas assumed their final and exact form in a series of essays which appeared, in 1902, in the *Przegląd Wszechpolski*.¹⁰

But the Polish leader nevertheless remained faithful to his conception of a self-governing Poland within the framework of the Russian Empire. On July 12, 1908, he openly affirmed his loyalty at the Congress, which had brought together in Prague the élite of all the Slavonic peoples.

At the outbreak of war Dmowski, in conformity with his principles and his earlier opinions, set up a National Committee at Warsaw, on November 25, 1914, whose task it was to plan, in agreement with the Russian authorities, "the political organization of the Polish nation". On May 11, 1915, a mixed Russo-Polish commission was established for the purpose of discussing the reforms which should be made. It held nine meetings between the fifth and the fourteenth of July, but its work was interrupted by the German offensive against Warsaw, and the National Committee was forced to move to Petersburg.

For almost two years, until the Russian Revolution, Dmowski and his partisans spent themselves in gloomy inactivity. Their policy had entirely failed; their opponents—first Pilsudski and then the "activists"—had seized power in the country, and the National Committee no longer had any significance. The immense majority of Poles had rallied to the cause of the Central Powers and were grateful to them for having renewed Poland's existence as a nation.

But Dmowski did not lose hope, for he anticipated the advent of the Russian Revolution; it would not take him by surprise and would find him prepared. He modified his plan of action accordingly: the Poland of which he dreamed would be an independent, vital State, since the old framework of the Tsarist Empire was breaking down of itself. And yet the difficulties which he still had to overcome were immense: Poland, in her rehabilitated state, played Germany's game until the last moment, and it would be difficult to convert the Entente, however credulous it might be; especially would America be difficult. The great issue was to be decided in Paris and in Washington.

Dmowski understood the situation clearly, and consequently Russia, henceforth of small importance, assumed a secondary place in the minds of the National Committee. On April 9, 1917, a Polish Council of the United Parties was constituted in Moscow, with M. Stanislas Wojciechowski as chairman. Its task was to liquidate the past whilst safeguarding the future against the possible contingency of a return of good fortune. Simultaneously a Polish National Committee was established in Paris under the leadership of Dmowski, which M. Skirmunt represented in Rome and M. Ignace Paderewski in America.

The Polish National Committee in Paris forthwith fought its first battle and achieved recognition by the Allied and Associated Governments as an "official Polish organization". Recognition was granted in the following order: France, September 20th; Great Britain, October 15th; Italy, October 30th; United States, December 1, 1917.

This order is significant, for it shows clearly the relative degrees of resistance to be encountered by the Poles in their activities abroad. The most difficult point of attack was Washington, and yet it was one of those which had been most worked upon, and for a long period, by Polish propaganda.

The ground had been prepared in Washington by a very strange and very interesting personality, George Sosnowski. George Sosnowski was a Pole born in Russian Poland, and had arrived in America in the early days of October 1915, entrusted with a special mission by General Polivanow, the Russian Minister of War. He was not long in forgetting the duties with which he had been charged, and within two years succeeded in becoming an American citizen. Very

soon he contrived to make useful friends in Wilson's entourage and to gain access to the President himself. As early as the middle of December 1916 he placed in the President's hands a long memorandum, certain parts of which found their way into the famous message of January 22, 1917.

Sosnowski, as later Dmowski, perceived at once that President Wilson was ignorant of the most elementary facts of the history and geography of ancient Europe. As was said by M. Nitti, "He was fickle in his infallibility, but he had the firmest faith that he was working for the peace of the world, and above all for the glory of the United States. Of European things he was supremely ignorant."¹¹ Lansing also recognized his "unavoidable lack of knowledge of the details of some of the simple as well as the most intricate problems to be solved".¹² Sosnowski obtained a private interview with Mr. Tumulty, Wilson's private secretary, on March 30, 1917; meanwhile he played in the most skilful manner upon the mind of Count Adam Tarnowski, who had come to the United States as Austro-Hungarian ambassador,¹³ and he entered into relations with Lansing. For a long time Sosnowski confined himself to urging Wilson to break with the Central Powers, without ever alluding to Poland. When he felt sure of success, he decided on April 7, 1917, to show his hand to the President in a letter, accompanied by three explanatory maps, in which he emphasized the necessity of restoring Poland to her frontiers of 1771, and of her annexing Upper Silesia "in order to hold Prussian militarism in check". This rather tendencious document was also intended to prove the rights of Poland over West Prussia.

Mr. Balfour, the British Secretary of State for

Foreign Affairs, much preoccupied on account of Sosnowski's dangerous activities, created a diversion by introducing another person within the President's entourage, so as to supply him with more impartial information, and to prevent him taking a decision too hastily on a question as thorny as the rehabilitation of the Polish State. It is nevertheless certain that the task of Paderewski and Dmowski was much facilitated by the work of George Sosnowski.

Dmowski, before starting his campaign, completed his list of claims and, in July 1917, published his book, *The Problems of Central and Eastern Europe*, which was destined to become the charter of the Polish negotiators.

In this work Dmowski declared himself hostile to a "peace without annexations or indemnities", which would confirm Germany's supremacy in Eastern Europe. In order to break Prussia's power it was absolutely necessary, he considered, to re-establish an independent Polish State, and to make of her a vigorous nation, politically and economically secure. But this object could only be achieved if Poland were given both an access to the sea through Danzig and the coal area of Upper Silesia.

Thus Germany should cede to Poland: the whole of Upper Silesia, with the exception of a small German area situated in the south-west; a small portion of Middle Silesia; Posnania, except for a small German oasis in the south-west; the whole of West Prussia, with the exception of some districts in the south-west; the districts of Lauenburg and Butov in Romerania; and finally, the whole of East Prussia.

These pitiless demands were, it is true, somewhat modified in their detail. Dmowski was not ignorant of

the existence of a small German area in West Prussia, and he declared himself prepared to grant it complete autonomy within the confines of the Polish State, or even to make of it a small independent republic, linked to Poland merely by a tariff agreement. On the other hand he entirely overlooked the German population of East Prussia. As to Danzig, he predicted that once it became a Polish port it would experience a great revival, following on the apathy into which it had fallen "as a consequence of its union with the Prussian State".

As soon as the National Committee had been constituted in Paris, he appointed M. Ignace Paderewski to represent it in America. This great musician continued and intensified the work which had been carried on by George Sosnowski. His first success was to achieve the union of the various Polish parties in the United States; he was able to organize them and to induce them to accept the authority of the National Committee in Paris.

He then endeavoured to win over the chief American statesmen to the Polish cause; Sosnowski had been able to carry conviction to Wilson, Paderewski attempted to convert the President's chief opponent, Robert Lansing, the Secretary of State.

"He came to see me", wrote Lansing,¹⁴ "after the United States had entered the war, for the purpose of pleading the cause of his country and of obtaining consent to the recruiting of a Polish army in the United States."

At first Lansing received Paderewski with great reserve. The Secretary of State, a cold, logical and dispassionate personality, a pitiless observer, knowing to the full, in contrast to Wilson, the wellnigh un-

fathomable complexity of certain European problems, had from the first diagnosed the malady.

"There were very difficult problems to be solved in the delimitation of the frontiers of Poland, for her territory, while she was an independent State, had been a variable quantity, since her borders had fluctuated with the triumph or failure of her arms in the wars in which the Poles were almost incessantly engaged during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At what time in history did the boundaries enclose Poland proper?"¹⁵

Paderewski was faced with peculiar difficulties dependent on his personality. His fiery eloquence, the unexpected ramifications of his keen intelligence, which called up with equal force the pros and cons of a certain course, the apparent inconsistency of his passionate arguments, did not stand him in good stead with the methodical and realistic minds of American politicians.

"My feeling", wrote Lansing, "was that I had to deal with one given over to extravagant ideals, to the visions and phantasies of a person controlled by his emotional impulses rather than by his reason and the actualities of life. I was impressed by his fervid patriotism and by his intense devotion to the cause of Poland, but it was not unnatural to think that so temperamental a nature would be swayed by sentimentality in the advocacy of a course of action and would give passionate support to his ideas with little regard to logic or practical considerations.

"Holding this impression of Mr. Paderewski—an impression which I believe was shared by many of those with whom he came in contact in those early days of active work for his country—I confess that I

was not disposed to give the weight to his opinions that I did later.”¹⁶

Lansing did not dissimulate his doubts; he was frank about them to Paderewski. But the latter had the courage to persevere in spite of all opposition, and to pursue the task which he had undertaken so effectually that he succeeded in making Lansing change his opinion to one more favourable to Poland. This victory of an indomitable will served by an impassioned, obstinate and ardent patriotism, is worthy of the greatest admiration.¹⁷

Thus the Poles were fostering the favourable atmosphere in which Wilson's Thirteenth Point was to be conceived. Let us now examine the various steps of the latter's formulation and of its final revision.

As early as the autumn of 1917 President Wilson had constituted a Research Committee, the findings of which formed the basis of the Fourteen Points. Its chairman was Professor Mezes, the son-in-law of Colonel House, but in reality it was the geographer, Isaiah Bowman, who directed its work. The Polish Section was delegated to Dr. Robert Howard Lord, Professor of History at Harvard University, who was assisted by two American Poles, Professors Zwierzchowski and Artowski. Dr. Lord was destined to be the great advocate of Poland's cause at the Peace Conference, and the constitution of the Polish Section of the American Commission is sufficient in itself to indicate the results of his activities.

In January 1918 the Polish Section submitted its report to President Wilson. It contained the following clauses:

“The Polish Question is the most complex of all. Poland's unification is impossible without severing

East Prussia from Germany, and such a course does not easily fit into the realm of practical politics. A Poland made up of Russian Poland and Austrian Poland would assure itself access to the sea, probably by the Vistula and the German canals leading to Bremen and Hamburg."

This text is of the first importance: each item in it is worthy of long examination.

The report concluded as follows:

"A democratic and independent Poland must be set up. Her frontiers must be defined on the basis of a just appreciation of her national and economic interests; especial attention must be paid to her necessity for access to the sea."

"The determination of the form of Poland's government and also of her economic and political relations must be left to representatives freely elected by the Polish people."

President Wilson wrote the following shorthand note in the margin of the report:

"An independent Polish State must be set up, of which the economic and political independence, as well as the inviolability, must be guaranteed by international agreement. This State must comprise those provinces which are inhabited by an indisputably Polish population and must have a free and assured access to the sea."

Finally, the third point was conceived thus: "A Polish State must be formed which will include the territories which are inhabited by populations indisputably Polish; it will be assured a free access to the sea; and its political and economic independence and its territorial integrity must be guaranteed by international conventions."

It is not without interest to recall the *Official American Commentary* upon the Fourteen Points, published in October 1918. There are some interesting suggestions to be found there:

"The chief problem is whether Poland is to obtain territory west of the Vistula, which would cut off the Germans of East Prussia from the Empire, or whether Danzig can be made a free port and the Vistula internationalized. . . .

"If Posen and Silesia go to Poland, rigid protection must be afforded the minorities of Germans and Jews living there, as well as in other parts of the Polish State.

"The principle on which frontiers will be delimited is contained in the President's word 'indisputably'. This may imply the taking of an impartial census before frontiers are marked."¹⁸

These passages are of the first importance. They prove that the Thirteenth Point did not imply, in the minds of Wilson and the other American negotiators, that Poland should gain access to the sea by means of an accretion of German territory. The possibility is faced, but the vague and indefinite wording of the Thirteenth Point did not prejudice of the ultimate solution. Opinion in the United States was hesitant, divided, and rather hostile to Polish claims. Dmowski understood the danger and hastened to Washington.

Immediately upon arrival he called on President Wilson, in company with Paderewski, and at the very first contact intuitively discovered the President's weak point: Wilson had no clear knowledge of European problems; his mind still fluctuated indecisively between Dmowski's suggestions and the rectifications made by the Foreign Office, but—he wished to appear well informed. Dmowski was not slow in pricking the

bubble of this childish conceit, and immediately adopted an extremely clever tactical plan. He would proceed by means of forceful and sharply defined statements, cutting short all attempts at argument, bringing to bear crushing statistics and decisive facts which could not be questioned; he would display old German maps of the 1910 census—maps that were falsified with such consummate art that nobody at the time perceived the deception.¹⁹

Nevertheless, in spite of his ignorance, Wilson did later on feel a momentary doubt. On June 1, 1919, a sharp discussion upon Upper Silesia—of which we shall hear more later—brought M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George into conflict. M. Clemenceau was affirming that from the first the Poles had claimed Upper Silesia, when Wilson, intervening in the debate, supplied the following particulars: 18420

“M. Clemenceau is right: when I received Dmowski and Paderewski in Washington, I questioned them at length, with maps in hand; their claims were excessive, but we agreed upon the formula: ‘Give to Poland all territories inhabited by Poles.’”²⁰

Dmowski has himself reported at length his interviews with Wilson (he saw him on at least three occasions). The first interview lasted an hour and a half; Dmowski insisted on the necessity for Poland of a direct access to the sea, which from time to time provoked critical comments from the President. When Dmowski had finished expounding his case, Wilson asked:

“Would you not be satisfied with the neutrality of the Vistula and with the creation of a free port at Danzig?”

“Mr. President,” Dmowski replied, “what you suggest is equivalent to saying: ‘We shall give you full

liberty to breathe, but the Germans will always grip you by the throat.'"²¹

Thereafter Dmowski began to support the Polish claims on utilitarian and economic grounds. He then passed on to the strategic aspect.

"But, Mr. Dmowski," interrupted Wilson, "who will be able to speak, after this war, of the strategic aspect? We shall have a League of Nations."

"Mr. President," Dmowski replied, "I believe in the League of Nations as I believe in the Justice of the United States. But for Justice to become a reality it is necessary to have not only laws and law-courts, but also police and prisons."

Wilson did not, however, allow himself to be convinced. He asked Dmowski to show him on a map the territories claimed by Poland, and to supply him with all possible information bearing on those areas.²²

Dmowski's account thus confirms point for point that given by Mermeix. Another fact also comes to light, however: after Dmowski's first interview with Wilson, the President had not yet decided to grant West Prussia to Poland; he envisaged only the creation of a free port at Danzig and the internationalization of the Vistula. As we have seen, these conclusions were, moreover, dictated to him by the recommendations of the American Commission. But Dmowski was not a man to be discouraged; he secured the aid of the *New York Times*, and without delay used it for appealing to American public opinion.

On October 8, 1918, he sought a fresh interview with Wilson and brought him four maps and a memorandum. These documents owed more to polemics and partisan psychology than to history and politics. All the difficulties were passed in silence or treated in

cavalier manner. Thus West Prussia was said to be Polish, and the name "Kashube" was not even mentioned; East Prussia, it appeared, had, through Germany's fault, remained in a backward state of civilization hardly superior to that of the Middle Ages, and the interests of civilization demanded that *this province should be seized from the German Empire and placed under Poland's charge.*

Dmowski also took the greatest liberties with statistics. He asserted, for instance, that half the population of Danzig was Polish, whereas no census has ever shown more than 3 per cent. of Poles. . . . Every item in the memorandum was presented in a pleasing light, and we already know what to think of the maps which were submitted to Wilson! The memorandum was, moreover, bellicose, in fact almost aggressive, in tone.

Nor did Dmowski stop his activities half-way. Feeling, as he himself tells us, that Poland's cause was strongly compromised and very nearly lost, he did not hesitate, when taking leave at the end of his last interview with Wilson, to have recourse to arguments *ad hominem*, which amounted to little less than a threat. He categorically declared to the President that:

"There are approximately four million Poles in the United States. If our German frontiers are not established according to our wishes; if we fail to obtain not only Posnania, but also Silesia, our Eastern provinces and Danzig, none of these Poles will understand how this came to be—and they are people who place much trust in you."²³

This time the argument found its mark, and Wilson was forced to compromise with his principles. Would he not shortly need the support of all his electors?

Late though it came, Dmowski's triumph was complete. At the Peace Conference Wilson supported the Polish claims, and it may be said with certitude that the fate of Germany's eastern frontiers was sealed on the day of Dmowski's interview.

On November 2, 1918, Marshal Foch, whom strong personal ties, together with fervent and militant Catholic sentiments, rendered particularly favourable to Poland, demanded "the evacuation by German troops within . . . (a fortnight?) of Danzig and of all Polish territory, including that which formed a part of Poland before the first partition".

Let us now follow the course of this discussion as it is reported in Mermeix's book, *Les négociations secrètes et les quatre armistices*:²⁴

"M. PICHON: 'I wish to insist that amongst the evacuated territories should be included all those territories which constituted the Kingdom of Poland before the first partition of 1772.

"Such a course is, moreover, in conformity with the statements and the first agreements made by the various Governments at the beginning of the war, and America has accepted it. I desire the reconstitution of Ancient Poland, with an access to the sea. This is one of the objects for which the Allies have fought, and President Wilson has given it his entire approval. The Poles who have remained in Poland, and that Polish Council in Paris to which we have accorded recognition, consider that we owe them this assurance. It would be wise to incorporate this clause in the terms of the Armistice, so as to prevent argument when the terms of Peace come to be examined.'

"MR. BALFOUR: 'I have listened to this suggestion with anxiety. You say that the Poland of 1918

should be the Poland of 1772. It is not this to which we have pledged ourselves. We have pledged ourselves to reconstitute a Poland composed of Poles. That of 1772 did not conform to this definition; it was not composed entirely of Poles. In it were merged non-Polish territories, whereas certain Polish territories did not form part of it. This formula errs as much by insufficiency as by excess. The exact delimitation of the frontiers of this new Poland is a subject so complicated that I beseech you not to introduce it into the terms of Armistice. I propose to summarize in one sentence, embracing the whole eastern front, the views expressed by Marshal Foch: "All the German forces in the East must retire within their frontiers such as they were before August 1914."

"We should leave the task of studying the question to the Inter-allied Conference, which must of necessity meet before the Peace Conference."

"COLONEL HOUSE: 'I accept Mr. Balfour's suggestions.'"

"M. PICHON: 'If a formula of such a general nature is adopted, the problem becomes modified. I do not insist; this summary includes everything. What I desire is that the Poles should clearly understand that we are not changing our attitude.'"

On the same day the British Minister intervened again, but this time in Poland's favour, to assure that she should receive her supplies by Danzig and the Vistula; the question was one of principle, but its results were to exceed the intentions of its author:

"MR. BALFOUR: 'I wish to submit another point which is intimately connected with the preceding question [the evacuation by the Germans of territories situated upon the eastern frontier]. Unless we formulate

a¹ special clause, the Allies will be cut off from Poland and the neighbouring countries. We must seek to preserve our contact with them—through Danzig, for example, or through any other avenue of approach—thus enabling us to send arms or police to those countries should special need arise, or to send supplies if conditions of transport allow.’

“This principle was accepted, and at the end of the sitting Mr. Balfour proposed the following motion, which was discussed at the second reading:

“‘The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans upon their eastern frontiers, either through Danzig or by the Vistula, so as to enable them to send supplies to the populations of those districts, or for any other purpose.’”²⁵

These provisional arrangements did not in any way prejudice the final solution, but they gave rise among the Poles to hopes which were dangerous to the precarious equilibrium of the new international situation. At the end of 1918 the necessity for a *coup de force* against Danzig was openly discussed in Warsaw. The British and Americans were beginning to feel anxious when on January 12, 1919, Paderewski, judging it essential to appease the fears of the Anglo-Saxons, addressed the following letter to his friend, Colonel House:²⁶

“Contrary to the rumours originated by the retiring pro-German propaganda, the Poles have been nowhere the aggressive party. Though claiming, most legitimately . . . Danzig as an indispensable condition for their political, commercial and economic life, they all rely with unshaken confidence on the results of the Peace Conference and do not intend to surprise the delegates by any *fait accompli*.”

This letter, it may be guessed, was scarcely calculated to reassure the Americans, the less so in that Paderewski ended with a demand to "send as soon as possible some artillery and plenty of German rifle munitions".

The Peace Conference was thus to discuss the burning question of the eastern frontiers of Germany in a feverish and bellicose atmosphere, charged with menace and passion, through which the distant clank of arms could be heard. Germany had feared the discussion for a long while. Prince Lichnowski, some time before the Armistice, had sensed the danger:

"The Polish question", he had then written, "constitutes for Germany the gravest question of the war and of the peace, far graver than that of Belgium. . . . With it stands or falls the position of Prussia as a Great Power, and therefore that of the Empire."²⁷

In what spirit, then, were the Allies about to approach the examination of this formidable problem?

In the rehabilitation of Poland and in the demarcation of her western frontiers, France perceived above all a means of destroying German unity. Gabriel Hanotaux had been in the past, and still remained, the acknowledged advocate of this policy, the spirit of which had remained alive among the French plenipotentiaries, and at each stage of the negotiations had been maintained by fresh memoranda circulated by this great historian.

Poland, when reconstituted, was to be the wedge which, thrust deep into the German Empire, was to dislocate her members and destroy the cohesion of the imperialistic Prussia of the Hohenzollerns.

"The territorial dislocation of the German Empire", wrote Hanotaux on November 11, 1918,²⁸ "is the

necessary consequence of the decision taken by the Allies to create a unified Poland, having access to the sea through Danzig.

"The ideal for world peace would be the reduction of Prussia to her simplest expression, with Germany divided into six or eight states, each with ten or twenty million inhabitants, having no other political link than a common Diet, enjoying but very limited authority."²⁹

"A confederated and liberal Germany would, in fact, be the Germany of 1848—the Germany of the Frankfort Diet, such as she has conceived herself, but which was destroyed by the political and military intrigues of the Hohenzollerns."³⁰

If the French negotiators never actually thought of dividing Germany, they nevertheless made use of Poland, as Hanotaux desired, to break up the unity of Prussia. They conducted the battle with vigour under the formidable aegis of Clemenceau. The latter was, according to Lansing,³¹ the dominating figure at the Conference, "the strongest man of the many strong men who participated in the negotiations at Paris".

"But without the background of accomplishment, M. Clemenceau possessed a strength of character and forcefulness which would have raised him above his colleagues. Persistent though patient, he was always ready, when the moment arrived, to use all his skill and cleverness in debate to obtain a decision which would be in the interests of his country. Every question was viewed by him in the light of how it would affect France. He was supremely nationalistic and interpreted international adjustments into national terms."³²

Finally, "M. Clemenceau seemed to be sceptical of the actual force of moral obligation and of abstract justice in international relations."³³ England, on the

other hand, pursued a more conciliatory policy designed to lay the foundations of Peace in confidence and justice. She feared that intolerable terms would be inflicted upon Germany in Eastern Europe, to the advantage of new States without political experience. Lloyd George especially was little favourable to Poland.

"During the first negotiations", writes Mermeix,³⁴ "the French and the Americans had noticed that the British Prime Minister's tone held little benevolence whenever a question referring to Poland came up for discussion. He was noticeably prejudiced against the Poles; he participated without enthusiasm in the rebuilding of a State which had perished because it had lacked political genius. He wondered whether it was not unwise in face of Germany, who would one day rise again, and Russia, who, sooner or later, would emerge from the abject state to which the Bolsheviki had brought her, to reconstitute a Poland which would perhaps resemble the old one in her instability.

"Without doubt the danger would be lessened if Poland were made into a very strong State which her neighbours must respect. But to endow this nation with the means necessary for economic prosperity and for growth in power after the attainment of her renewed independence, would entail breaking into German and Russian territory, and to this the British would not consent."

During the first conflict of the Conference, Lloyd George was to formulate his principles with rare elevation of thought:

"Our terms of peace must be hard, severe, uncompromising, but at the same time they must be so just that the country on whom we impose them must feel

that it has no right to complain. Injustice and arrogance in the hour of victory will never be forgotten or forgiven.

"For these reasons I am entirely opposed to a policy which aims at taking from Germany, for the purpose of transferring them to another State, more Germans than is made absolutely necessary by circumstance. The German people have again just shown that they form one of the world's most vigorous races. But to place around Germany a number of small States, many of which are composed of peoples which have never governed themselves and which include large numbers of Germans who would demand a return to the Fatherland, would seem to form the greatest of all causes for future wars.

"The suggestion made by the Polish Commission, according to which we should place 2,100,000 Germans under the authority of a people of different religion who, in the course of their history, have never shown that they knew how to govern, would lead sooner or later to another war in Eastern Europe. . . .

"Peace will only be lasting if the Treaty leaves no cause for exasperation, and if it contains no stipulations which are contrary to justice and to right, or which are liable to stimulate Chauvinism and a desire for revenge."³⁵

We have already considered the attitude of the American delegation.

Italy refrained from discussing the question of Germany's eastern frontiers as she was absorbed and almost hypnotized by the one problem of the Adriatic.

Italy, as M. Tardieu declared without circumlocution,³⁶ did not count at the Conference. Signor Orlando spoke little, and Italy's activities were concentrated,

even to excess, on the question of Fiume, and her part in the debates was thereby too much reduced. There remained a three-cornered dialogue between Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George.

In actual fact the debate was to become a struggle between the ideas of France and England, and to take the form of a veritable duel between Clemenceau and Lloyd George. In this conflict the British Premier found himself heavily handicapped by his previous statements and by the entire absence of any American programme. M. Nitti has unravelled, with his usual acumen, the hidden threads of the situation.

"Lloyd George, with swiftly acting brain and clear insight, undoubtedly the most remarkable man at the Paris Conference, found himself in a difficult situation between President Wilson's pronouncements, some of them, like that regarding the freedom of the seas, undefined and dangerous, and the claims of France tending, after the brutal attack it had had to meet, not towards a true peace and the reconstruction of Europe, but towards the vivisection of Germany. In one of the first moments, just before the General Elections, Lloyd George, too, promised measures of the greatest severity. . . . But such pronouncements gave way before his clear realization of facts, and later on he tried in vain to put the Conference on the plane of such realization."³⁷

M. Nitti also shows great perception in his analysis of the reasons which led to the success of the French policy at the Conference:

"Generally speaking, in every claim the French representatives started from an extreme position, and that was not only a state of mind, it was a tactical measure. Later on, if they gave up any part of their

claim, they had an air of yielding, of accepting a compromise. When their claims were such that anxiety was caused, the opposition they raised was evident, Clemenceau put on an air of moderation and gave way at once. Sometimes, too, he showed moderation himself, when it suited his purpose, but in reality he only gave way when he saw that it was impossible to get what he wanted.

"In points where English and American interests were not involved, given the difficult position in which Lloyd George was placed and Wilson's utter ignorance of all European questions, with Italy keeping almost entirely apart, the French point of view always came out on top, if slightly modified. But the original claim was always so extreme that the modification left standing the most radically severe measure against the conquered countries."³⁸

Let us now see how these opinions were justified by events.

On January 15, 1919, M. Pichon, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, invited the Polish National Committee in Paris to appoint two representatives who would take part, on January 18th, in the first plenary session of the Inter-allied Conference charged with preparing the preliminaries of the Peace. The delegates nominated by the committee were Dmowski and Paderewski, the latter of whom had recently been appointed President of the Council at Warsaw.

On January 29th the Polish National Committee, on being invited to send representatives before the Council of Ten, sent Dmowski and Pilz. Clemenceau suddenly called upon Dmowski to expound the Polish question, and he spoke for five hours by the clock. He laid emphasis on the necessity to Poland of a terri-

torial access to the sea, "subordinating to the imperative requirements of a nation of 25,000,000 inhabitants the destinies of the 2,000,000 Germans in East Prussia".

The Council of Ten, having listened to the Polish delegate, decided on the creation of a Commission for Polish Affairs, which started work on February 12th and was subsequently augmented by two sub-commissions. The first of these, set up to deal with the local delimitations of frontiers, had as its chairman M. Noulens; General Niessel represented France, General Kernan and Professor Lord represented America, and England and Italy each had two delegates. The second sub-commission, whose work was to draw up the plan for the future frontier, was composed of General Le Rond, France (chairman); Dr. Bowman, America; and Colonel Kish, England. The Commission for Polish Affairs was presided over by Jules Cambon, and the United States had appointed Dr. Isaiah Bowman; England, Sir William Tyrrell; Italy, the Marquis della Torretta; Japan, M. Otchiai.

Although Sir William Tyrrell was personally pre-disposed towards Poland, it was not long before the lack of Anglo-French harmony became apparent within the Commission for Polish Affairs. Dmowski, for his part, worked with all his might. The Polish National Committee had already sent to the Cambon Commission an extract from a memorandum presented by Dmowski to President Wilson on October 8, 1918, and at Cambon's express request he furnished, on February 28, 1919, a further document on the future western frontiers of Poland.

Poland claimed, in the west, the frontiers of 1771, the whole of Posnania, and, in Pomerania, besides the

districts of Lauenburg and Butov, that of Stolp, together with the whole of the territory between it and the sea.

In the month of March 1919 a special commission, which had arrived from Warsaw in February and which was composed for the most part of University professors, issued a long work entitled, *Questions Relative to Polish Territory under Prussian Rule*. Although such well-known men as Professors Bujak, Buzek, Konopczynski, Romer and Nibsch had formulated the conclusions, this study did not betray any scientific characteristics; the figures in the statistics, doubtless because they had been too hastily transcribed, did not correspond to those in the original documents; the historical summary, almost entirely imaginative, contained errors of the most serious kind. It stated, for instance, that "Danzig is a Polish city superficially Teutonized", that "it would become Polish again as easily as Cracow and other cities which at one time had had a German majority" . . . furthermore, "that the enemies of Poland and of humanity should not control the mouth of Poland's national river".

But Danzig was not sufficient for Poland: she also needed Elbing, "because East Prussia possesses Königsberg". As to East Prussia herself, it was necessary to sever immediately those territories which were peopled by the Mazures, and to create at Königsberg a small German republic closely linked to Poland. . . . On re-reading such phantasies to-day one believes them to be a dream; nevertheless they helped to turn international opinion in a direction favourable to Polish claims.

Professor Lord, the principal American delegate, whose influence over Wilson increased daily, took the part of Poland on all occasions and encouraged her to

formulate the most extravagant demands. Professor Lord was already known before the war for his predilection for Poland and for his Germanophobia; he was so much under the domination of Dmowski that his memoirs of the Conference might have been signed by the Polish leader himself.³⁹

Lord brought all his energy to bear upon the question of Poland's territorial access to the sea, which had for so long excited the opposition of Wilson, who was obstinately set, as we have seen, upon the idea of internationalizing the Vistula and making a free port of Danzig. At the meeting of the Council of Four on March 17th a long discussion took place upon the fate of Danzig. After an obstinate battle, Wilson was obliged to give way, and on the morrow Colonel House gleefully announced by telephone to his friend Dmowski that Danzig would be given to Poland.⁴⁰

On the 19th Cambon read before the Council of Four the report of the Territorial Commission.

He recommended that the greater part of Posnania and of Upper Silesia should be given to Poland, leaving to Germany only the western portions of these provinces.

Poland was also to be given the western and central portions of West Prussia, together with the two banks of the lower Vistula and Danzig. Thus did the famous Polish Corridor originate.

We shall see later ⁴¹ the reasons given by the Commission. Ethnographical considerations held an important place in them, but the Commission had suggested a very much wider Corridor than was justified by ethnographical data, even admitting that the Polish claims were based on sound premises. The suggested Corridor was to include the city and

territory of Danzig, although its 300,000 inhabitants were indisputably German, and also the district of Marienwerder on the right bank of the Vistula.

Danzig, according to the report, was the natural port of Poland, and the only possible one; it must therefore be annexed. The district of Marienwerder (138,000 inhabitants) was necessary for the control of the lower Vistula and of the only direct railway-line between Danzig and Warsaw. There only remained to determine the fate of the district of Allenstein; and though the majority of the inhabitants in this province, according to the report, were Polish, they were of the Protestant faith, and it was highly doubtful whether they would willingly be reunited with Catholic Poland. The Commission therefore recommended a plebiscite.

Lloyd George thereupon intervened.

"Suddenly he changed from a state of bored indifference to one of aggressive participation. From that moment forward Lloyd George never relaxed his interest or his control. Sitting forward in his chair, and speaking in an earnest voice, he proceeded to tear the report to pieces, and the argument he employed wiped the smile from the faces and drove fear into the hearts of his listeners. 'Gentlemen,' he said, 'if we give Danzig to the Poles the Germans will not sign the Treaty, and if they do not sign, our work here is a failure. I assure you that Germany will not sign such a Treaty.' There ensued a silence that could be heard. Everyone was shocked, alarmed, convinced."⁴²

Mermeix gives, in the passage which we quoted in expounding the political theories of Lloyd George, a less sensational turn to the intervention of the English Premier, but one of more fundamental importance. It displays a moving appeal to international conscience,

to the sentiment of justice among nations and to the impartiality and tolerance of the conquerors, which should rise above the ephemeral interests of any individual negotiation, however important it might be. And Lloyd George immediately obtained a first result: the Supreme Council faced the possibility of having recourse to a plebiscite in the district of Marienwerder. Dmowski, in his *Memoirs*, shows that Lloyd George might with equal justice have asked for a plebiscite in the district of Soldau.⁴³

When to-day one reads over this stern report of the Territorial Commission—that Commission which, according to Lloyd George, “had so great a partiality for Poland”⁴⁴—one wonders how the Allies could bring themselves to consider so complete a dismemberment of Germany in the East, since even the fundamental tendencies of French policy together with Polish propaganda, able and well directed as it was, are not sufficient to give a satisfactory answer to this question. Another and yet more important cause, the abstention for the time being of Russia, whose rights the Allies wished to reserve, seems to have escaped the notice of historians up to date. The following curious passage occurs in Wickham Steed’s *Through Thirty Years*:

“The underlying idea of the proposed Danzig settlement recommended by the Council on March 19th⁴⁵ has been that, if the Conference stretched a point in order to satisfy a clear economic need of Poland, it would be the better able to insist upon a more moderate assessment of Polish claims to the east, and thus to prevent friction between the Poles and their eastern neighbours.”⁴⁶

One fact is worthy of notice: if this idea played any considerable part in the secret activities of the Terri-

torial Commission, it must be regarded as derived from Mr. Lloyd George, though it was taken from quite a different angle. Karl Friedrich Nowak, even if he has not succeeded in gauging the general importance of this problem in the progress of the work of the Conference, has nevertheless clearly perceived what part it played in the English Premier's diplomacy:

"Lloyd George saw nothing in the Poles but a rebel people whom he did not on any account wish to favour at the expense of the former Russian ally. He hoped that a day would come when the Bolsheviks would fall and when the old Russia, with whom one could treat, would reappear under one form or another."⁴⁷

On March 19th there was a bitter dispute. Wilson, with Clemenceau's support, tried to defend the point of view of the Territorial Commission, but Lloyd George was immovable. The Commission, however, did not hold itself beaten, and in a counter-proposition, presented on March 20th, demanded once more the pure and simple annexation to Poland of the district of Marienwerder.⁴⁸

The end of March and the beginning of April were truly critical moments in the history of the Conference. The French Press sided vigorously against Lloyd George, the Poles sent deputation on deputation "to make known to the Council the wishes of the population"; Paderecki made ready to leave Paris; finally, M. Tardieu, on Clemenceau's order, drew up a note intended to refute, point by point, Lloyd George's new conception. The latter had set out his principles in a memorandum entitled, "Some Considerations for the Use of the Peace Conference before the final Determination of its Conditions."⁴⁹

"Mr. Lloyd George, in his note," stated the French

reply,⁵⁰ "is apprehensive that if territorial conditions of too severe a nature are imposed on Germany they will lead the way to Bolshevism. Is it not to be feared that the method he suggests would have precisely this result?

"The Conference has decided to call into being a certain number of new States. Can it, without inflicting an injustice, sacrifice them by imposing unacceptable frontiers out of regard to Germany? If these people, notably the Bohemians and the Poles, have until now resisted Bolshevism it is because of their national sentiment. If we do violence to this sentiment Bolshevism will find them an easy prey, and the sole barrier which exists between Russian Bolshevism and German Bolshevism will be destroyed.

"The result will be either a confederation of Western and Central Europe, under the leadership of a Bolshevized Germany, or else the subjugation of these same countries to a Germany become reactionary by virtue of the general anarchy.

"In either case it would be the Allies who had lost the war.

"On the contrary, the policy of the French Government, with the support of all the liberal elements in Europe, is resolutely to assist these young nations and not to seek, at their expense, ameliorations (which anyhow would be futile) of the colonial, naval and commercial disintegration which peace has brought upon Germany.

"If, in giving to these young nations frontiers within which they can live, it is necessary to transfer to their sovereignty those Germans who are descendants of the men who had subjugated them, it may be regrettable, and it should be done with moderation, but it cannot be avoided.

“Furthermore, whereas all of Germany’s colonies are being once and for all taken from her because she ill-treated the natives, by what right can one refuse to grant natural frontiers to Poland or to Bohemia because Germans have taken up their residence on the soil as forerunners of Pan-German oppression?”

This note, which M. Nitti called “ironical”,⁵¹ infuriated Mr. Lloyd George. Without delay he answered:

“To judge by the memorandum, France does not seem to attach any importance to the wealthy German colonies of which she has taken possession in Africa. She attaches no importance to Syria, she attaches no importance either to the indemnities or to the compensations, although no great priority was granted to her with regard to the latter, as I had suggested in my memorandum. She also passes over the fact that Alsace-Lorraine possesses the majority of Germany’s iron mines and a large proportion of her sulphates. She attaches no importance to the promise that she shall receive a share of Germany’s ships in compensation for those which were sunk by submarines, or alternatively a certain number of German warships. She attaches no importance to the disarmament of Germany on sea and land. She attaches no importance to a British and American guarantee as to the inviolability of her territory. All these points are represented as of interest only to maritime nations which have not been subjected to invasion. What really interests France is that the Germans in Danzig should be given to Poland.”⁵²

The situation seemed to be at a deadlock, and President Wilson spoke of returning to America, when on April 5th the horizon cleared. Lloyd George and Wilson decided, after a long conversation, to turn

Danzig into a Free City. An agreement between France and America ensued, and alone the Silesian question remained in suspense. Lloyd George was not ignorant of the fact that Clemenceau had already been compelled to renounce his original idea of granting the whole of Silesia, including its capital, Breslau, to Poland, and he was prepared, when the time came, to resume the examination of the problem.

On May 7, 1919, the terms of peace were handed to the German plenipotentiaries.

On the 29th the German delegation sent to the Conference their "Remarks upon the Peace Conditions". Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau protested against the blow dealt at the integrity of German territories.

"From the territorial point of view the plan of the Allied Powers is contrary to justice and to principle, because it requires the annexation of territories purely German in character, and thus threatens to strangle that which goes to make the German nation.

"Upper Silesia, for example, has belonged to Germany since 1163. In the event of Germany acceding to these territorial losses, the cessions should at least be preceded by plebiscites, taken commune by commune."

The German Government protested against the allocation of Pomerania to Poland and to the creation of the Free City of Danzig:

"The Government of the Reich is prepared to give Poland free and assured access to the sea, to transform the ports of Danzig, Memel and Königsberg into free ports and to grant considerable rights to Poland within them. By a suitable arrangement, Poland might be guaranteed every facility for construction as well as for the use of the necessary equipment in the free ports (such as docks, quays, warehouses, etc.) . . ."

As soon as this note had been made known to the Allies, a second acute crisis broke out at the Conference between Lloyd George and Clemenceau.

"On all points,⁵³ disarmaments, occupation, reparations, Danzig, Upper Silesia, Mr. Lloyd George suggested unacceptable concessions, excused himself for putting them forward so late, and spoke of having to hold the House of Commons. . . ."

It will be remembered that according to the proposals made on May 7th, the whole of Upper Silesia was to pass into the hands of Poland. On June 2nd, Mr. Lloyd George once more reopened the question of this allocation, and the conflict which thereupon followed lasted through five sittings of the Conference. It is of such importance that we ask the reader to follow its course from day to day, as reported by Mermeix.⁵⁴

June 2, 1919.

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'All my colleagues say that Germany's eastern frontier will be unacceptable unless it is changed, and yet in the event of Germany refusing to sign, they are all agreed that coercive measures against her would not be thought justified by the country. And furthermore they are in agreement with our technical experts. They believe that, Upper Silesia not having formed part of Poland for six or seven hundred years, a plebiscite is absolutely indispensable. If the plebiscite is favourable to Poland, it will then be impossible for Germany to contemplate revenge.

" 'This is what would have happened in 1871 if a plebiscite in Germany's favour had taken place in Alsace-Lorraine. Besides, I am convinced that the plebiscite will be in Poland's favour.'

“CLEMENCEAU: ‘As regards Poland, there is first of all an historic crime to be redeemed, but there is also a barrier to be erected between Germany and Russia. You can read about M. Erzberger’s interviews: he demands that Poland should be as weak as possible, because she separates Germany from Russia. M. Erzberger adds that, when relations with Russia are once again established, Germany will be able to attack France under much more favourable conditions than in 1914.’”

It was thus on June 2nd that the suggestion of a plebiscite for Upper Silesia was first made by Mr. Lloyd George.

The discussion was continued on the following day.

June 3, 1919 (afternoon).

“WILSON: ‘The plebiscite in Upper Silesia appears to me difficult, for it will be necessary first of all to expel the German officials. A free and honest plebiscite is, according to our technical advisers, impossible of realization in a country which has for so long been under foreign domination and which will have before it the fear of reprisal so long as the Germans do not leave.’

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘And yet in 1907, in spite of this fear, the Poles were victorious in the elections; my own technical experts foretell a plebiscite in favour of Poland. They believe that such a plebiscite will prevent the Germans from advancing any claims later on.’

“WILSON: ‘There is not in Germany any body of opinion in favour of Upper Silesia; it is a matter of capitalistic interests.’

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘And yet it is the German Government, composed of a Socialist majority, which protests.’

“WILSON: ‘Yes, but on behalf of capitalism.’

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘I am not of your opinion; it is a national sentiment. Upper Silesia has been separated from Poland for seven hundred years; I am surely not making an excessive demand in asking that its inhabitants be allowed to vote.’”

The discussion then strayed from the point: means of assuring the freedom of the vote were examined, but the French Premier then questioned the very principle of a popular referendum.

“CLEMENCEAU: ‘We have given no undertaking that there should be a plebiscite in that region.’

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘It is Mr. Wilson who, on all occasions, has proclaimed the right of peoples to decide their own fate. We are holding plebiscites in the Saar in Fiume, in Klagenfurt; why refuse one to Silesia?’

“WILSON: ‘I am not abandoning any of my principles, but I do not wish the Poles to vote under pressure from Germany.’”

The debate once again strayed to a secondary matter, namely, the method of occupation of Upper Silesia by the Allies in view of the possible plebiscite.

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘I desire peace, and I know from a reliable source that the question of Silesia is the most important one to Germany. I prefer to send a division to Silesia than an army to Berlin.’

“CLEMENCEAU: ‘What makes you think that you will be given the choice?’

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘I do not want to re-enact the follies of Napoleon in Russia and to occupy Berlin as he occupied Moscow.’

“CLEMENCEAU: ‘It is a little late to say all this.’

“WILSON: ‘The question is whether our decision is

made according to the dictates of justice. If I can be shown to have made an ethnographical error I shall be ready to set it right, but the threat that Germany may refuse her signature leaves me indifferent. If the Germans really have something sound to say regarding Upper Silesia, I shall be willing to examine the matter.'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'It is not at all too late. The Treaty sent to the Germans on May 7th is not an ultimatum. We ought to listen to the Germans; my colleagues in the Government are of that opinion. The Germans are asking for nothing unjust when they ask that the inhabitants should be consulted. As to the freedom of the vote, that is our concern. If Germany opposes the application of a plebiscite favourable to Poland, the British Army will march to Berlin with enthusiasm. That is what I wish: I need to have the English people behind me if any fresh difficulties arise.' "

The discussion continued, in a rather confused manner, between Lloyd George and Wilson. The latter was beginning to give way when Clemenceau intervened.

"CLEMENCEAU: 'You say, Mr. Lloyd George, that you do not desire to go to Berlin. No more do I. If we have caused millions of soldiers to be killed, it was for the purpose of saving our existence. You say that you want to know the wishes of Upper Silesia, and I reply to you that, under the German rule, Upper Silesia will not be able to express itself freely, and that if placed under Inter-allied occupation the Germans will claim that the plebiscite has been falsified. You wish to appease racial passions, but you are going to excite them. There are cases where the simplest course and the wisest is just to say "No". We are convinced that we have made a just treaty; let us stand by it. The plebiscite and the occupation will bring quarrels in the future, perhaps

even battles—in a word, the very contrary of all that you desire. . . .’

“WILSON: ‘We stated, in laying down the foundations of the Peace, that all indisputably Polish provinces would be returned to Poland.’

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘And it is precisely this that the Germans deny to be the case in Upper Silesia.’

“CLEMENCEAU: ‘How so? You know very well that even German statistics show Upper Silesia to be Polish by a large majority.’

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘But there is not only the legal aspect, there is the question of sentiment, and I wish to know it.’

“WILSON: ‘What I maintain is that our decision regarding Upper Silesia is not contrary to the Fourteen Points.’

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘Which of us had thought of Upper Silesia until the reports of our experts had brought it to our notice?’

“CLEMENCEAU: ‘You are entirely mistaken; all the Poles, from the very beginning, have claimed Upper Silesia.’

“WILSON: ‘M. Clemenceau is right. When I received Dmowski and Paderewski in Washington, I questioned them at length, with the maps before us. Their claims were excessive, but we agreed upon the formula: “Give to Poland all territory inhabited by Poles.”’

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘I repeat that we never can have thought of giving to Poland a province which has not been Polish for nine hundred years.’

“CLEMENCEAU: ‘And I repeat to you that the claim for Upper Silesia has always been made by Poland and recognized by us as just.’

“WILSON: ‘We must come to a decision. We might

agree to a plebiscite conducted under the control of an Inter-allied Commission, and we should declare the plebiscite void if it came to the knowledge of the Commission that pressure has been exercised from any quarter.' ”

The experts then prepared a scheme upon this basis, in spite of the tenacious opposition of M. Clemenceau.

June 5, 1919 (morning).

Present: The Four and Paderewski, President of the Council of Polish Ministers.

“WILSON: (addressing Paderewski): ‘We are told that the important question for Germany is that of Upper Silesia. Our experts have prepared a Note which has been communicated to you, but before coming to a decision we wish for your advice. The main change suggested is the institution of a plebiscite.

“‘We know that the population is Polish by a large majority, but some of us believe that a plebiscite, held, of course, after the withdrawal of the German troops, would strengthen our decisions.’

“PADEREWSKI: ‘The text of the Treaty was justice itself. There are in Silesia two districts where the Poles are in a large majority, and one where the majority is German. The western portion, which is agricultural, is under the sway of the Catholic clergy, who are very dangerous from our point of view, and who influence the opinions of the peasantry. In the east the population is more self-conscious and more free, but if the eastern portion alone becomes Polish, all the industrial area will be near the line of the frontier.’ ”

Paderewski’s answer must hold our attention for a moment. For the purpose of showing an apparent impartiality, the President of the Polish Council

recognized two distinct ethnographical zones in Upper Silesia, and by implication admitted the strength and the importance of the German element. We know that this admission made a deep impression on Wilson, who was still hesitant, and in the end made him decide to accept the plebiscite. If Dmowski had answered instead of Paderewski, his decisive and trenchant affirmations might well have convinced the President of the United States. Paderewski had in reality, and quite unawares, committed a grave tactical error.

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'Which is the most thickly populated zone?'

"PADEREWSKI: 'The eastern one. In the mining district there are 900,000 Poles and 400,000 Germans. In the agricultural district there are 600,000 inhabitants. In its totality this is an indubitably Polish territory.'

"WILSON: 'The Germans themselves recognize that the population is Polish.'

"PADEREWSKI: 'Nevertheless they claim Upper Silesia.'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'If we speak of Silesia in its entirety and not only of Upper Silesia, it is in the majority German.'

"PADEREWSKI: 'Yes, but there were many people who spoke Polish in Breslau when I was there.'

"CLEMENCEAU: 'But as regards Upper Silesia, would you, after evacuation of the territory by German troops, accept a plebiscite? This is what we wish to learn from you.'

"PADEREWSKI: 'Such a change in the Treaty would compel my resignation, for the people, to whom Upper Silesia was promised by the terms of May 7th, would lose confidence.' "

This threat stirred Mr. Lloyd George to indignation. He burst out:

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'We have promised nothing at all. We have drawn up the plan of a treaty and we did not give it the form of an ultimatum. We reserved the right of examining the reply of the Germans and we therefore have the right to make concessions if they are reasonable in nature. How then? Only yesterday Poland was divided into three portions and your countrymen were fighting against each other, and all against the independence of their country; yet to-day, when you are sure of a rehabilitated Poland with 20,000,000 inhabitants, you ask in addition for non-Polish populations, as, for example, in Galicia; you ask this of us, you, whose liberty has been won by the 1,500,000 dead of France, the 800,000 dead of England, and the 500,000 dead of Italy. It is our blood which has bought your independence. If you rise against our decisions it will show that we have been mistaken about you.'

"PADEREWSKI: 'I confined myself to saying that I would be unable to remain in power.'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'We have given liberty to Poland, to Bohemia and to Jugo-Slavia, and these, then, are the countries which rebel against a plebiscite? They are much more imperialistic than the great nations themselves.'

"PADEREWSKI: 'I cannot admit what you say. You are merely reproducing impressions gathered from the Press.'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'I say that you wish to annex populations contrary to their wishes.'

"PADEREWSKI: 'Not in the least; we stand up for our countrymen when they are attacked.'

“CLEMENCEAU: ‘I should like to return to the question of the plebiscite. If it takes place after some time has elapsed, and if, until then, the district is occupied by American troops, do you think that the vote would be free and favourable to Poland?’”

“PADEREWSKI: ‘Doubtless, yes, for the eastern portion; but for the western, the triple influence of the land-owners, the officials and the clergy, would make the result a doubtful one.’”

It is scarcely necessary to emphasize the fundamental importance of Paderewski's last reply. If the President of the Polish Council opposed, with such passion, and sometimes with such clumsiness, the idea of a plebiscite in Upper Silesia, it was because he felt uncertain of the soundness of the Polish thesis. He foresaw “doubtful results”, that is to say a German success, in the western portion of the territory, and he admitted it. If the Allied negotiators had payed to Paderewski's statement all the attention which it deserved, they would have been able to foretell with certainty the result of the forthcoming plebiscite in Upper Silesia.

After listening to the President of the Polish Council, Wilson came round to Lloyd George's opinion, and a plebiscite for Upper Silesia was decided upon in principle.

On June 9th a short sitting of the Council of Four was devoted to the examination of the conditions under which the plebiscite was to be conducted, in spite of the fact that three of the experts were, in principle, opposed to this solution. The latter, as a consequence, had formulated impossible demands against which Lloyd George was forced to protest in the name of common sense and reason.

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘The report of the experts contains

proposals which are not acceptable, for instance, that of expelling all the clergy! The Commission which goes to Silesia must be free in making its decisions.'

"CLEMENCEAU: 'I admit that it is perhaps difficult to expel all the clergy; you cannot, however, fail to know that its influence in Germany's favour will be considerable.'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'Just as in Ireland, and yet in spite of that we do not expel the Irish clergy. The plebiscite will take from the Germans any excuse for fighting . . . if it is granted, together with concessions regarding the partitions, the Germans will sign.'"

The afternoon of June 11th was devoted by the Council of Four to a hearing of the Commission for Polish Affairs.

"CLEMENCEAU: 'Would you like to hear the Commission for Polish Affairs?'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'This Commission is very partial to Poland. I do not wish to discuss Poland with it.'

"CLEMENCEAU: 'We shall only discuss among ourselves, but we must first of all hear the Commission, question it and listen to what it has to say. I wish to state once again that I am opposed to the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. But since you are agreed to it in principle, I fall in with you out of a spirit of conciliation; but I cannot forget that wherever the people have elected Polish deputies, the plebiscite will be useless.'

"WILSON: 'We might indeed discuss its limitation. I must add that my colleague, Mr. White, has also informed me of the pro-German influence of the Polish clergy.'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'I wager that that information is of Polish origin. Look at what the Poles say about the Jews: they claim that they treat them in the best

possible way, and everyone knows it to be untrue. The plebiscite is a just measure. Without a plebiscite we should not have a clear conscience if we had to send British troops to give their lives for Upper Silesia. A plebiscite timed a few months ahead, or an Inter-allied occupation, would provide a free election.' ”

Following a vehement protest by President Wilson, some sharp words were exchanged by the English and American representatives.

“LLOYD GEORGE (*continuing*) : ‘You know that my sole object is not to give to Poland territories which are not Polish ; if we did such a thing we could not fight for the purpose of assuring her these territories.’ ”

“WILSON : ‘I am sorry to have provoked such strong feeling in you ; it is, moreover, beyond question that you have never changed your opinion in this respect.’ ”

“LLOYD GEORGE : ‘I wish to avoid any conflict. The Germans in Upper Silesia hold the Poles to be an inferior people whom they despise. To place Germans under Polish sovereignty is to provoke trouble.’ ”

The debate continued rather confusedly, without making progress, until the arrival of the experts : Jules Cambon, General Le Rond, Norley and Lord.

“WILSON : ‘On what points are the experts in agreement, and on which are they in disagreement?’ ”

“GENERAL LE ROND : ‘We are in agreement on the territorial question, the question of coal and on the financial clauses, and we disagree upon the question of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. President Wilson asked us, two days ago, to draw up two plans, one for a plebiscite to be held shortly, the other for a plebiscite at a later date. The Poles in Upper Silesia are not free ; the large landowners are masters of the soil ; they are real feudal lords, more powerful than those of the

thirteenth century, for they own not only the land, but also the riches underground, the factories and the capital.'

"CLEMENCEAU: 'The Bishop of Breslau is notably one of these great landowners.'

"GENERAL LE ROND: 'I will speak of him presently. The great landowners hold the country as in a net, and especially the clergy; the Bishop of Breslau is particularly powerful. Since the Armistice the Polish priests have been sent away; the Germans prevent the Polish papers from being published, and it is being said that if Upper Silesia becomes Polish the money in the Savings Banks will disappear.

" 'The general opinion of the experts is that serious precautions need to be taken. The majority of the experts believe that this will require a fairly long delay, say one or two years.'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'I accept this.'

"GENERAL LE ROND: 'Of eight electoral divisions in Upper Silesia, five were represented in the Reichstag by Poles.'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'And do these Poles claim their independence?'

"LORD: 'They were not able to under the German régime.'

"WILSON: 'There was a party strongly favourable to Poland in Upper Silesia. . . .'

"GENERAL LE ROND: 'Yes.'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'I think it is useless to think of an immediate plebiscite.'

"GENERAL LE ROND: 'I am about to speak of the preparations for the plebiscite. If the plebiscite is only conducted after a fairly long delay, it will be necessary to give increased powers to the Commission.'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'For my part, the question seems settled.'

"GENERAL LE ROND: 'Who will decide the date of the plebiscite—the Powers or the League of Nations?'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'I should accept either solution.'

"WILSON: 'Can you give us any information as to the Polish party in Upper Silesia?'

"LORD: 'There are two of them; one Socialist and one that is not, but both of them are working for Polish unity.'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'But is it not the same as in Ireland or in Wales: loyalty to the idea of nationality, but never, until recent times, even in Ireland, any serious thought of secession?'

"LORD: 'Secession was not on their programme probably because it was not thought possible in the actual state of Europe.'

"GENERAL LE ROND: 'Since the war the movement in Poland's favour has been very active in the whole of Upper Silesia.'

"LLOYD GEORGE: 'I do not deny it; what I do not know is the strength of the general feeling.'"

(The experts then retired.)

"WILSON: 'I consider that we must support the plebiscite, and that it should be held at least one, and not more than two, years hence. Mr. Lord has heard from an American who has been to the country that all classes of the population desire a plebiscite, and yet Mr. Lord is opposed to the plebiscite.'

"CLEMENCEAU: 'I have nothing to add to what I have said, and I continue in the belief that the plebiscite is a mistake. Since I am alone in this opinion, I must bow to you, but I think none the less that we are

heading for great difficulties in Upper Silesia, and that a quick decision would have been better.'"

The Council then approved a scheme concerning the determination of the powers of the Plebiscite Commission.

Dmowski and Paderewski were summoned to the morning session of June 14th.

"WILSON: 'We have decided to have recourse to a plebiscite so as to remove the least pretext for future imperialistic action on the part of Germany. The Germans recognize that the population is Polish in the majority, but they deny that it desires to be united to Poland. M. Paderewski has distinguished between two zones, that of the mines in the east, where the result of the plebiscite seems not to be in doubt, and the agricultural region in the West, where the result is uncertain.⁵⁵ This fact must be kept in mind. We have thus decided:

" '1. That the plebiscite shall take place commune by commune.

" '2. That it shall be postponed so that German influence may be eliminated.

" '3. That German troops shall immediately evacuate Upper Silesia.'

"PADEREWSKI: 'I cannot pretend that this is not a cruel blow, for we had been promised Upper Silesia. If the plebiscite should prove unfavourable to us, it will be the peasant and the workman who suffer. As to the interim which you have prescribed, it will create an undesirable tension; the plebiscite should not be postponed for more than six months at the maximum. Our delegation accepts your decision with the respect due to you, but not without profound regret.'

“WILSON: ‘Your words have moved me deeply, and I have experienced many doubts and scruples of conscience.’

“CLEMENCEAU: ‘You know that my opinion has never varied.’

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘I also have been much moved by M. Paderewski’s speeches; we have pondered these matters at length, but I am certain that, as regards the mining region, Poland has nothing to fear from a plebiscite.’

“WILSON: ‘An American who has been there tells me that union with Poland is the wish of all and that the result will be favourable.’

“DMOWSKI:⁵⁶ ‘I am convinced that the plebiscite will yield good results in the main. I know the German argument very well. The Germans declare that the population does not wish to be Polish, and I admit that fifty years ago it was no longer Polish save in language; but during the last half-century a great awakening has taken place. This might even create difficulties if the districts which hesitate to vote for Poland in 1919 should later rise against the German régime. What, then, would be the action of the Great Powers?’

“WILSON: ‘It is one of the essential functions of the League of Nations to treat of such questions.’

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘Certainly. We cannot settle everything at once, but there will be a permanent body for making adjustments.’”

The Polish delegates withdrew after having asked further questions of secondary importance.

“LLOYD GEORGE: ‘All the partisans of Poland have asked us that the plebiscite should be delayed, and here are the Polish delegates themselves asking that it shall be held as soon as possible.’

“WILSON: ‘I should have thought that a delay of one or two years would have been a guarantee for Poland.’

“CLEMENCEAU: ‘Possibly; but M. Paderewski told you that there is a risk that the interim will send the whole world mad.’

“WILSON: ‘We must take what he says into account and pass a resolution which allows the period of delay before the plebiscite to be abridged if necessary. I suggest we say from six to eighteen months.’”

(The proposal was then adopted.)

In this manner the problem of Upper Silesia was solved. The Peace was signed under the terms which are known, on June 28, 1919. On the 21st and 23rd the German Government had sent the following protest against the cession, without a plebiscite, of the eastern territories:

“In the face of the attitude of the Allied and Associated Governments, there is left to the German people no other course but to appeal to the inalienable right of everyone to independent existence, a right which belongs to the German people as to all other peoples. It can hope for no help save from the conscience of humanity. No nation, even amongst the Allied and Associated Powers, can expect the German people to accept, with inner conviction, peace-terms which must detach vital members from the body-corporate of Germany without any consultation of the populations involved.”

AFTER VERSAILLES

I

DANZIG, THE POLISH CORRIDOR AND THE FRONTIER OF THE VISTULA

UNTIL now we have recorded events in their chronological order. We shall now study separately, in the next two sections, the consequences and the application of the Peace Treaty as regards Danzig, the Polish Corridor and the frontier of the Vistula in the North and Upper Silesia in the South.

Two plebiscites were to be held in West and East Prussia: one for the district of Allenstein (East Prussia), the other for that of Marienwerder (West Prussia). They took place simultaneously, on July 11, 1920, under the control of the Inter-allied Commissions which had been on the spot since the month of February. Rennie, the English Minister, presided over the plebiscite of Allenstein; the Italian general, Pavia, over that of Marienwerder.

DISTRICT OF ALLENSTEIN: 371,083.

				Votes	Per Cent.
For Germany	363,159	97·5
For Poland	7,924	2·5

DISTRICT OF MARIENWERDER: 104,842.

				Votes	Per Cent.
For Germany	96,895	92·8
For Poland	7,947	7·2

The decision of the Council of Ambassadors concerning the region of Allenstein was made public on August 15, 1920. East Prussia would lose only three

Ambassadors based its decision on Para. 4 of Article 97 of the Treaty of Versailles, which ran as follows :

"The delimitation of the frontier in this region must be so effected as to leave in any case to Poland for the whole of the section bordering on the Vistula full and complete control of the river including the east bank as far east of the river as may be necessary for its regulation and improvement."

The German Government protested against this annexation on August 14, 1920. Poland's right to control the river (a right defined by the Treaty of Versailles) did not, according to the German Note, extend to the territories situated on the eastern bank of the river, which, in spite of the clearly expressed will of the inhabitants, were now being detached from the Reich. Control of the river did not of necessity imply a further cession of territory.

This protest remained without effect.

Paragraph 5 of Article 97 of the Treaty of Versailles nevertheless guaranteed free access to the Vistula to the populations of East Prussia, and undertook: "To draw up regulations for assuring to the population of East Prussia to the fullest extent and under equitable conditions access to the Vistula and the use of it for themselves, their commerce and their boats."

The new frontier was fixed by an Inter-allied Commission on August 27, 1921, and the result of its work was confirmed more than a year later by the Council of Ambassadors, on December 19, 1922. As Germany and Poland could not agree on the ordinances concerning the access of the population of East Prussia to the Vistula, the Council of Ambassadors, on November 21, 1924, took a decision on the subject, which came into effect on February 1, 1925.

The Peace Treaty intended that East Prussia should not be separated by the line of the future frontier, from her ancient arterial river, the Vistula. The letter of the Treaty was respected. East Prussia has access to the river at Kurzebrack over a length of four metres, but she does not own the port of Kurzebrack, which has become Polish; moreover, the frontier is drawn some metres from the river-bank, which has remained Polish, while a Polish Customs-house and control station compels those who cross the boundary to be in possession of a passport bearing the visa of the Polish authorities of Dirschau (Tczew). All this renders the guarantee of the Treaty of Versailles practically a dead-letter.

THE REGULATION OF TRAFFIC PASSING BETWEEN GERMANY AND EAST PRUSSIA THROUGH THE POLISH CORRIDOR

Article 89 of the Treaty of Versailles establishes the principle of "Freedom of Transit" for traffic between Germany and East Prussia.

"Poland undertakes to accord freedom of transit to persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails in transit between East Prussia and the rest of Germany over Polish territory, including territorial waters, and to treat them at least as favourably as the persons, goods, vessels, carriages, wagons and mails respectively of Polish or of any other more favoured nationality, origin, importation, starting-point or ownership as regards facilities, restrictions and all other matters.

"Goods in transit shall be exempt from all Customs or similar duties.

"Freedom of transit will extend to telegraphic and

telephonic services under the conditions laid down by the conventions referred to in Article 98."

This Article defined the specific claims which were to serve as basis to the Germano-Polish Convention for the regulation of communications:

(a) Between Germany and East Prussia via the territory ceded to Poland and via the Free City of Danzig;

(b) Between Poland and the Free City of Danzig through East Prussia, along the right bank of the Vistula.

We have already stated a few of the addenda to these arrangements. Here is the main text of the agreement:

"Germany and Poland undertake, within one year of the coming into force of this Treaty, to enter into Conventions of which the terms, in case of difference, shall be settled by the Council of the League of Nations, with the object of securing, on the one hand, to Germany full and adequate railroad, telegraphic and telephonic facilities for communication between the rest of Germany and East Prussia over the intervening Polish territory, and on the other hand to Poland full and adequate railroad, telegraphic and telephonic facilities for communication between Poland and the Free City of Danzig over any German territory that may, on the right bank of the Vistula, intervene between Poland and the Free City of Danzig."

On February 23, 1920, the Polish and the German Governments entered into negotiations to give effect to the principle of "Freedom of Transit", which had been established by Article 89 and those contained in the conclusion of the "Convention" mentioned in Article 98 of the Treaty of Versailles.

The negotiations were broken off in March 1920 by the Polish delegation. They were resumed on April 12, 1920, in Paris. Later on the Council of Ambassadors appointed a French expert, M. Leverve, to help the two parties towards agreement upon the technical questions, and the Commission diligently pursued its work from November 22nd until February 1921, when the Convention was finally established.

It is not our intention to quote it at full length: it is desirable, however, that we should draw attention to those essential points in it which we believe form the only serious basis upon which an impartial study of the consequences of the Polish Corridor may be built.

The Convention started with this principle, that alone Germany's economic needs and her necessities with regard to means of communication should determine the importance and the extent of the transit.

In the event of war, the arrangements contained in the Convention were to lapse *ipso jure*.

Traffic, being subjected to Polish law, particularly where public security was concerned, was not to enjoy the privilege of extra-territoriality.

Communications by rail were to include, in principle, "privileged transit" and "ordinary transit" (Article 4).

The first of these was to be conducted along very clearly determined lines (Article 23), and in time of peace was to be free of all passport and Customs formalities. In time of war the privileged transit was to cease. German nationals were to be provided with identity cards, and those coming from other countries with passports bearing a Polish visa. Passengers were to be prohibited from alighting from trains *en route* or

during halts in stations, and from giving or receiving anything through the windows.

Neither goods nor passenger traffic was to be subject to Customs duties.

"Ordinary traffic" was to enjoy no special privileges. Travellers of German nationality were to be provided with an identity card bearing the Polish visa. Goods traffic was not to be subject to duty, but was to be subject to Customs formalities (a Customs guarantee by application of a seal or against security).

The transport of German postal matter was to be effected in German rolling-stock. This rolling-stock and its German personnel were to be accompanied by Polish officials.

In return for payment, Poland was to put a certain number of telephonic and telegraphic lines at Germany's disposal.

THE FREE STATE OF DANZIG

The Free City was constituted on November 15, 1920, by virtue of a further declaration, dated October 27th of the same year, and signed by England, France, Italy and Japan as an addendum to Article 102 of the Treaty of Versailles. An important convention had been signed in Paris on November 9, 1920, between Poland and Danzig.

Let us recapitulate the chief points of these diplomatic enactments:

1. Danzig to be a Free City under the protection of the League of Nations.

2. Danzig to fall within the Customs frontier of Poland. (This incorporation took place on January 1, 1922.)

3. Poland to control the external relations of Danzig and to be entrusted with its representation abroad.

4. The railway system and the control of this system to be in the hands of Poland.

5. The Polish Government to be authorized to establish in the port of Danzig postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications with Poland on the one hand, and with foreign countries on the other.

6. The Free City of Danzig to have its own constitution, to be drawn up in agreement with the High Commissioner of the League of Nations, who would reside in Danzig, where he would carry out his duties and act as judge, in the first instance, in litigation between Poland and the Free City.

7. The Polish minority in Danzig to be afforded the same protection as the foreign minorities in Poland.

8. The control and the exploitation of the port of Danzig, of the Vistula within the borders of Danzig, of the canals and of those buildings in the port which formerly belonged to the Reich or to Prussia, to be vested in a mixed Polish-Danzig Commission named 'The Council of the Port and Waterways of Danzig'. The Council, composed of Danzig officials representing the Free City, is to assure the "free and full use of the port and of the means of communication specified in Article 20, without restriction, and to the extent required". The Council to have a chairman of Swiss nationality, appointed by the League of Nations, which chairman is to have the casting vote in the event of disagreement.

The difficulties between Poland and Danzig have been innumerable, particularly during the first five years following the signing of the Treaty.

The establishment of a Polish munition depot on the beach of Westerplatte, for instance, is still fresh in our memories. Permission for this had been accorded to Poland only provisionally, pending the completion of a new Polish port at Gdynia (Gdingen). The Polish port was to be completed in 1930; but to avoid having to evacuate the Westerplatte, Poland lodged a request with the League of Nations for the recognition of its extra-territoriality, and for the right to retain possession of it. The ensuing dispute has lasted for almost ten years.

If Poland's request is granted in Geneva, the extra-territoriality accorded to the Westerplatte will enable Poland definitely and legally to maintain her fleet there. In this event the Westerplatte would become a naval and military base. Danzig seems unwilling to accept this solution with a good grace, and here again the dispute remains unsettled. We do not intend to make a complete study of the question. Let us point out, however, that in international law all the Powers are entitled to use Danzig as a port of call for warships, which may stay there for twenty-four hours, but that no fleet is authorized to remain there.

The railway administration has been another source of much litigation.

The railways of Danzig, except those of purely local importance, are controlled by Poland, who has established two organizations: the one, as is to be expected, for the lines of the Free State territory, the other for those of Pomerania (the Polish Corridor); but Danzig having protested against the latter, the High Commissioner of the League of Nations decided to abolish it. Poland appealed to Geneva, but the Council of the League of Nations confirmed the

decision of the High Commissioner. Nevertheless, in spite of the decision of the Council of the League of Nations, the Polish organization for the railways of Pomerania continues to function at Danzig. The conflict remains unresolved.

The postal services—the famous dispute over the Polish letter-boxes will be recalled!—the schools, the harbour administration, the question of the Customs, the position of foreigners, in a word—everything, has formed a pretext for discussion and for appeals to Geneva.

We shall, however, return to these matters later.⁵⁷

UPPER SILESIA

DMOWSKI's last words to the Council of Four, spoken on June 14, 1919, when he had been informed of the Allies' irrevocable decision to call upon Upper Silesia to express its will by means of a plebiscite, deserve to be recalled and remembered.

"I am convinced", he had said, "that the plebiscite will yield good results in the main. I know the German argument very well. The Germans declare that the population does not wish to be Polish, and I admit that fifty years ago it was no longer Polish save in language; but during the last half-century a great awakening has taken place. *This might even create difficulties if districts which hesitate to vote for Poland in 1919 should later rise against the German régime. What, then, would be the action of the Great Powers?*"

Wilson had answered: "It is one of the chief functions of the League of Nations to deal with such questions."⁵⁸

Dmowski's conclusion and Wilson's reply might serve as epigraph to the story of the Upper Silesian plebiscite.

This important declaration by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs also proves that, as early as June 1919, Polish statesmen, whose illusions on the result of the plebiscite were fewer than Wilson's, were already thinking out means of correcting the result by an uprising which would bring the Great Powers face to face with a *fait accompli*. Wilson's weak reply and his ineffectual allusion to a League of Nations which was powerless were well calculated to confirm them in their resolution. The explanation of another fact, which the negotiators did not understand, with the exception

perhaps of Clemenceau, follows as a consequence—namely, the Polish attitude over the date of the plebiscite, at which Lloyd George had expressed surprise:

“All the partisans of Poland have asked us that the plebiscite should be delayed, and here are the Polish delegates themselves asking that it shall be held as soon as possible.”

Wilson insisted: “I should have thought that a delay of one or two years would have been a guarantee for Poland.”⁵⁹

If a rising was desirable, it had, in order to have the greatest chance of success, to take place as soon as possible, during the troublous post-war period; Germany must not be allowed time to recover and to emerge from the domestic disturbances into which anarchy had plunged her after her military defeat: time would work for her, and it was necessary for the Poles to hasten. Dmowski, that incomparable politician, had the merit of understanding the situation right away, and of adopting without delay the tactics which would be the most efficacious *ad majorem Poloniae gloriam*. From the moral viewpoint, from the human viewpoint of absolute justice, we may condemn this political realism which is near neighbour to cynicism; but the cleverness and the far-sightedness of the manœuvre is really worthy of the greatest statesmen known to contemporary Europe.

The actual realization of this plan, however, was not very glorious.

As early as the month of August 1918 the Poles had constituted a “Polish Supreme National Council” for Upper Silesia, of which the headquarters were in Beuthen. This committee, which was charged with the organization of propaganda in the coveted terri-

tories, was in close contact with Posen, Cracow and Warsaw. In April 1919 it published a "Protest against the German Government made in the name of the Two Million Poles inhabiting Upper Silesia".

Polish secret societies sprang up everywhere; they had armed and munitioned themselves cheaply enough during the dark days of the German *débâcle*, when the vanquished troops gave up their rifles and their cartridges for a piece of bread.

On April 4, 1919, the Polish Supreme National Council of Upper Silesia got into touch with Korfanty. Adalbert Korfanty, a former journalist and a popular leader, was the man of action for whom Dmowski was looking to prepare and organize the rising. He was to be helped in his task by Mgr. Adamski, at that time Bishop of Posen, and by Major Dombor-Musnicki, who had already fomented the great rising in Russian Poland. This officer was charged with superintending the supply of arms and munitions to the rebels, and with keeping open communications with Poland. Haller's army, come from France after having crossed Germany, would at the proper moment, if needs be, support the insurrectionary movement.

On May 1, 1919, the Polish secret societies took stock of themselves. They went into the streets, formed into processions and demonstrated their patriotic sentiments by pursuing the Germans. The Terror had begun.

The decision of the Council of Four was destined to hasten the preparation of the *coup de main*. A Polish High Command, a veritable revolutionary General Staff, composed of 243 officers and non-commissioned officers, took up its position at Sosnowice, three kilometres from the German frontier. It was composed of

nine independent sections, to each of which was assigned a different field of activity, the sections corresponding to the nine districts of the plebiscite area, which at the end of 1920 was itself subdivided into 74 revolutionary sub-sections.

In each of these sub-sections shock troops and companies of machine-gunners were armed and trained. The District Commandants met every fortnight at Beuthen. Their work was to compile "black lists" for the elimination, at the right time, of the most active German elements and to prepare a plan for the occupation of all industrial establishments.

On June 1, 1919, 7,124 men were numbered in these secret organizations. (The Circle of Pless, 1,018 men; of Kattowitz, 1,497; of Beuthen and of Tarnowitz, 3,397; of Hindenburg, 1,212.) They consisted of one infantry regiment of four battalions (5,000 men), of four companies of shock-troops and four machine-gun companies of 110 men apiece. During the following month three detachments of Regulars and three of Reserve, whose strength is not known to us, were attached to the base of operations. Finally, Haller's army put 2,000 men at the disposal of the High Command; 1,000 were already in the plebiscite area and 1,000 were ready to enter it. At the beginning of July an official Polish document enumerates 11,000 men, 10,000 rifles, 15,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 10,000 hand-grenades and 500 revolvers.

The first uprising had been arranged for Sunday, June 22, 1919, at ten o'clock in the evening. The order for it bore the signatures of M. Sigismund Psarski and M. Joseph Dreysa, who directed operations from Sosnowice. But on the night of June 19th General Haller announced by telegram that his army would

be unable to take part in the movement. Korfanty, who was in Posen at the time, went to Sosnowice by aeroplane, and the order given was postponed.

But the counter-order was not received in time by the commandants of the districts of Kozel, Kreuzburg and Rosenberg, and they launched an attack which was soon repulsed by the Germans.

The Poles used the delay which they had obtained in strengthening their organization; their forces were doubled and reached 20,000 men. A vast campaign of agitation was undertaken among the working classes, and it resulted, on August 11, 1919, in the proclamation of a general strike in Upper Silesia.

The real uprising started on August 17th, at two o'clock in the morning. It was destined to unsuccess, for Haller's army did not intervene. The rebel High Command quickly became discouraged and fled to Sosnowice, but fierce fighting nevertheless took place at Tarnowitz and at Pless. The defeated rebels retreated over the frontier in disorder and joined Haller's army; on August 26th the Germans were masters of the situation. In preparation for revenge and to preserve their influence in Upper Silesia the rebels founded a newspaper in Sosnowice, named the *Poswstaniec, Pismo uchodzców gornoslaskich* (*The Rebel, Organ of the Refugees of Upper Silesia*).

The Entente, however, began to take action. On August 24, 1919, after the first uprising, it sent over an Inter-allied Commission, presided over by the French general, Dupont.

The first French troops of occupation arrived in Upper Silesia on January 27, 1920. On February 11th the Plebiscite Commission, composed of General Le Rond, France (Chairman), Major Percival (England),

and General Marinis (Italy) took in hand the administration of the plebiscite area. Meanwhile, the Polish Government appointed Korfanty to be Polish Commissioner for the Plebiscite, and he immediately took up residence in Beuthen. Dr. Urbanek had been appointed German Commissioner, and he appealed to the population to keep calm, in a proclamation which was full of wisdom and moderation. Korfanty promptly answered it by an inflammatory proclamation, of which the Chauvinism and the expressions of hatred sadly recall the literature of civil wars. Prussia was represented in it as Poland's everlasting enemy, an envious, jealous, cruel enemy, and *agents provocateurs* were referred to. Korfanty described the "officials of the Entente and their troops" as the friends of Poland, and apparently wished to use them as a cloak for his most audacious plans.

It must unfortunately be recognized, in all impartiality, that the appearance of French troops in Upper Silesia allowed free play to the most unscrupulous Polish propaganda concerning the choice of a policy. This is explicitly stated by one of the most important of the rebel leaders.⁶⁰

This propaganda was openly conducted from the headquarters of the Polish Plebiscite, which had been opened in Beuthen. Korfanty adopted the policy of reviving the secret organizations which had already been established in the districts before the first uprising; he reorganized them, armed them, and evolved a plan of mobilization. He recommended "illegal work", to use his own phrase; advocated the creation of secret stores of arms, munitions and explosives, and, in short, prepared for civil war in all its particulars.⁶¹

On May 3, 1920, the Poles in Upper Silesia decided

to celebrate their national festival with great pomp and circumstance; as the day fell on a Monday, the ceremonies were put forward to Sunday. Polish propaganda had organized demonstrations and processions, which in all the large towns ended in bloodshed in affrays with the German elements of the population. The Poles then incited the miners to a two-day strike of protest. The disturbances continued for the whole of the month, and were particularly serious at Beuthen (May 27th and 28th). In the month of August fresh disorders brought the Poles and the Germans of Kattowitz into conflict for five days, from the 14th to the 19th. These regrettable incidents resulted in many casualties.

The second rising broke out during the night of August 19 to 20, 1920. It had been methodically prepared by the High Command of the Polish rebels, which had established its base of operations in Eichenau, a small town of the district of Kattowitz.

The movement started on the 19th in the eastern portion of Upper Silcsia, and reached the west of the province on the 20th. Armed bands from Poland crossed the frontier and occupied Rodzin, Bogutschütz and Myslowitz. The German police guarding the district were insufficient in numbers, and were obliged to retire. On August 21st and 22nd the rebellion made fresh progress, and spread to the districts of Tarnowitz, Beuthen, Hindenburg and over half of Pless. The rebels everywhere formed bodies of Polish militia, which disarmed the local police and fossicked into everything, stealing and pillaging under pretext of a search for hidden arms, and terrorizing the German population. The whole of the district of Rybnik fell into the power of these bands.

It was their last success. The Germans counter-attacked; the struggle was particularly severe in the districts occupied by the French—the districts occupied by the Italian troops not having been touched by the insurrection—and on August 26th Korfanty was obliged to abandon his attempt.

The secret organizations which he had built up nevertheless continued to exist until the plebiscite. Their activities, as one may well imagine, did not lessen as the decisive day approached. The authorities in charge of the occupation closed their eyes to acts of terrorism, but since then very complete records of them have been drawn up. Acts of violence and outrages of all kinds against the life and property of German subjects were especially numerous, before the plebiscite, in the regions where a Polish majority was recorded on the day of the poll. It is not necessary to insist further upon these painful details.

The plebiscite took place on March 12, 1921. 1,186,758 electors took part in the voting.

707,393 voted for Germany.

479,365 voted for Poland.

These figures are eloquent in view of all the previous events.

"All the violences in Upper Silcsia to prevent the plebiscite going in favour of Germany", says M. Nitti,⁶² "were not only tolerated, but prepared far ahead.

"When I was head of the Italian Government in Rome, von Herf (the representative of the German Government) gave documentary evidence on what was being prepared, and on April 30, 1920, in an audience which I gave him as head of the Council, he furnished me with proofs of what was the Polish

organization, what were its objects and the source of its funds.

"As everyone knows, the plebiscite of March 20, 1921, in spite of the violence and notwithstanding the officially protected brigandage, resulted favourably to Germany. . . . The 664 richest, most prosperous and most populous communes gave a majority for the Germans, 597 gave a majority for Poland. The territory of Upper Silesia, according to the Treaty, according to the plebiscite, according to the most elementary international honesty, should be immediately handed over to Germany."

This was the point of view adopted by Mr. Lloyd George, by the English Liberal Press, and by American public opinion. But let us again hear M. Nitti.⁶³

"Instead of accepting, as was the first duty, the result of the plebiscite, people have resorted to sophism of incomparable weakness: Article 88 of the Treaty of Versailles says only that the inhabitants of Upper Silesia shall be called to designate by means of a plebiscite if they desire to be united to Germany or to Poland.

"It was necessary to find a sophism!

"The Addendum of Section 8 establishes how the work of scrutiny shall be carried out and all the procedure of the elections. There are six articles of procedure. Paragraph 4 says that each one shall vote in the commune where he is domiciled or in that where he was born if he has not a domicile in the territory. The result of the vote shall be determined commune by commune, according to the majority of votes in each commune.

"This means that the results of voting, as is done in political questions in all countries, should be controlled

commune by commune: it is the form of scrutiny which the appendix defines. Instead, in order to take the coal away from Germany, it was attempted, and is still being attempted, not to apply the Treaty, but to violate the principle of the indivisibility of the territory and to give the mining districts to Poland."

On the very morrow of the plebiscite the idea of dividing Upper Silesia was mooted. But this conception was so new and so unexpected that it had little chance of being accepted. A *fait accompli* was to cut this Gordian knot. On May 2, 1921, the third insurrection, fomented by Korfanty, broke out in Upper Silesia.

On May 1, 1921, Korfanty's newspaper, the *Oberschlesische Grenzzeitung*, spread the most alarming rumours on the future of Upper Silesia, and this was the signal for the third Polish insurrection.

Let us, while on this matter, correct an historical error which is made only too commonly. The President of the French Council, in his Note addressed to the German Government on May 7, 1921, declared that the disturbances in Upper Silesia were attributable to false information originating from Germany. But the rumours to which he referred had in fact been spread abroad by Korfanty's newspaper.

On May 2nd a strike was begun by the Polish miners, who immediately came into conflict with their German fellow-workers. Disturbances broke out everywhere, and reinforcements from Poland occupied all important points. These forces were assisted by Haller's army and the Polish members of the "Apo" (the Plebiscite Police which had been formed by the Inter-allied Commission after the second Polish rising). The French troops of occupation remained passive; the one company which was stationed

in Beuthen, where the rising was to have broken out, was withdrawn, and General Le Rond, having found it necessary, a few days before the decisive events, to go on an urgent official journey, disappeared from the scene. On the other hand the small detachments of Italian troops which were distributed over the invaded area put up a brave resistance, and only withdrew after having suffered heavy losses, over thirty being killed.

Within twenty-four hours the insurrection had triumphed.

The rebels had considerable resources, for Poland had placed at Korfanty's disposal volunteers recruited from the schools, the universities, and from the masses of the unemployed. Moreover, Regular troops invaded the plebiscite area.

Four companies of the 28th Infantry Regiment arrived in Lublinitz by rail; one company of the 16th Infantry Regiment made its appearance in the canton of Rosenberg; a detachment of 250 cavalry of the 15th Uhlans moved into action in the district of Gross Strelitz, and near Praschka 600 men of the Regular Army entered the plebiscite territory in close formation, having previously removed their national badges. The following is a list of the units of the Polish Regular Army which took part in the movement:

Infantry: Detachments from the 27th, 42nd, 58th, 67th, 73rd and 155th Regiments.

Cavalry: the 15th Uhlans.

The 5th and 14th battalions of Frontier Guards.

On May 11, 1921, the Council of Ambassadors drew Poland's attention to the fact that her frontier was not

closed in the Upper Silesian district, which allowed the rebels to be supplied with war materials of every kind.

Meanwhile, an appalling reign of terror was in existence. Murders increased in numbers; the Germans were tortured, mutilated, put to death and the corpses defiled; villages and châteaux were pillaged, burnt or blown up. The German Government has published on the subject a series of White Papers, illustrated by photographs, which the reader of fine sensibilities would do well not to open. The scenes which have thus been perpetuated pictorially surpass in horror the worst imaginable atrocities.⁶⁴

The Polish rebellion was destined to produce fresh international complications.

As early as May 13, 1921, Lloyd George intervened firmly in the House of Commons.

"From the historical point of view", he said, "Poland has no right to Upper Silesia. The only reason which allows her to claim Upper Silesia is that it includes a large Polish population, whose comparatively recent immigration was for the purpose of working in the mines.

"The Polish rebellion is a challenge to the Treaty of Versailles, although the latter constitutes Poland's charter of liberty. Poland is the last country which ought to complain of the Treaty of Versailles, for she did not win the right to make it. Poland did not win her liberty, and she, more than any other nation, should respect every comma of the Treaty. She owes her liberty to Italy, France and England.

"We have the right to all that the Treaty gives us, but we also have the duty of ceding all that it takes away from us. Our duty to be impartial compels us to

act with rigorous justice, without consideration of the advantages or inconveniences which may result."

But a *fait accompli* is a *fait accompli*. Poland, being mistress of that portion of Upper Silesia which she coveted, could henceforward wait and let time have its effect. It would be necessary, sooner or later, to acquiesce in what she had done. The Allies, granting one concession after another, finished by acceding to all the Polish demands. The history of the delimitation of the Upper Silesian frontier is the story of the Powers' capitulation before force. Dmowski had foreseen correctly and his plans were justified by events.

The Supreme Council, during the session of August 8 to 13, 1921, discussed the question of Upper Silesia. All were agreed on the necessity of dividing it, but opinions differed on the line of demarcation which had to be drawn.

Various solutions had been contemplated between the start of the Polish insurrection and these deliberations.

The Powers, and the Council of Ambassadors in particular, had, on the recommendations of the Plebiscite Commission, thought of giving Poland only the district of Pless and part of that of Rybnik.

Then this line was stretched northward and assumed the name of "the Sforza line". It gave to Poland, beside Pless, the southern portions of the districts of Kattowitz and Myslowitz and the greater part of that of Rybnik.

On July 6, 1921, Lord D'Abernon, the British Ambassador in Berlin, noted the following interesting details in his diary:⁶⁵

"The prospect of a settlement in Upper Silesia appears to have improved during the last few days, in

the sense that both Germans and Poles have moderated their pretensions.

"On the German side, they recognize they must lose Pless and Rybnik, together with a stretch of agricultural territory along the northern border of the frontier. They still hope to obtain the whole of the industrial area, and there will be violent dissatisfaction if any considerable portion of this is taken away.

"On the Polish side, I hear from a friend who has just come from Warsaw that the more sensible people there consider the Sforza line as the maximum they can hope for.

"Talking the matter over privately with a French business man this morning, he fully recognized the economic folly of giving any valuable industrial property to the Poles, but he said: 'In France we are inclined to regard the Poles as heroes. They have a romantic and sentimental attraction for us. When I was at school I remember that the master who taught us German badly—and who happened to be a Pole—was regarded as a demi-god. On the other hand, I fully recognize that they are quite incompetent in business affairs, and if any industrial territory is taken, the fullest guarantees must be exacted that it shall be worked, not by them, but by others.' I should not be surprised if the French have taken adequate precautions of their own for replacing Polish industrial incompetence."

When the Supreme Council met on August 8th it was still swayed by the idea of the indivisibility of the industrial area. France, England and Italy could not reach an agreement, and, if we are to believe Lord D'Abernon, the attitude of Italy gave rise to the most diverse comments.

"No one", he wrote, "could explain Sforza's policy about Upper Silesia."⁶⁶

Unofficial history might perhaps cast light upon this matter, but it is not our intention to delve in that direction.

"From another source I hear that Barrère threatened Bonomi, as he was starting for Paris, that France would not renew 49 million francs of Treasury Bonds, which fall due soon, unless Italy stood by France in the Upper Silesian question. Bonomi was rather alarmed by this menace, and was only kept up to scratch by Torretta."

The Paris Conference, as we see, opened in a stormy atmosphere.

"The outstanding problem of the agenda was that of Upper Silesia. . . .

". . . The industrial area, or 'triangle' as it is called, must remain indivisible. Mr. Lloyd George wished to assign it to Germany and M. Briand to Poland. There ensued a grave deadlock, which even the personal appeal of the French President to all the delegates who visited him at his château at Rambouillet failed to remove."⁶⁷

On August 13th a way out was suggested by the Italian delegates, Signor Bonomi and the Marchese della Torretta. "Before coming to a decision on the demarcation of the frontier between Germany and Poland in Upper Silesia, the Supreme Council decided to seek the advice of the League of Nations on the line which it was the duty of the Principal Powers to establish."

The Council of the League of Nations accepted the mission which had been proposed to it by the Conference of Paris, and entrusted the work to a Commission

of five members (a Chinese, a Belgian, a Czech, a Brazilian and a Spaniard).

On October 12th the Council of the League transmitted to M. Briand the "recommendation" for which it had been asked on the subject of the settlement of the Silesian frontier. The solution advocated, which was a sort of compromise between the French and British points of view, divided into two the famous industrial triangle which had until then been considered indivisible.

"Because of the geographical repartition of the peoples and of the mixture of ethnographical elements, any division of this district must of necessity leave considerable minorities on both sides of the frontier, and must cut across important interests.

"In these circumstances the Council thought it necessary to take steps which would guarantee, during the transitory period of adaptation, the continuity of economic life in this region, which, from the density of the population, the number of factories, the close network of ways of communication, has acquired the character of a vast agglomeration. The Council also thought it desirable to look to the protection of minorities."

A week later, on October 19th, the Council of Ambassadors linked up, within the limits established by the regulations for the final settlement, the territorial decisions and the economic recommendations.

On October 20th the final text of the resolution of the Council of Ambassadors was sent to Berlin and to Warsaw.

Germany protested, while Poland made reservations. The decisions of the Allies were as follows:

"That the German and Polish Governments shall,

with the least possible delay, conclude a convention for the purpose of stabilizing for a maximum period of fifteen years the temporary dispositions relative to railways, water and electricity, customs, coal and mining products, social services, traffic rights, rights of nationality and the protection of minorities.

"In order to insure the execution of these measures, there shall be instituted :

"1. A mixed commission for Upper Silesia, composed of two Germans and two Poles of Upper Silesian extraction, and a chairman of another nationality appointed by the Council of the League.

"2. A Court of Arbitration charged with deciding upon all differences of a private nature which the application of the fore-mentioned Convention might arouse. This Court shall be composed of one arbitrator chosen by the German Government and of one chosen by the Polish Government. The Council of the League shall be asked to appoint the President of this tribunal."

Lord D'Abernon, after the decision of Geneva, noted the confusion of the German Government contrasted with the composure of M. Stresemann. He writes :

"The following from Geneva :

"The German witnesses were badly selected, and their evidence did not make a good impression. The German Government say that they did not select these witnesses, but that they were chosen by Geneva among elements notoriously in alliance with French interests. I have not been able to check the truth of this statement, and I dare say it is erroneous. . . .

"The general impression here is that England was outwitted at Geneva, and that the French used means of pressure which we neglect. That is as it may be,

but the result is that we have lost face. Our out-and-out friends say we were fooled; those less biased in our favour class us with Judas Iscariot. But this is temper as well as injustice.

"I contend that, compared with the Le Rond line, Germany obtains a very favourable solution. Compared again with the Versailles proposal to give the whole of Upper Silesia to Poland, the gain to Germany through the P.M.'s intervention is enormous. . . ." ⁶⁸

On November 23, 1921, those Germano-Polish negotiations foreshadowed by the decision of October 20th were instituted under the chairmanship of M. Calonder, a former President of the Swiss Confederation. On May 15, 1922, the Convention fixing the provisional economic status of the plebiscite area of Upper Silesia was signed; it was ratified by the Polish Diet on the 24th, and by the Reichstag on the 30th. On June 29th the French troops evacuated Upper Silesia.

The Upper Silesian Mixed Commission, presided over by M. Calonder, sits at Kattowitz; the Court of Arbitration, presided over by M. van Kaekenbek, sits at Beuthen.

Let us see how the situation in Upper Silesia has developed since then. Volumes would be necessary to recount the differences which have continually arisen in this region. But let us confine ourselves to proving our point now, in 1929, by the help of three official documents: the speech made in Geneva on December 15, 1928, by M. Zaleski, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs; certain passages from the reply by M. Stresemann, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs; and finally, an important letter written by M. Ulitz, a member of the Polish Diet.

SPEECH DELIVERED BY M. ZALESKI ON
DECEMBER 15, 1928

A Flood of Petitions

"I will ask the Council's permission to detain it for a moment longer in order to direct its attention to petitions received from the German minority in Polish Upper Silesia. I should be glad to dwell at greater length on the deep-seated reasons for the fact that, for some time past, the Council has been, so to speak, submerged by a stream of petitions from the Volksbund,⁶⁹ which arrogates to itself the right to represent the interests of the German minority in Upper Silesia.

"As the Council has often had an opportunity of observing, these petitions are either in the great majority of cases quite groundless or deal with questions which are quite insignificant. Furthermore, the Volksbund has very often submitted petitions to the Council without having made any attempt, although both good faith and loyalty should have indicated the necessity of doing so, to come to an understanding with the competent authorities. Moreover, the Volksbund has too often neglected to follow the local procedure set up under the terms of the Geneva Convention.

"In these circumstances it is difficult not to believe that, in addressing complaint after complaint to the highest instance—the League of Nations—the petitioners' object is not so much to satisfy the wishes of the minority as to persuade world opinion that the rights of the German minority are disregarded and that the Geneva Convention has been violated.

German Education in Upper Silesia

"The Volksbund accuses the Polish Government of neglecting the interests of German education in Upper Silesia, but not all the petitions from the Volksbund can disguise the fact that, for a German population of about 200,000 in Upper Silesia, there are ninety elementary minority schools, in which no fewer than 20,500 children are taught in German. Thus it cannot be alleged that the position of minority education in Polish Upper Silesia is deplorable.

The Economic Development of Upper Silesia

"When the Conference of Ambassadors, on the basis of the resolution adopted by the Council of the League, after mature reflection, decided in 1921 to attach part of Upper Silesia to Poland, there were many prophets who then predicted with amazing assurance the disastrous consequences of that decision. They condemned Upper Silesia to economic ruin. They foresaw terrible social conflicts. They thought that a struggle between nationalities was inevitable. While, however, it is true that the part of Upper Silesia assigned to Poland underwent, immediately after its acquisition—like all other countries at that time—an acute economic crisis, aggravated by the German-Polish Customs war of 1925, it is equally indisputable that that district has to-day entered upon a period of remarkable economic development.

"This can easily be proved by the quotation of a few figures. In 1922 the extraction of coal amounted to 25,700,000 tons. The production of soft coal, which had fallen in 1925 as a result of the Customs war with

Germany, soared in the first half of the current year to 14,500,000 tons, so that the total figure for 1928 will be at least 29,000,000 tons. Exports of coal have again reached the 1923 level, namely, 11,000,000 tons per annum. In the first half of 1928 the metallurgical industry produced 1,000,000 tons of pig-iron, which represents an increase of 150,000 tons on the 1922 output. This advance has been realized notwithstanding the great difficulties which metallurgy has had to overcome in Polish Silesia in completing its industrial equipment, much of which was destroyed during the war and the plebiscite.

"The output of zinc was 70,000 tons in 1922. It has been estimated to amount to 68,500 tons for the first half of 1928, which means that it has almost doubled since 1922. . . .

"The railway system has increased by 11 per cent. in the last six years. More than 100 school-buildings have been constructed, as well as 1,500 houses for the working population.

"I believe that anyone who is familiar with conditions in Upper Silesia must conscientiously share the opinion expressed by two powerful German organizations—the Oppeln Chamber of Commerce and the Kattowitz Mines and Forges Syndicate—in memoranda submitted in 1915 and 1916. These endeavoured to show that the economic future of Upper Silesia depended upon its being linked up with the territory which constituted former Russian Poland.

The Absence of Conflicts

"Similarly, there is no evidence either of serious social disputes or of any decline in the general level of culture in Upper Silesia.

"I venture finally to assert that the conflict between the nationalities in Polish Upper Silesia would not exist if the Volksbund were to abstain from constantly stirring up men's minds against the present status of the country, from creating political agitation and even engaging in subversive activities.

The Illegal Activities of the Volksbund

"The Volksbund does not merely confine itself to carrying on propaganda against the Polish State. With the support of a vast network of confidential agents, the Volksbund is endeavouring by illegal methods to win over partisans, even among the Polish inhabitants. For instance, it is notorious that the German industrialists bring economic pressure to bear on their Polish workers in order to induce them to send their children to the minority schools.

"What I have just said shows the extreme liberalism of the Polish Government, which tolerates the existence of an organization, some of the members of which have notoriously committed the crime of high treason.

"We are not without tangible proof of such illegal activity on the part of the Volksbund. It is on the ground of such proof that the Courts have quite recently condemned several of the leaders in that organization to terms of imprisonment. Among others, the Director of the Central Administration of the Volksbund of Kattowitz, M. Ulitz, who was charged with having assisted deserters to escape, owes his liberty solely to the fact that he is a Deputy in the Silesian Parliament, and therefore enjoys parliamentary immunity.

"It would be impossible for me to tell the Council

of all the difficulties created by the Volksbund, difficulties which the Polish Government has to overcome in the continuance of its work of economic consolidation, of social stabilization in Upper Silesia and of smoothing the way for friendly relations between the two national groups. . . .”

Dr. Stresemann replied with vivacity:

“It was with the greatest amazement that I listened to the speech of the Polish representative, and I regret to have to say that the speech, which was an invitation to combat and prosecute those who exercise before the League of Nations rights which have been conferred upon them by a Convention concluded under the League’s auspices, appears to me to have been prompted by a spirit of hatred towards the German minority.

“The question is that of the right enjoyed by parents to determine, of their own free will, the language in which their children are to be educated and the culture they are to receive. That forms part of the rights of man conferred by the League upon the minorities and guaranteed by the League to them.

“How can M. Zaleski say that, when we deal with questions of that kind, an abuse has been committed against the League of Nations? . . . M. Zaleski is perfectly aware of the terms of the Geneva Convention; he is perfectly aware of rights which it grants to the minorities, and he cannot say that, if the number of petitions brought before the Council is on the increase, one of the parties alone is responsible for that state of affairs.

“I was extremely surprised to hear the economic survey which M. Zaleski gave us, and I am still wondering what his reason was for doing so. I should

like to know the connection, if any, between figures for the output of coal or zinc and the question with which we are at present dealing, namely, the school question. . . . Should I reply that it is chiefly under German direction that the industrial production of Polish Upper Silesia is developing, and that the Poles, if left to themselves, would perhaps not have succeeded in reaching their present economic level? . . .”

M. Ulitz, the Deputy, brought further light to bear on the subject in an open letter to M. Zaleski. It ran as follows :

“The serious reproaches and accusations which you levelled against the ‘Deutsche Volksbund’ during the session of the Council of the League of Nations of December 15, 1928, compel us to correct your assertions.

“1. The President of the Mixed Commission of November 26, 1923, recognized the right of appeal of the ‘Deutsche Volksbund’.

“The Government acknowledged its recognition of this right of appeal in a declaration which was brought to the notice of the Council of the League of Nations on March 13, 1928.

“The exercise of a right which has been expressly recognized by the League of Nations can thus not be termed an unjustifiable assumption.

“2. The ‘Deutsche Volksbund’ has not inundated the League of Nations with its appeals.

“From July 15, 1922, until December 15, 1928, we delivered 21 memoranda to the Council of the League of Nations, of which 17 were declarations for transmission in conformity with Article 157 of the Geneva Convention. We may be permitted to assume your knowledge of the fact that such declarations are in-

admissible unless the President of the Mixed Commission has authorized the minority in question to formulate its complaint, and that the Government makes an abstract of its point of view.

"Of these 21 Appeals, 19 were made during the term of the voivode who held office at that time; 15 of them were declarations for transmission through the Minorities Office as referred to above.

"Since January 1, 1928, we have transmitted 652 appeals, in conformity with Article 149 G.K., to the competent authorities and to the Minorities Office.

"This figure proves that, on principle, we take our complaints to the local authorities. It is solely the practice of drawing out the examination of these complaints and the ensuing prejudice to the interests of the German populations which has constrained us to appeal directly to the League of Nations.

"The 'Deutsche Volksbund' has many times declared, both verbally and in writing, that it was prepared to settle complaints in friendly fashion. In the days of the previous authorities, the majority of these complaints were settled by the Minorities Office, but this custom ceased upon the present voivodes coming into office.

"Under such conditions, the accusation that we show a lack of good will and loyalty in the exercise of our right of appeal is without foundation.

"3. You stated that there exist 90 minority schools in our district, which contains a German population of about 200,000, that these were attended by 20,500 children, and that consequently one cannot consider the German scholastic situation desperate.

"Exact data on the numbers of the German minori-

ties are lacking by reason of the absence of a census of the population. At the elections for the Sejm, on March 4, 1928, 164,877 German votes were recorded in the Upper Silesian area of the voivoidat of Silesia. This proves that the figure 200,000 cited by you is far short of the reality.

"For the German minority there exist, according to the statistics of December 1, 1928, only 77 German State schools, and not 90.

"The number of pupils in these schools is not 20,500, but only 17,500.

"The educational situation cannot, moreover, be appraised only by the number of schools in existence, but by their intrinsic worth.

"4. You have, sir, accused the 'Deutsche Volksbund' of being the cause of national rivalries and of political disturbances, and you have attributed to it illegal actions and the fomenting of an insurrection.

"The 'Deutsche Volksbund' takes no part in political movements of a general order.

"If German nationals fall foul of the law, responsibility for their acts cannot be attributed to us unless they have been performed by our order, and this has never been the case.

"In the prosecutions referred to, none of the sentences have yet been put into force. In no case are we named as instigators to the acts which have been impugned.

"M. Ulitz, the delegate whose name you quote, was not even given a hearing concerning the charges brought against him. No one, moreover, has the right to anticipate the sentence in a case under litigation in an independent court of law.

"The 'Deutsche Volksbund' has as chief object, besides its civilizing mission, the legal protection of

its members. It has always encouraged them in a meticulous accomplishment of their duty as citizens, and has always placed itself on the side of the State and of civic order.

"The struggle for the attainment of our dues as a national minority is both a right and a moral duty. It is not directed against the State, but only against those particular authorities which ignore our rights. The encroachment made on these rights, which have been guaranteed constitutionally and contractually by the local authorities, does not exist merely in our imagination. It is proved by the attitude adopted on many occasions by the President of the Mixed Commission, and is also recognized in Polish Nationalist circles. . . ."

Some time after the publication of this letter, M. Ulitz was arrested on the charge of having assisted a German illegally to cross the frontier so as to avoid military service in Poland.

The Landtag of Upper Silesia, in which the Polish party forms the majority, twice, however, rejected the petition of the Polish Public Prosecutor for the suspension of M. Ulitz's parliamentary immunity. The Commission of Inquiry of the Landtag declared, moreover, that the document forming the basis of the charge was a forgery. It was drawn up in bad German, and contained several purely Polish expressions, although Ulitz does not speak Polish. M. Volny, the Polish President of the Landtag, consequently offered, of his own free will, to defend M. Ulitz before the Tribunal.

Having cited these divergent opinions, it will not be without interest to hear the views of the creator of Polish Upper Silesia, Adalbert Korfanty. On

February 9, 1918, he delivered a Budget speech in the Polish Upper Silesian Landtag, of which the publication was prohibited in Poland; all the newspapers which printed it were confiscated. In it Korfanty gave frank expression to his views on the activities of M. Gracynski, at that time Voivode of Polish Upper Silesia; he protested against the obstacles placed in the way of freedom of thought, freedom of assembly and of electoral freedom, and against the pressure which was brought to bear on officials by the Central Power. He asserted that the Voivode had gone so far as to subsidize, out of local funds, an association of common malefactors, the "Silesian Revolutionary League", which, under the cloak of Polish Nationalism, practised murder and pillage, and that he supported hateful newspapers, such as the *Polska Zachodnia*, which were veritable organs of civil war.

Electoral lists were falsified, and officials (especially those connected with education) were used for the lowest kind of political activity. A state of general corruption held sway; one heard talk only of bribes, of political blackmail and of the abuse of power. "Our administrative officials", Korfanty declared, "are imbeciles and ignoramuses! And yet", he added sadly, "Upper Silesia is not in Asia! Our country is being dishonoured here! Poland is being dishonoured!"

What a disillusion has followed on the *fait accompli* of May 5, 1921!

PART II

A PRESENTATION OF THE POINTS OF VIEW

Nowadays it is only the sword which weighs in the balance of the destinies of nations. A people which closes its eyes to this fact would irretrievably imperil its future. We must not be that people.

JOSEPH PILSUDSKI

I

THE POLISH POINT OF VIEW

THE Polish argument, which is clear and definite as regards the Polish Corridor, Danzig and East Prussia, does not present these characteristics as regards Upper Silesia.

The Polish claims were concerned, as will be remembered, with an important portion of East Prussia—namely, the districts of Allenstein and Marienwerder, the fate of which was determined by the plebiscite of July 11, 1920.

Poland did not accept the result of this popular referendum, as is evidenced by the following speech delivered on July 15, 1920, by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

“On July 9th the Polish Consul-General in Allenstein (Olsztyn) sent to the Inter-allied Plebiscite Commission an official Note in which the Polish Government asked that a revision of the electoral lists should be effected, and that the plebiscite should be postponed until this had been done. The request having remained unanswered, the Polish Consul-General informed the Inter-allied Commission on July 10th that he considered that the plebiscite would fail to

express the true will of the people, and that it would thus be conducted in a spirit contrary to that of the Treaty of Versailles. *As the plebiscite took place under these conditions, the Polish Government is unable to accept the result.*"

It is necessary to lay emphasis upon the great importance of this declaration: the question of the eastern frontiers of Germany is left open from the Polish point of view, and the declaration in no way harmonizes with the honoured formula, *Quieta non movere*, by which the official policy of the Belvedere is usually described in the West. The Polish policy regarding East Prussia, and especially the districts of Allenstein and Marienwerder, is thus not entirely based on respect for the treaties and for international agreements. The protest of July 15, 1920, and the non-acceptance by Poland of the results of the plebiscite in Allenstein and Marienwerder are equivalent, in law, if not in fact, to an important reservation, which may in the future lead to further territorial claims. We shall study, in due course, the growth of this point of view in Polish public opinion.

How, then, do the Poles legally justify their annexation of Pomerania and their protectorate over Danzig? We shall make use, to expound the Polish thesis, of two excellent works, well and fully documented, which are highly thought of in Poland—namely, the book by Dr. Stanislas Slawski, *Poland's Access to the Sea, and the Interests of East Prussia*,⁷⁰ and a very recent work by M. Casimir Smogorzewski: *Poland, Germany and the Corridor*.⁷¹

"The Poles consider that there is, on the one hand, an old Polish province which has been returned to the rehabilitated Polish State; on the other hand there is

the Free City of Danzig, which developed in parallel with ancient Poland, of which it has always been the port and to whom it was always economically united, and which is now similarly united to the new Poland.⁷²

"The Polish littoral, which German propaganda has named 'Corridor', is the northernmost part of Pomerania. Pomerania comprises 16,000 square kilometres and has about a million inhabitants. . . .

"The Corridor, including Danzig, forms not only the sole coastline of Poland, but also the mouth of her only river. The Vistula is the backbone of Poland; the course of this river—which bears the Polish impress—is inhabited by Poles from its source almost to its mouth. The former capital of Poland—Cracow—as well as her present capital—Warsaw—and also her only port—Danzig—are all situated on the Vistula. With the exception of the Danube, all the most important rivers of Central Europe—the Rhine, the Weser, the Elbe, the Oder—flow from south to north. The same applies to the Vistula: it is the natural boundary of Poland, both geographically and economically. . . .

"During the thousand years of Poland's history, the Vistula formed an integral part of her framework; it cannot to-day be torn from her without sealing the doom of the Poles and the Polish State. The fate of Poland is linked up with the Vistula."⁷³

Thus we see that imperative geographical considerations link the Corridor indissolubly to Poland. Other arguments of a historical, ethnographical and political character can equally be invoked. In order to present all these points we shall choose, from among the works of the defenders of the Polish thesis, those texts in which the point of view of Warsaw is expressed with the greatest force and persuasion. The reader will

understand that it is this care for impartiality which leads us to pass continually from one author to another.

* * * * *

"At the dawn of history all territories to the east of the Elbe were inhabited by Slavonic tribes."⁷⁴

"In the eleventh century King Boleslas the Great, the founder of a powerful Poland, united all the Polish territories and incorporated Pomerania within his realm. From that time, for several centuries, Pomerania formed part of the Polish State or was governed by Polish princes residing in Danzig."⁷⁵

"Under the administration of the Slavonic princes of Pomerania, Danzig was gradually enlarged and transformed owing to the affluence of German settlers who, especially in the thirteenth century, were encouraged in this direction by their princes. The German historian, Perlbach, states, however, that the affluence of these colonists did not change the essentially Polish character of the province; Perlbach adds that the policy of Mestwin II, last Duke of Pomerania, was "resolutely Polish". This Prince, who died on December 25, 1294, without issue, left his Duchy to his cousin Przemyslaw II, Duke of Greater Poland, who was crowned King of Poland in 1295, and was assassinated in the following year by order of the Margrave of Brandenburg. Ladislas the Brief succeeded him, and after a period of disturbance became King of Poland, which was once more united.

"Let us here look back again.

"In 1225 Conrad, Duke of Mazovia, appealed to the German Order of the Virgin Mary, known as the *Teutonic Order* . . . and after having conquered the territory which to-day represents Eastern Prussia, he cap-

tured Danzig by storm and invaded Polish Pomerania (i.e. the 'Corridor' of present days). On November 14th the Polish population of Danzig and Tczew (Dirschau) was butchered. According to the Danzig historian, Löschin, there were ten thousand victims. . . ."76

"This was the beginning of Danzig's Germanization.

"In 1410 Poland defeated the Teutonic Order between Grünwald and Tannenberg, but it nevertheless succeeded in remaining master of Danzig until 1454. Then the complaints of the Pomeranian population, oppressed by the iron hand of the Order, incited the King of Poland, Casimir Jagellon, to incorporate Pomerania and Danzig within Poland; and after the ensuing war, which lasted twelve years, a peace ratifying this restitution was concluded at Thorn on October 19, 1466, between Poland and the Teutonic Order.

"In 1525 the Teutonic Order's Grand-Master, Albert von Hohenzollern-Anspach, embraced the Protestant faith, and was followed by the majority of the Order. The Teutonic State, after centuries of existence, became an hereditary monarchy, and the King of Poland, Sigismund I, recognized it on condition that Albert and his successors recognized the sovereignty of Poland. On April 6, 1525, in Cracow, the Hohenzollern swore a solemn oath of vassalage to the King of Poland.

"Sigismund was then strong enough to wipe out the political consequences of Conrad's act, yet this was not done because of the trust placed in Albert's oath, and in the treaty signed by him. Many times have Polish historians reproached Sigismund for this excessive confidence.

"The City of Danzig, which since 1454 had formed an integral part of Pomerania, remained in Poland's possession until 1793, during the second division of Poland; for although Pomerania was given over to Prussia at the beginning of the division in 1772, the City of Danzig itself remained attached to Poland. . . ."77

"In 1807, by the treaty signed at Tilsit on July 7th, Danzig became a Free City. From the autumn of 1808 the garrison of Danzig was composed of two Polish infantry regiments of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw (founded in 1806). . . ."78

It is fitting to end this *exposé* by adding that Pomerania was once more annexed to Germany in 1772 and was not again separated from her until 1920. Danzig was united with Prussia in 1814.

Let us now note the historical conclusions reached by M. Smogorzewski:

"That which the Germans call the 'Corridor' of Danzig is not an invention of the authors of the Treaty of Versailles. The 'Corridor' always has existed. When Danzig made its first appearance in history in 997, it belonged to Poland; and in the course of the eight ensuing centuries, up to 1793, it was detached from her only for one hundred and forty-six years, during which it passed under the rule of the Teutonic Order; whereas for six hundred and fifty years it formed part of the Polish dominion."79

"After historical arguments let us give ethnographical ones. Despite the two German annexations (the second one lasted from 1772 to 1920, one hundred and forty-eight years), and despite the systematic and pitiless colonization undertaken since 1886 at a cost to Ger-

many of more than one milliard of gold marks, the population of Polish Pomerania (namely, the Corridor) has remained in the majority Polish.

"In 1921 the *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, an official journal appearing in Berlin, estimated the German population of Poland, following the defining of frontiers, to be 1,363,000. Since then approximately half a million Germans have left Poland. The large majority of these left voluntarily (Poland expelled only 30,000 settlers or optants). . . .

"In no ward of the Polish Republic are the Germans in the majority. . . ." ⁸⁰

M. Smogorzewski then reproduces a long table drawn up from the official Polish census of September 30, 1921, which gives the numbers of Polish and German inhabitants in eighteen districts of the voivodat of Pomerania. Of a total of 933,572, it shows 757,801 Poles and 175,771 Germans.

These statistics do not distinguish between the true Poles and the Kashubes, but M. Smogorzewski is undeterred by this difficulty.

"As the ethnographical truth is here in favour of Poland, the Germans endeavour to weaken its force by drawing a distinction between the Poles and the Kashubes. It would appear that when the Kashubes (to the north of the 'Corridor') and the Poles each speak their native tongue, they are unable to understand one another . . . at least so the Germans affirm. As this allegation has no scientific basis, it deserves but little attention. The Kashubes speak a Polish dialect, and the mountaineers of Zakopane speak another; but an educated man in Warsaw can easily understand both. The Kashubes have never manifested the least desire for separation from the Poles. On the contrary,

before the war they even sent Polish deputies to the Reichstag.”⁸¹

M. Slawski gives further particulars upon this.

“During the whole of the existence of the German Empire, that is to say from 1871 to 1918, the six districts of the coastal area—of which two border upon the sea, namely, Puck (Putzig) and Wejherowo (Neustadt in West Prussia), while four are in the interior, namely, Kartusy (Karthaus), Kosciierzyna (Berent), Starograd (Preussich, Stargard) and Tczew (Dirschau)—have, in the thirteen elections (1871–1918) returned only Polish deputies. During this period not a single German deputy was elected from these six constituencies.”⁸²

* * * *

The frontiers of the Corridor are, from the economic point of view, invisible frontiers.

We have analysed, in Part I, the agreements reached between Germany and Poland concerning railways; it is therefore unnecessary to return to them.

The traffic within the Corridor functions to the entire satisfaction of Germany. The frontiers of the Corridor are economically invisible. There are no formalities of Customs or passports for travellers going from Berlin to Königsberg or vice-versa. On the other hand the Germans, so as to create an appearance of difficulties in the Corridor, very unnecessarily wake up travellers in the middle of the night and proceed to hold a vexatious “Pass Kontrolle” for foreigners.

“The number of trains detailed to the service fulfils, and more than fulfils, the needs of transport. . . .

“600,000 travellers annually make use of the trains of privileged transit through the Polish Corridor. . . .

"German traffic through the Corridor continues to increase, but the Polish traffic increases even faster. . . ." ⁸³

Navigation on the Vistula is far from giving as satisfactory results as the railways:

"When we speak of Poland's access to the sea, we cannot disregard her river traffic, although this traffic is not of great importance. Whereas during their occupation the Germans regulated traffic on the lower part of the Vistula, the Russians did nothing to improve navigation on the middle portion of the great Polish river. Poland had so much to do during the first ten years of her independence, with her ruin to be repaired and public buildings to be constructed, that she was forced to forgo the vast expense necessary for the improvement of the Vistula." ⁸⁴

"Gdynia", remarked M. Lacour Gayet in his Preface to Slawski's book, "will always lack the advantage possessed by Danzig of having a waterway which gives access to the interior." ⁸⁵

In spite of these reservations, of which the future will show the full importance, Polish opinion looks with optimism to the economic consequences of the Corridor and refuses to see in it any cause for discomfort or uneasiness to Germany.

Meanwhile, after having analysed at length all aspects of the problem, M. Smogorzewski reaches a less favourable conclusion, the interesting developments of which we shall refer to later:

"Poland inevitably would be 'stifled' if she were deprived of her territorial access to the sea. Some people question this, quoting the examples of Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, etc. But these examples are not applicable. Switzerland has four or five issues, for

Marseilles, Genoa, Hamburg, Rotterdam and Antwerp compete for her traffic. Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary find themselves in analogous situations, but Germany is obliging with regard to all these clients because they can be served elsewhere; Poland, however, has no choice. Her geographical position forces her to utilize the port of Danzig. This immediately becomes evident on looking at a map.

"On the other hand it is indisputable that the economic situation of Eastern Prussia is difficult. The cause of her difficulties does not lie in the existence of the Corridor, but in the absence of a Germano-Polish commercial treaty."⁸⁶


We shall see later what is to be understood by these words.

The Silesian question has so far not elicited many comments from Polish sources, and the point of view upheld by all the more or less official writers remains sketchy and elementary.

In the preceding chapter we have seen Dmowski and Paderewski defend, with varying success, first in America then at the Peace Conference, the claim that Upper Silesia should be Polish. Since this province has been detached from Poland for six centuries, there can be no question of invoking historical arguments, and no support can be found for those which grew out of propaganda and polemics, nor do serious Polish authors any longer refer to them.

The chief argument which still obtains is that Upper Silesia is inhabited by an immigrant Polish population, speaking Polish.

If we are to believe M. Smogorzewski⁸⁷ the German



UPPER SILESIA

proportion "does not exceed 29 per cent." of the total.

The partial union of Upper Silesia to Poland, we are informed, does not deal a mortal blow to German economic life.

"Would Germany be short of coal because 80 per cent. of the Silesian mines have been ceded to Poland? No; Germany at the present time annually produces within her borders 140,000,000 tons of coal, and consumes only 110,000,000. Germany's reasons, in this case as in that of Pomerania, are of a very special order: first of all there is the question of national susceptibilities and prestige, and furthermore, considerations of a military nature.

"The Germans despise the Slavs generally, and the Poles in particular. They consider them to be an inferior people whose land is destined to be colonized by the Germanic race. They do not ask themselves whether the Polish nation has a right to a place in the sun or whether the frontiers which have been made are just; they feel themselves humiliated by the fact that they were obliged to return certain territories to the 'Verfluchte Polacken', and that the mines and the blast-furnaces of Polish Upper Silesia assure economic independence to Poland. It is at this point that the sentimental factor becomes linked to reasons of a military order."

M. Smogorzewski thus offers, as chief reason in favour of Upper Silesia being Polish—other reasons being of secondary importance—the figure of 71 per cent. of Polish inhabitants against 29 per cent. of Germans. As he does not explain these figures very clearly, we must assume that he refers to the part of Upper Silesia which has become Polish. Moreover, this

excellent propagandist has sought to answer beforehand a question which his readers were sure to ask: if in Polish Upper Silesia there are only 29 per cent. of Germans, why, in the last elections, in 1928, did the German lists receive 43 per cent. of the votes? M. Smogorzewski faces the question with great frankness.

"On November 14th last, Communal elections took place in Polish Upper Silesia. Their result was an unquestionable victory for German propaganda which, with the greatest cleverness, took advantage of the difficult economic situation in which the young Polish State finds itself.

"Out of 399,071 votes, the Germans received 169,998 (43 per cent.), and the Poles 226,698 (57 per cent.). The Polish element is therefore in the majority, but these figures nevertheless show that, thanks to their powerful organization, to the pressure of capital exerted on the workers, and especially to the discord within the Polish camp, the Germans attracted a proportion of the Silesian workers who were dissatisfied with their economic situation. . . .

"The lesson is a hard one, but it will be fruitful. The 'Deutsche Wahlsieg' (the German electoral victory) is undeniable, but it is only a relative victory and one which will not be repeated. The German Press really exaggerates when it represents the elections of November 14th as being a 'counter-plebiscite', 'proving Germany's right to possess the whole of Upper Silesia'. The Polish Press, on the other hand, is unanimous in calling for greater solidarity on the part of the Polish parties, and for more foresight on the part of the authorities."

To our knowledge Polish writers have never raised the question of Lower Silesia. Why is this? We, for our part, regret that we cannot expound their point of

view in a manner as complete and impartial as we should wish. Be that as it may, this problem, as those of Upper Silesia and of the Corridor, cannot, in the unanimous opinion of the official Polish representatives, be submitted to revision. "At no price", has declared M. Auguste Zaleski, the Minister for Foreign Affairs,⁸⁸ "will the Poles give up one inch of their Pomcranian land, which has been Polish for centuries. . . . Every Pole would sacrifice his life and fortune in defence of these territories, in the event of an attack, from whatsoever quarter it might come." These words, definite as they are, must not, however, be taken too literally. We know that more conciliatory solutions are possible and, better still, that certain of them have already been examined; and we shall be careful, in the right place, not to pass them by in silence.

THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW

“Les traités de 1815 n'existent plus en droit aux yeux de la République Française: toutefois les circonscriptions territoriales de ces traités sont un fait qu'elle admet comme base et comme point de départ dans ses rapports avec les autres nations.

LAMARTINE

Manifesto to the Powers, March 4, 1848

THE Polish Corridor (including Pomerania and West Prussia) is of great geographical importance to Germany since formerly it united her eastern to her western territories. Did not Bismarck, in fact, call these regions the “tendon of the Prussian State”?

We must not omit the lucid exposition of this fact which M. Jacques Bainville has given.⁸⁹

“Danzig forms the issue from the Corridor which henceforth will separate East Prussia from West Prussia, as was the case in the eighteenth century and at the time when Frederick's empire was but a ‘border kingdom’ which Voltaire ridiculed. The Allies have not dismembered Germany, and have not even federalized her. They held that one should never reverse the evolutionary processes of history. But they did so on one point, And what a point! Königsberg, the city of Kant, the city wherein the first King of Prussia had crowned himself! The former Prussian kingdom, weak and misshapen, like ‘three anvils submitted to the blows of three hammers,’ only gained respite when Königsberg was welded to the rest of the kingdom and when the Polish Corridor was closed. And now the Treaty of Versailles has re-created the little island of East Prussia, while allowing a large German Prussia to remain.

"It cannot be said that the Treaty does not dismember Germany. It clearly does so in the east, in a vulnerable point, and one far from the supervision of the Allies."

M. Gabriel Hanotaux, rejoicing over the German defeat has, like the inexorable historian that he is, strongly emphasized the formidable consequences of the Peace Treaty in Eastern Europe:

"As to the eastern frontiers of Germany,⁹⁰ these perhaps constitute the most painful aspect of her defeat. Prussia has been struck to the heart. The loss of Bismarck's conquests may be passed over in silence, but those of Frederick II! . . . At the first weakening of the Alliance, the world will be shaken in that direction."

Should we then be surprised that the German people vehemently demand a revision of the terms which were imposed upon them? They, too, invoke historical, ethnographical and political arguments.

The history of Danzig, as seen by the Germans, differs considerably from the exposition which we have based upon the works of Polish writers. According to Dr. Kaufmann, the former Keeper of the Archives of the Free City, Danzig has always been a German city, independent, and mistress of her destinies in spite of the tenuous and remote bonds which linked her for a time with the Polish State. Let us, then, sum up, in broad outline, the principal features of his argument.⁹¹

The oldest charter concerning Danzig dates from 1235; it is a draft plan for extending the protection of German law to the colony of German merchants which was established at the mouth of the Vistula and which was to give birth to the Free City. We do not know whether this project was crowned with success. But

in 1263, at the request of Swantopolk, Duke of Pomerania, the Council of the City of Lübeck granted to the inhabitants of Danzig the status of citizens of Lübeck; this right, which had incidentally been accorded to other German colonies in the East, such as Elbing and Riga, originated at Soest, in Westphalia. Thus we see that Danzig was, from its origins, a German city.

In 1271 Duke Mestwin expressly averred that his burghers were German (*burgenses theutonici civitatis Gedanensis*) as opposed to the Prussians and to the small number of Pomeranians (Kashubes) who were deprived of the freedom of the city.

In 1308 Danzig was admitted to the Teutonic Order. The latter, suggests M. Kaufmann, did not destroy the city, nor massacre the inhabitants; this tradition is only "a sinister legend invented by the enemies of the Order".

Whatever the truth may be, the city developed in a purely German direction until 1454; it then found itself obliged to form a personal alliance with the King of Poland, but not with the Polish State. This action did not affect its national character; German was the language of the Law Courts and the Government from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries; the kings of Poland themselves corresponded with the inhabitants of Danzig in *German* or in *Latin*, but *never in Polish*. In any case the kings were weak, and far away in Cracow.

The nominal and formal suzerainty of the King of Poland carried with it only limited honorific rights, as, for instance, that of appointing a burgrave, chosen from a list of eight Danzig senators submitted by the city. In Danzig no foreigner, and consequently no Pole, had even the right to trade with another foreigner.

Furthermore, the city obtained a guarantee, "solemn

and for all time", that no one should have the right to dispose of her port, that she should be exempt from all Customs dues and from all taxes on land or sea, and confirmed in the continuation of all her former privileges.

The Charter of May 15, 1697, gives Danzig the right of continuing her membership of the Hanseatic League, a right which the city had enjoyed, with the consent of the Teutonic Order, ever since the middle of the fourteenth century. She could thus conduct her foreign affairs as she wished, without interference from the King of Poland. This complete freedom gave her the right to declare war on her own initiative, to conclude peace, to maintain an army, to own war-vessels, to build fortifications, to enter into alliances, to conduct diplomatic negotiations with any Power through the intermediary of her *Chargés d'Affaires* and to receive foreign representatives. All attempts by the kings of Poland to reduce these rights were invariably resisted by Danzig: the Free City even conducted a successful war against Stephan Bathory, King of Poland.

During the war between Sweden and Poland, Danzig declared herself neutral. In 1630 she concluded with Sweden the Treaty of Tiegenhof, which affirmed her complete neutrality, without regard to Poland.

In spite of this convention the perpetual wars between Poland and Sweden and the increasing impotence and disintegration of Poland brought about the ruin of Danzig in the eighteenth century. The Free City found herself obliged to seek a reliable protector from outside. Her senate and her corporations turned to the King of Prussia, asking that he should give them "his noble aid and protection for the security of the city and for the prevention of further misfortunes". "The

continual disturbances", they added, "which have already afflicted Poland for some time, are now so widespread that Prussia, being incorporated with Poland, finds herself in a bad pass; the City of Danzig and her territory has already suffered much, and there is a threat that these dangers will become lasting and may, in the future, become still more serious."

A treaty was concluded on August 26, 1704, at Schönhausen, between Danzig and Prussia. The latter undertook to protect Danzig against all attack, to watch over the interests of the Free City as if they were her own, and to include her in all the treaties concluded with other Powers. The King of Prussia stipulated that in return Danzig should remain neutral in the event of Prussia being attacked from any quarter.

Thus, in complete independence, Danzig sought safeguards against the dangers to which Polish anarchy exposed her.

In 1793 the Free City became attached to Prussia.

This account, we see, differs appreciably from the picture painted on broad lines by the Polish historians. We shall meet with similar inaccuracies when we come to speak of the Corridor itself.

Pomerania and West Prussia, after having been the prize in confused conflicts between the Slavs and the Germans during the troubled era of the early Middle Ages, fell into the power of the Order of Teutonic Knights in 1308, and remained in its possession until 1454. From 1454 to 1772 this region was, according to the Poles, united to the Kingdom of Poland.

But in this case, as in that of Danzig, the Germans reply, it is necessary to understand the relations existing between these territories and Cracow.

They were, before 1308, inhabited by a very ancient people, the Eastern Pomeranians, who were half Slav, and whose descendants, the present-day Kashubes, still inhabit the land. The Kashubes speak a language of their own, which is of Slavonic origin, but which cannot be considered a Polish dialect. Their history is but one long conflict between Poland and their dukes, who were jealous of their independence: these were the princes who appealed to the Teutonic Knights. After its victory the Order undertook to civilize the country; it drained the marsh-lands, built dykes along the Vistula and constructed roads. When these provinces became reunited to Poland, the Kashubes attempted to combat the foreign domination, but they were less fortunate in their efforts than Danzig had been, and the district suffered swift and total decadence. In 1772 Frederick II found there only starved and half-deserted lands.


Nor do the ethnographic data furnished by German writers accord with Polish statistics. The Germans hold to the last census taken before the war, in 1910, at a time when no one had the least idea that there might be a territorial rearrangement.

The German officials distinguished between the Poles, the Germans, the Kashubes and the "Bilinguals", the latter forming a doubtful ethnographical element, half Polish and half German.

The table on page 126 gives an idea of the distribution of the population in 1910.⁹²

Thus, in the district as a whole, there was an absolute German majority, and even when the Free State of Danzig is omitted, a relative German majority.

If we examine a detailed map showing the regional distribution of the various races, we find the German



elements massed compactly in the north, in Pomerania and along the littoral (in the districts of Putzig, of Hella and of the present Free State of Danzig); in the south-west in the districts of Konitz, and in the south-east in those of Graudenz and of Schweiz.

	Germans.	Poles.	Kashubes.	Bilinguals.
Free State of Danzig	315,281	9,491	2,124	3,021
Former West Prussia	378,424	347,238	104,317	11,829
Basin of the Netze. .	191,014	112,974	None	2,630
Total ..	884,719	469,703	106,441	17,480*

* Doubtful ethnographical elements.

The Kashubes occupy a narrow band of territory squeezed between Pomerania in the west, the Free City of Danzig in the east, the districts of Putzig in the north and the district of Konitz in the south.

The Poles form an island in the centre of the Corridor, between the Kashubes, the territory of the Free City and East Prussia.

As we have seen, the Poles claim that the Kashubes have, since 1870, continuously elected Polish deputies to represent them in the Reichstag. Contrary to the statement made by M. Slawski, M. Fürst contends that only three out of the thirteen constituencies of West Prussia have always returned Polish representatives. These electoral results may be explained by the discontent aroused among the Kashubes, who are fervent Catholics, by the religious policy, the "Kultur-Kampf", of Bismarck; they were never, apparently,

a manifestation of separatist or autonomist tendencies, but were due solely to religious causes.

On the other hand the Germans point out that the Corridor alone returns to the Diet of Warsaw at the present time five dissentient German deputies. (There are 24 German deputies in the Polish Sejm, whereas there is no longer a single Polish representative either in the Reichstag or in the Prussian Landtag.) And yet, since 1919, 150,000 Germans have been obliged to leave the Corridor.


Are the frontiers of the Corridor really invisible, as Polish writers go on repeating? The Germans do not seem to think so, to judge by the literature which has arisen from this question. Let us confine ourselves to pointing out only the clearest and the least disputable facts.

The privileged traffic, which is free from Customs and police formalities in crossing the Corridor, comprises only a few passenger trains and a limited number of goods trains. In actual fact, the trunk railway which unites Germany to East Prussia, from Konitz to Marienburg, via Dirschau, is inadequate and congested; the goods in the privileged trains, which are allowed only in limited quantities, are held up at the forwarding stations; perishable commodities deteriorate and general expenses are increased. Let us take as an example a consignment of live-stock from Marienburg to Berlin: if the number of animals exceeds the available space, certain of them must be left behind; they have to wait for the next train, and this implies further expense for food and custody. As a consequence the export of live-stock coming from East Prussia, or from that part of West Prussia which has remained German, and destined for Posnania or the Polish portion of West

Prussia, has to all intents ceased. In 1913 these districts had exported 191,000 head of live-stock; in 1925 this figure fell to 1,207. Such examples could be multiplied indefinitely.

Then there is the question of the frontier of the Vistula, from Weissenberg to Voltz. Its new line follows the river, in a northerly and southerly direction, over a distance of eighty kilometres, leaving the whole length of the Vistula to Poland. The Lowlands of the Marienwerder district, which are cut off from the river to which they have, in all, an access by road of only four metres, situated at Kurzebrack, no longer have the use of the great water-way. These regions, which are situated on a very low level, are protected by dykes against floods from the Vistula and the Nogat. . . . (In 1888 the Nogat burst its dykes at Jonasdorf and 2,000 persons were drowned and 200,000 head of cattle carried away). The frontier crosses the dyke five times, which has rendered necessary the creation of a mixed Germano-Polish commission for its superintendence. The Germans maintain those sections of the protective works which have been left under their control, whereas the Poles allow Nature to work her will on their section. They let the river undermine the dykes and eat away the embankments. In the month of February 1928 the danger seemed at one time to be so acute that the Polish authorities entrusted the Germans with the task of protecting from the Vistula the five Polish villages which are situated on the right bank of the river, in front of Mewe.

Before the war Germany devoted 20,000,000 gold marks per annum to the upkeep of the Lower Vistula. The Polish Budget allocates only 800,000 zlotys for the purpose, which is little better than nothing. As a



consequence the Vistula is deserted, encumbered with sand-banks and entirely useless. This state of things, which becomes worse from year to year, increases the danger which threatens the Polish Lowlands, for the rising of the river-bed lessens the height by which the protective works overtop the mean level of the water.

It is said that funds and technical experts are lacking at Warsaw. There are nevertheless sufficient of these to demolish the enormous iron bridge of Münsterwalde on the Vistula, as the Germans bitterly point out. This bridge, over a kilometre in length—1,058 metres, to be exact—was built between 1907 and 1909 at a cost of 9,000,000 marks, and linked East Prussia to Berlin, Breslau and Silesia, by the shortest route. It was a marvel of German science and technique; it carried a railway and a wide road. Its destruction quite simply sentences to death, in the event of a flood, the inhabitants of the five villages which have become Polish, and which are situated opposite Mewe. Is this due to "Schadenfreude" or to strategic considerations, or to the hallucinations of fear? Such is the question which the German people ask themselves. It is not for us to answer it.

In the preceding chapter we have enumerated the prolonged complaints of Danzig; we shall proceed to examine them later.

Other difficulties have arisen in the Polish Corridor, of which the most important is the liquidation of the property of the landowners who have been obliged, willy-nilly, to leave the country. One hundred thousand hectares are involved.

"In the liquidation of these 100,000 hectares—of which 80 large estates comprise 70,000 hectares and 2,000 small estates comprise 30,000 hectares—there

are lawsuits in progress involving 95,000 of these 100,000 hectares. The compensation offered is simply ridiculous. The Polish Government calmly offers to the parties concerned one-eighth, or even one-tenth, of the real value of their property.

"Of the total German property which is in liquidation in Poland, only 1,500 hectares of small estates and two large estates have in all been dealt with without lawsuits. All the rest are in course of litigation."⁹³

* * * * *

From the German point of view the Upper Silesian question has to-day shrunk, or, to put it better, has been concentrated: it has now become essentially the question of the industrial basin, a great indivisible unit which has nevertheless been divided. It is necessary, however, to view the problem as a whole, in its essential aspects, in order to understand its past and future developments.

Historical considerations cannot here furnish matter of a very controversial character.

The earliest inhabitants of Upper Silesia were of German origin.⁹⁴ In the first half of the Middle Ages, the Germans in Upper Silesia were replaced by Slavs; then followed re-Germanization, and since the fourteenth century the country has become almost totally German.

Upper Silesia, in the very remote past, had been Polish for about a century and a half. Since 1163 the union with Poland had not represented a reality, and in 1335 Casimir, the Polish king, formally renounced the country. Until 1745 Upper Silesia formed part of the Austrian Empire, and was then reunited to the Prussian province of Silesia.

The bonds which linked it to Germany were nevertheless, for a long time, as tenuous as those which had linked it to Poland. A mixed race, a combination of Poles and Germans, which, when left to itself, knew little prosperity, had come into being in this lost province, and "for many centuries troubles of every kind forced it down to a very low rung on the ladder of civilization". There was no regular immigration on the part of Germany, and there was therefore no possibility of the province becoming definitely German. There was a similar lack of Polish immigration, as is shown by the country's language, which was in no way influenced by the Polish language. The inhabitants were, in truth, the "people of Upper Silesia". They have been given the name "Wasserpolacken",⁹⁵ which gave rise to the idea that they were Polish, but they are in reality a mixed people in a category entirely of their own.⁹⁶

It must be said, in all fairness, that German geographers had paid very little attention, before the war, to determining with exactitude the fundamental characteristics of this curious, mixed people. Assuming the name of "Wasserpolacken" or "Wasserpolen" to be a local name unworthy of scientific classification, or an obscure and ill-defined term, they spoke, not of "Wasserpolacken", but simply of "Poles".

This misconception, M. Volz remarks, has been very prejudicial to German interests.

"We are accustomed to regard the Poles of Upper Silesia—the 'Wasserpolen', as the usual German expression has it—as being true Poles. At any rate it is thus that they are named in the ethnographical maps in our atlases and on the school wall-maps issued by our topographical institutes, which maps are well

known beyond the German frontiers. Consequently the Entente and the Poles make use of our own maps as a means of propaganda.⁹⁷ We are accustomed to think that the mighty human conglomeration of Upper Silesia is, to a large extent, derived from a numerous and constant immigration of Polish and Galician workmen,⁹⁸ so that if these immigrants end by establishing their domiciles in the district, the increasingly Polish character of Upper Silesia shows itself precisely in the propaganda in favour of Poland.

"We are, moreover, accustomed to believe that all the Germans are Lutherans and the Poles Catholic.

"All these current ideas contain great inaccuracies and serious misapprehensions."⁹⁹

If German scientific opinion was formerly so ill-informed, Western ignorance is certainly entitled to indulgence.

Thus the Germans to-day tend to consider the Silesians as a people apart, a mixed nation, Germano-Polish by race and language, but of definitely German sympathies.

"The situation of Upper Silesia", we were told when in the country by a German of very shrewd mind and of wide knowledge of the realities of European affairs, "is very reminiscent of that of Alsace. In neither case is the race or the language pure ; in both cases the people lean towards the nation which was furthest removed from its own ethnographical origins. The Alsatians lean towards France, the Upper Silesians towards Germany."

In reality Polish immigration has considerably slowed down since the middle of the nineteenth century, and the population of Upper Silesia has flowed back towards Germany. Did not 195,000 Upper Silesian

immigrants, who had established themselves in Germany, take part in the plebiscite?¹⁰⁰

Finally, Upper Silesia is, by a large majority, Catholic; it even constitutes, from the political point of view, one of the contributors to the German Centre Party. Therefore one should not, according to the Germans, confuse religion and race. The famous Polish watchword, "You are Catholic, therefore you are Polish", does not correspond with reality.

M. Volz concludes his historical and ethnographical discussion as follows:

"Upper Silesia has had no link with Poland for six or seven hundred years. The tremendous vitality and growth of her population is the achievement of German civilization and labour.

"Thus our statistics and our atlases should not speak of 'Poles' in Upper Silesia—for there are none. There were still a certain number seven hundred years ago, then a people of mixed Polish and German blood came into being, which has maintained itself almost free from further Polish admixture; the German strain, on the other hand, has counted to an ever-increasing extent. In our time it is the 'Oberschlesier' (or Upper Silesians) who form the population of Upper Silesia."

Indeed, a careful examination of the results of the plebiscite shows that 42 per cent. of the votes in favour of Germany come from the inhabitants of Upper Silesia who speak Polish.

It is not without interest to recall the number of votes cast for Germany and Poland respectively in the large towns ceded to Poland, (The difference between the total number of votes obtained by the two countries and the number of voters represents the disqualified ballot papers.)

	Number of Voters.	Germany.	Poland.
Kattowitz	26,715	22,774	3,900
Königshütte	42,758	31,864	10,764
Tarnowitz	8,771	7,451	1,297
Pless	3,759	2,483	910
Laurahütte	9,287	6,130	3,081
Bismarckhütte	13,088	8,340	4,654
Ruda	10,351	4,105	6,212
Lipine	9,411	4,053	5,319
Chorzow	6,269	3,242	2,980

The Germans complain that the new frontier, which apparently respects mathematically the proportions indicated by the plebiscite (42 per cent. of the population and 35 per cent. of the territory have been allocated to Poland) has deprived Germany of everything of any value—works, mines and factories.

Germany has lost, according to German statistics :

92·5 per cent. of the reserves of coal estimated to be in Upper Silesia (113 milliards of tons).

53 out of 67 coal-mines.

77 per cent. of the coal production.

Half of the coking plants and nearly the whole of the coal suitable for transforming into coke.

82·4 per cent. of the total output of zinc.

72·5 per cent. of the total output of lead.


All the zinc, iron and silver-works.

5 (out of 8) foundries, with 22 (out of 37) blast-furnaces, namely, 67 per cent. of the output.

9 out of 12 steel-works.

72 per cent. of the part-worked metallurgical output.

POLAND



GERMANY

Breslau

LOWER SILESIA

+++++ Present Frontier

----- Former Frontier

84 per cent. of the output of finished metallurgical products.

Almost the entire chemical industry.

The industrial basin forms an indivisible unit; this region, divided as it now is, no longer has a normal life. The new frontier has indiscriminately cut across the railway system which, as in the Ruhr, forms an inextricable network of primary and secondary lines, linked to local railways or to light railways; it has also cut across the system of drinking-water conduits and electric power cables. The part of the basin which has remained German, being deprived of the forests in the districts of Pless and of Rybnik, is compelled to obtain its pit-props from a great distance. The metallurgical industry no longer finds *in situ* the raw materials necessary to its steel-works but is obliged to import them.

“The unity of Upper Silesia”, concludes M. W. Volz, “is in no way an empty word invented by the Germans for the needs of their case, so that they may retain a country replete with natural wealth. As in England and the United States, so in Upper Silesia, the proximity of coal and ores has produced a most powerful industry—a veritable island in the midst of the agricultural country to the east of the Elbe—and has drawn into its orbit everything in the neighbourhood which can serve it. To-day this industry, a devouring Moloch, has taken possession of the country. If it is to live, one must not start by sapping its foundations and depriving it of the air necessary to its existence. No stone should have been removed from such a complex edifice.”¹⁰¹

M. H. Stahler estimates the annual loss of national

wealth caused to Germany by the partition of Upper Silesia, at one-and-a-half-milliards of gold marks.¹⁰²

We are already familiar with the complaints of the German minority in Polish Upper Silesia.

It remains for us to refer to a question of which little is known in the West—that of Lower Silesia. It concerns certain Silesian regions in the districts of Namslau and of Gross Wartenburg, to the south-east of Breslau, which have been united to Poland without a plebiscite having previously been held. Other less important rectifications of the frontier, in the districts of Guhrau and of Militsch-Trachensberg, were decided in her favour (Article 27, Paragraph 7, of the Treaty of Versailles). These annexations were an aggravation of the conditions first imposed upon Germany, for they do not figure in the draft of the Treaty which was submitted on May 7, 1919, to the German delegation. The region is almost entirely German, and a test ballot, held in November 1919, showed that there were 93 per cent. of German votes.

This annexation was followed by the pure and simple destruction by the Poles, in their newly acquired territory, of the railways between Oels and Adelnau, by Festenberg, and between Oels and Kempen, by Gross Wartenburg. This small disinherited region, moreover, experienced the most rigorous frontier system in all Europe. The Germans insist on the incontestably German character of the lost territory of Lower Silesia.

We have, in the course of our inquiry in Germany, sought to learn the opinion of all the leaders of the political parties, with the exception of the Nationalists and the Communists, on this question of the problem of the eastern frontiers of the Reich. Without exception,

all the politicians whom we have met, from M. von Rheinbaben to M. Rudolf Breitscheid, including M. Wirth and the prelate Ullrich, chief of the Upper Silesian group in the Reichstag,¹⁰³ have expressed fundamentally the same thought. Germany has no thought of gaining by force a revision of the demarcation of her frontiers: all appeal to violence is condemned and excluded in advance. But she considers that the present situation is abnormal and, in the long run, intolerable. The question is, and will remain, open; the Reichstag looks for a revision. Until a readjustment has been conceived and put into operation it is useless to dream of an Eastern Locarno. This fact has been so often brought to light that it is useless to insist upon it further.

PART III

A FRENCH OPINION

Sine ira et studio.

TACITUS

WE have tried to expound, with as much impartiality as possible, the two points of view which obtain. The time has come to depart from the standard of strict objectivity which we had set up as our rule, and to recount what we have seen, and to give our own opinion.

We shall not, however, attempt to judge between the points of view of the two Governments. The true feelings of the various peoples, the concrete and living realities, and the dangers which the present situation may hold for the peace of Europe, will, above all, engage our attention. In short, we shall attempt to see truly, without preconceived ideas, and without partisan feeling. We shall be guided by that conciliatory sense of the relativity of points of view which in the long run results, on direct contact with men and things, from the careful and patient study of a complex problem.

Both the Germans and the Poles make use, though with a different interpretation, of the teachings of history. The reader will find no great difficulty in disentangling the truth, and furthermore this truth is relative and, as a whole, only of secondary importance.

It is less important in our time, indeed, to determine the facts and the various vicissitudes of an already distant past, than to have a full knowledge of the national sentiment, of the present ethnographical

composition of the country, and, to sum up, of the will of the people. It is nowadays no longer possible to carve up States at the will of politicians and to take into account only strategic or economic considerations. The people must be consulted: this was one of the first principles established by the French Revolution. In making any territorial changes we must take into account the clearly expressed will of the populations concerned.

And what do we find in actual fact?

The City of Danzig has been severed from Germany in spite of the will of its population.

The Corridor has been given to Poland without a plebiscite.

The popular referendums carried out in those neighbouring districts which were vigorously claimed by Poland in the name of ancient Slav tribes, such as the Mazures, have resulted in an overwhelming majority for Germany (92·5 per cent. and 97 per cent. of the votes recorded).

We have been assured that the region of the Corridor was inhabited by a Polish population. We should like to believe it, and formerly there would have been a very simple way of convincing European opinion of the fact, namely, by instituting a plebiscite. This has not been done. The population has not been consulted, and a decision imposed upon a region which unquestionably would lend itself to a referendum must always remain unstable because it is contrary to that great principle of the French Revolution, the right of peoples to decide their own fate, which is an essential and fundamental principle of modern States.

It therefore seems to us that the Germans are right when they ask why, if the Corridor was unques-

tionably Polish, as is stated, no plebiscite was granted in 1919.

But an objection immediately comes to mind.

You take your stand, we shall be told, on the right of peoples to determine their own fate, and on the present ethnographical constitution of the disputed territories, the criterion which, according to you, must decide the justice of the case. But do you forget that the ethnographical composition of these districts has been greatly modified during the last ten years? Do you forget that 800,000 Germans from Poland have been expelled and that 150,000 have had to leave the Corridor? These elements have been replaced by true Poles, and because of that fact it is quite possible that to-day a plebiscite would yield results which would conform to the wishes of Warsaw.

The Germans reply to this argument by pointing out that the Corridor sent five German dissentient deputies to the Polish Diet at the last elections. The process of colonization is thus not as advanced as it is often said to be.

But the objection is a serious one. It is so serious, indeed, that it deserves to be considered in all its implications and to be thoroughly sifted; it is one of those, moreover, which has most painfully troubled our conscience. It forms, in fact, a tremendous problem, that of the violent assimilation of one people by another, and of the demographic reconstruction *per fas et nefas* of a State.

Indeed, more than 150,000 Germans have left the Corridor, either willingly or by compulsion. No one is prepared to challenge this fact.

We have met with vast numbers of these emigrants in all the regions which have remained German and

which border on the provinces which have become Polish: they are for the most part officials, merchants, industrialists, landed proprietors. We shall confine ourselves to citing two typical cases of compulsory emigration.

The first is that of an old inn-keeper of the province of Konitz; he had been domiciled there for thirty-eight years. His licence was withdrawn because he had sent his son to study in the technical school of Danzig (the great Technische Hochschule). The old man was obliged to sell his property at a loss and to leave the country, together with his family. The second example concerns the owner of a small distillery in the province of Graudenz. The authorities informed him that he must renew the trade-licence which permitted him to manufacture alcohol. He took the necessary steps, but did not receive the licence within the expected period. He had to sell the distillery at a knock-down price, and a Polish emigrant bought it for 20,000 zlotys. Hardly had the deed of purchase been registered when the long-awaited licence arrived. But it was too late, and the Polish Treasury deducted 15,000 zlotys from the amount obtained from the sale. Nothing remained for the luckless man except to leave the country, ruined and stripped of all his belongings.

We can guarantee the strict authenticity of the facts which we have just recounted. The Polish authorities themselves make no secret of the procedure which they employ. In Upper Silesia we ourselves visited a Polish official holding one of the most important posts in the province. He expounded to us, with perfect honesty, the point of view of his Government.

"Poland at present comprises", he told us, "nearly

all the territories which have, at any period of history, been Polish. Other peoples have come in the course of time, and have been able to establish themselves in this or that province and to modify its ethnographical constitution. Well, we shall re-Polonize that which has been de-Polonized, and in ten years time this will be an accomplished fact. Anyhow, no one has a right to interfere in the matter, which is one of purely domestic character."

And this is, of course, one point of view.

The Poles have understood that they cannot assimilate the Germans, and it therefore only remains to force them, willingly or unwillingly, to leave the country in which they have established themselves—and the process is being carried out with energy. But can one not imagine the stored-up hatred, anger and revenge which is imprudently being inspired in Germany? These 800,000 exiles, returning to their native country after having lost all their property, are consumed with rage and fury; they constitute so many centres of anti-Polish propaganda and go to swell the army of Nationalists and of impenitent Chauvinists. They form the most formidable stimulus to war and violence which any State could prepare against itself. Imagine this army of vengeance, these 800,000 despoiled Germans, maddened by hatred of this injustice, whose one thought is to chastise Poland and to make her pay to the utmost farthing for the wrongs which they have endured. How could ideas of peace and of European concord enter their minds and make them think and act according to the spirit of Geneva? They are but human after all, and one cannot expect them to be saints!

To seek to modify the demographic constitution of a

disputed country by such methods is most dangerous for the peace of Europe.

Since we are on the subject of ethnography, let us complete its examination. When Polish theorists—such as M. Slawski—speak of the Corridor, they state that only Polish populations are to be found in it. In his most recent work M. Smogorzewski mentions, for the first time, the Kashubes of the Corridor. We have indicated his argument: it is trivial and superficial, and disposes of objections in a few contemptuous lines, but at any rate M. Smogorzewski has gone to the trouble of naming the Kashubes.

Who, then, are these Kashubes?

We have not, in France, any general work on the subject. Niederle, in his classic book upon the “Slavonic Race”, perceives in the Kashubes individual national characteristics, and distinguishes them from the Poles. His opinion is not an isolated one: “Many ethnographers divide the Kashubes from the Poles and link them to the Pomeranian Slavs”, he states, and cites in support the great names of Hilferding, Zubaty, Ramult and Beaudoin de Courtenay.¹⁰⁴ The best recent work known to us on the matter is that of Dr. Lorenz.¹⁰⁵

This author adopts the theories of Ramult and Beaudoin de Courtenay. The Kashubes, he considers, are related to certain no longer existent Slavonic tribes which had established themselves in Pomerania, in Mecklenburg, in Brandenburg, in Holstein and in Hanover.

Their language is not a Polish dialect: it is linked to the ancient Prussian language, the ancient Pomeranian of the East. We ourselves, when on the spot, embarked upon the study of this vernacular; it has nothing in common with Polish, and Polish officials themselves

admit that they can understand nothing of it. Moreover, it contains a number of words and of constructions which are directly taken from the German, for the people have been half-Germanized.

We were told, in their own country, the story of the Kashubes' disillusionment. The first Polish troops which occupied the district belonged to Haller's army. They behaved decently, but were soon replaced by a corps from Russian Poland which the Kashubes immediately christened "Siberian Troops". These primitive and wild soldiers treated the Kashube country as a conquered land and laid it waste. The Kashubes had, for a short while, hoped that their small Fatherland would be made autonomous within the framework of the Polish State. These hopes were never realized. To-day the Kashubes complain that the officials who have come from old Poland decry and despise their language, and look upon them as an inferior race, "subservient to the Germans". The discontent of this people provoked, in 1919, a harsh attack from the *Kurjer Warszawski* (*The Warsaw Mail*).

"The Kashubes are ingrates and imbeciles," it said; "they regret the German domination, and their peasants go so far as to say, 'Even the rain was better in the days of the Germans.' This trait", adds the Polish paper, "gives the measure of the intelligence of these people." We have not, as regards ourselves, to estimate the intelligence of the Kashubes. One fact is certain: they are not satisfied with having passed under Polish domination.

Nor do the Poles distinguish, in Upper Sillesia, between the pure Poles and the "Wasserpölacken", or "Wasserpölen". It would be well, however, to examine this important point more closely.

The Germans, as we have seen, had for a long time paid little attention to their "Wasserpolacken". Niederle discovered an ingenious explanation for this name. "The Polish water-men who navigated log-rafts on the Vistula", he says, "have been known in Germany, since the seventeenth century, by the name of Wasserpolacken."¹⁰⁶ Unfortunately his reference to the past is over-ingenious and does not accord with the truth; it seems more probable, according to the theory of Wilhelm Volz, that the German word "Wasser" (water) refers to the mixture of races, which have suffered much admixture and are very far removed from their original purity.

Be this as it may, the Upper Silesian race has nothing in common with the Polish.

As to the language, it, too, is a Germano-Polish "Wasserdialekt". Here again we have sought, by instituting a detailed inquiry on the spot, to arrive at the exact facts.

Let us then sum up, without making undue linguistic claims, the essentials of our conclusion.

The Germano-Polish dialect of Upper Silesia is a poor language which entirely lacks words with which to express ideas. There exists a vocabulary only for the designation of inanimate things, with the exception of a small number of words appertaining to the religious side of life or to the Catholic liturgy. As soon as conversation reaches a certain level, "Wasserpolsch" gives way to German, though the German may, in certain cases, assume Polish terminations, as is shown in the following example taken from some local administrative offices in Polish Upper Silesia:

"W tem amtzie sie nie przyjmn jetaki gesuchi bleistiftem schreibowane."

It is not necessary to know Slav to guess the meaning of this sentence; a slight knowledge of German is sufficient: "In this office applications written in pencil are not accepted", which in German would be: "In diesem Amt werden mit Bleistift geschriebene Gesuchen nicht angenommen."

We shall confine ourselves to this one linguistic curiosity, although our files would allow of many analogous examples of equal value in demonstrating the point, but such elaboration would be of too specialized a nature and would exceed the limits which we have set ourselves.

By elimination we can, however, reach the following conclusion: that in these disputed areas neither the racial nor the linguistic characteristics are fundamentally in question.

The religious problem also has disappeared from the national horizon, but such has not always been the case.

The Kulturkampf was a great error of which the detrimental consequences have been felt by Germany for over thirty years. It contributed powerfully to the success of the Polish Nationalist movement, that "Polish awakening" which took place at the end of the nineteenth century, and which had its principle centre at Posen. It was in order to protest against Bismarckian policy that the Kashubes and the Catholic Upper Silesians elected Polish deputies.

But the Kulturkampf is dead. Upper Silesia has become one of the dependencies of the German Centre Party, and Catholicism no longer contributes, even indirectly, to the advantage of Poland. Nevertheless, in the Corridor the Polish bishops are ousting the former German priests; in all, there remain in this area only

fourteen German priests, and the new clergy are ardently Polish and follow the nationalist tendencies of the official policy.

But if, in the last analysis, the problem is neither one the race nor language, nor religion, what then is it? The facts themselves will give the answer.

If we compare the maps showing the results of the Upper Silesian plebiscite with the philological maps drawn up after the last German census in 1910, we shall see that the two pictures do not tally, that they are, in fact, entirely different. In the district of Rosenberg, for instance, there were 80·7 per cent. of Poles; at the time of the plebiscite only 32 per cent. were shown. In the district of Kosel the figures reversed themselves: 75 per cent. of Germans instead of 75 per cent. of Poles. In all cases a great increase in the number of Germans is to be found. In fact, the census took account only of the Mother-tongue, the "Wasserpolsch", while the plebiscite took account of political sentiment.

42 per cent. of the votes in favour of Germany were given by inhabitants of Upper Silesia speaking the Polish dialect.

One may, in fact, reckon, according to the results of the plebiscite, as follows:

410,000 German Upper Silesians speaking German,
300,000 German Upper Silesians speaking Polish,
480,000 Polish Upper Silesians speaking Polish.

The Polish and German populations are approximately balanced; it is the German Upper Silesians speaking Polish who bring down the balance in Germany's favour.

This is a fact of prime importance.

How can it be accounted for? Its explanation lies very deep: the Upper Silesian plebiscite did not judge

between two races, two languages or two religions; it cut across two *civilizations*. The Silesians had to choose between two cultures, German culture and Polish culture, and they preferred the first. In Upper Silesia, as in the Corridor, the future of civilization is in the balance: must a superior culture give way to one less advanced? In this lies the essence of the matter.

This conception accounts for the insoluble anomalies which are to be met in the Germano-Polish problem.

The official German census of June 16, 1925, shows 663,360 Poles in Germany. M. Casimir Smogorzewski disputes these figures, and claims that his compatriots number 1,398,000.¹⁰⁷ If we are to believe him, there are, on the other hand, only 800,000 Germans in Poland.¹⁰⁸ Let us admit that this Polish writer is correct and that his figures are accurate. Assuming this, how, then explain the fact that the 800,000 Germans in Poland have twenty-four deputies in the Polish Diet, whereas the 1,398,000 Poles in Germany do not manage to send a single deputy to the Reichstag or to the Prussian Landtag?

It is not sufficient to explain this fact by accusing the Germans of arbitrariness. The German electoral law is more liberal than the Polish. Only one explanation should be accepted: the Germans in Poland are more numerous than he says, they are self-conscious, well-organized and they sternly defend their national integrity because they do not desire to step down from a superior stage of civilization to one that is inferior. The Poles of Germany, on the other hand, feel themselves absorbed in a nation of superior culture, and they merge in the different German political parties. They are Centrists, Democrats, Socialists, or Communists, but they no longer vote as Poles; the religious

factor, of which the influence was formerly considerable, has ceased to operate, and a successor has not yet been found to revivify the Polish National Movement in Germany.

Another surprising fact for the average European is the position of the minority schools in Germany and in Poland. Let us refer to statistics.

GERMAN MINORITY SCHOOLS IN POLISH UPPER SILESIA (1927-1928)

A. PRIMARY EDUCATION

	Pupils.		Pupils.
1. State Schools	19,788	In 1924	18,029
2. Private Schools	1,038	In 1924	806
Total	20,826	Total	18,835

B. ADVANCED PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

1. Municipal Schools	2,888	In 1924	3,272
2. State Schools	544	In 1924	496
3. Private Schools	1,724	In 1924	1,325
Total	5,156	Total	5,093

C. RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION

27	In 1924	131
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POLISH MINORITY SCHOOLS IN GERMAN UPPER SILESIA

A. PRIMARY EDUCATION

	Pupils.		Pupils.
1. State Schools	659	In 1924	1,317
2. Private Schools	nil	In 1924	nil
Total	659	Total	1,317

B. ADVANCED PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

nil

C. FOREIGN LANGUAGE COURSES

1. Polish course	637	In 1924	1,540
2. Religious instruction in Polish	2,988	In 1924	5,325

These figures require no comment. They show with entire clarity the fundamental difference between the German schools of Polish Upper Silesia, which are active, prosperous and flourishing, and the Polish schools of German Upper Silesia, which are markedly degenerating and are neglected by the Poles. We have visited them: the classes are small, of only fifteen or twenty pupils, although an international agreement allows the German Government to close a school when the attendance falls below the figure of 40. The Poles of Upper Silesia do not send their children to the schools which are reserved for them, because the Polish language seems to them less useful than the German, and because, fundamentally, the German school represents a superior degree of education and of civilization. Do not the Polish Nationalist papers complain, indeed, that the Poles in Polish Upper Silesia send their children to the German minority schools? The German schools are, or appear, better than the Polish because they benefit from the prestige of a civilization incomparably more developed, from a more uniform social culture, from a collective organization which has been well tested, and from a higher general tone. The Germano-Polish conflict is essentially a conflict of civilizations.

But to return to the north. What do we see in Danzig? An essentially German city, whose evident desire is to

be reunited to Germany. Nor do we find that its port has gained much benefit from the Customs Union with Poland, although some affirm it; but in Danzig there are always from twelve to twenty thousand unemployed—a large figure in relation to the total population.

Statistics indicate a considerable increase in the traffic of the port, and the graphs they form are indeed impressive. But the Free City claims that it derives no benefit from this prosperity, which is more apparent than real. The great increase which has been referred to represents the coal directly exported to foreign buyers by the great Polish trusts of Upper Silesia, by the Polish transport and navigation companies, or by their shipping agents.

Danzig suffers from the sharp competition of the Polish port of Gdynia, but the great cause of her deterioration—for at the present time the Free City subsists on the reserves accrued during her wealthy past, and is encroaching on her capital—arises from the fact that the Vistula has ceased to be navigable and is no longer used for transportation. Both Danzig and Gdynia receive their supplies exclusively by rail, and therein lies a real economic error.

Let us recall M. Casimir Smogorzewski's melancholy admission¹⁰⁹:

“Whereas during their occupation the Germans regulated traffic on the lower part of the Vistula, the Russians did nothing to improve navigation on the middle portion of this great Polish river. Poland had so much to do during the first ten years of her independence, with her ruin to be repaired and public buildings to be constructed, that she was forced to forgo the vast expense necessary for the improvement of the Middle Vistula.”

The Vistula, that great natural outlet of an immense hinterland, and Poland's only river, is deserted, obstructed by sand-banks, useless even for the floating of timber. The timber-trade of Danzig is entirely ruined; the railways must take the place of waterways, but at what cost! . . .

Gdynia has no water-way giving access to the hinterland. Everything must come to her by rail; goods have to be carried by rail, and only by rail, for hundreds of kilometres. But a port is a commercial undertaking and is not concerned with prestige. Commercial transportation which is obliged to be conducted over enormous distances exclusively by rail, is doomed to a perpetual deficit, and sooner or later to bankruptcy. The costly creation of Gdynia, in fact her very existence, is a challenge to economic law; so long as the Vistula is not deepened and made navigable, as it was formerly, Poland will sacrifice on railways, without return, ever increasing sums in a most useless and most unproductive expenditure, and one which is entirely against the economic efficiency of a great nation.

As to the Prusso-Polish frontier of the Vistula, which is so erratic and so unreasonable, it is already condemned by the Poles themselves; they derive no profit from it and the best minds among them admit that it should be revised and its course made to follow the centre of the river, as was done in the case of the Rhine.

Are the frontiers of the Corridor really invisible, as is said? We cannot believe it.

The privileged traffic—exempt from customs and passport formalities—is too limited in the number of trains. There is one a day between Berlin and Königsberg in each direction. The link between Marienburg

and Danzig via Dirschau is defective in the matter of trains which are exempt from Polish formalities. One may go from Marienburg to Königsberg and back in the same day, but not from Marienburg to Danzig unless one has a Polish visa. On the journey from Marienburg to Stettin, via Danzig, there are no less than six passport examinations. Moreover, the Corridor has become famous for the misadventures which are experienced in it; M. Henri Béraud, who did not escape these annoyances, recently gave a humorous account of his experiences.

The same criticism is applicable to goods traffic—namely, that too few trains are supplied for German needs. The question we must ask is quite simple: Is it possible to send goods from Berlin or from Königsberg in unlimited quantities and under the same conditions as from Berlin to Breslau, or from Frankfort to Berlin? The answer is in the negative, and yet, if the Corridor is to be economically invisible, this condition must be fulfilled. It does not seem impossible, but so long as it has not been satisfied East Prussia will remain isolated from the rest of Germany and will suffer thereby and have cause for complaint.

We shall not leave these economic considerations without returning to the question of Upper Silesia.

The solution which has been adopted has destroyed the unity of the industrial basin, that indivisible entity of which the inhabitants would have wished to preserve the integrity at any cost. The new frontier is bad because it breaks up a hitherto harmonious and coherent whole, because it is wasteful and runs directly counter to natural economic laws.

The German point of view, which we have expounded in the preceding chapter, appears to us sufficiently

close to the truth. We shall, however, confine ourselves to stating only that of which we have direct observation.

At Hindenburg, a large frontier town of 105,000 inhabitants, the most important coal-mine left to Germany, the Delbrück mine, is situated on the territorial limit. The new demarcation has compelled it to abandon over a third of its galleries, which are now flooded—a total loss of capital wealth. The exhausted galleries of this mine used to be filled with sand, the quarries for which, situated a few hundred metres from the offices of the mine, are now in Polish territory. It has therefore been necessary to construct a narrow-gauge railway for the purpose of bringing sand from a distance of eighteen kilometres.

Hindenburg is eleven kilometres from Beuthen. The two towns are linked by an electric tramway which follows the main road. The finest hospital in Upper Silesia is situated half-way. It was desired that Poland should receive it, and so as to achieve this end the road has been cut across by the border for a distance of several kilometres, thus creating a miniature Polish Corridor. The trams are closed while crossing it and are accompanied by an armed Polish Customs guard, but the passage of other vehicles has been stopped. The Germans have therefore had to construct a new road on their own territory, parallel to the part of the road which has been annexed, and then to build a new hospital. And yet at Szarley, a few kilometres from there, a model hospital was about to be completed when the district was ceded to Poland; the work was interrupted, and the building, which was destined to fulfil a double function, remained unfinished and is slowly crumbling away, left to the rigours of the weather.

In matters of detail anomalies abound. At Hinden-

burg, for instance, the frontier follows a railway as far as a level-crossing, where it suddenly forms a salient into German territory so as to encompass a school, which is now unused, having been abandoned by the Poles.

Beuthen is surrounded by thirty-four frontier stations, and it is necessary to visit the district on foot to realize the almost incredible waste which has resulted from the partition; the increase in the number of officials, the duplication of work both in the offices and in the administration, the loss of time, of money, of effort and of serenity, and above all the atmosphere of hatred and irritation, the everlasting tension—a sort of dull anger felt alike on both sides—the unpleasant incidents of all kinds which occur without intermission. . . . One feels Upper Silesia to be very far removed from Geneva.

In all the districts which are claimed with such bitterness, peace seems to be in perpetual danger. A passage from M. Robert Tourly's excellent book, *Le Conflit de demain, Berlin, Varsovie, Danzig* is worthy of special attention.

"On account of the Corridor, East Prussia, from her isolated position, sees Customs barriers raised between herself and the rest of Germany. Commercial interchange and communication of every kind is complicated by formalities without number, and has become extremely difficult."

"Further, overshadowing this unhappy province, is the threat that it may be annexed by Poland. Indeed there are annexationist tendencies of considerable strength in Poland, which are expressed with insolence in certain quarters. The consequence of this uncertain state of affairs is that the German banks, through fear of the possibility of annexation, no longer dare to

invest money in East Prussia or lend it except at a very high rate of interest." (P. 41.)

Later on we shall proceed to inquire whether these Polish plans, tending to the annexation of East Prussia, really do exist. Let us for the time being confine ourselves to actual fact. There must be serious and definite cause for apprehension for banks to raise the interest on their loans, and even to refuse them, in a country whose territorial status is guaranteed by international agreements. The views of political theorists do not as a rule carry much weight with business men. Can it be, then, that these fears are justified by precise and ascertainable facts? We shall here give the results obtained during the course of our inquiry in the districts concerned.

Some unusual organizations have come into being in Poland, in what is known as the Western Marches. There has been created, side by side with the military defences of the frontier, a civil defensive organization, and the administrative centres of the frontier districts of Posnania, West Prussia and Upper Silesia have been militarized. Let us enlarge upon this point.

The civil defences of the frontier originated, two years ago, in the Polish Nationalist Association of the Western Marches, which has an active membership of 20,000. It recruits its adherents from local patriotic societies: Sokols, associations for self-protection, the League of ex-soldiers from Haller's army, the League of former Upper Silesian Insurgents, the Union "of the Mazures and of the Faithful Sons of Ermland".

The organization comprises provincial groups, district groups, and Communal groups, and these sections form battalions, companies, squadrons and units of cyclists. In the event of war, each district must mobilize a battalion and a company of machine-gunners, and

each province a division for the protection of the frontier. These formations have their sectors for attack and defence allocated to them.

The supreme command of the organization rests with the military command of the Posnanian and West Prussian Corps, and it is entrusted, even now in time of peace, with the arming and instruction of these newly formed units, which is accomplished by providing a *cadre* of officers and non-commissioned officers from the active list.

This civil defence of the frontiers has been considerably reinforced during the last few months. The *cadre* has been completed by former students from the high-schools and teachers' colleges, and by civilian doctors; stores of arms and munitions have been established.

Last year, for the first time, a mobilization test under the direction of staff officers allowed an estimate to be formed of the results achieved. The plan of manœuvre was not defensive; on the contrary, it was based on a forward movement in the direction of Marienwerder (namely, the occupation of the German station of Garnsee), and the standing army had lent 1,500 Regulars to the forces mobilized.

The civil defensive organization is duplicated by a military defensive system which comprises 900 officers and 27,000 men derived from the State police and from the frontier guards. This formation, which is intended for times of war—it must total altogether from five to seven brigades—is to support the civil defensive organization; it is armed both with heavy and light machine-guns and is commanded by General Paslawski. This officer has the rank of corps-commander and takes his authority, in this special function, from the Ministry of War, which he has to keep informed con-

cerning the progress of instruction. General Paslawski commands the Pomeranian Corps, and we have before us the text of his latest proclamation to the officers of the garrison of Thorn.¹¹⁰ The least that may be said is that it so closely recalls the literature of civil war that it might be mistaken for such. An army inspector, attached to Thorn, is entrusted with helping General Paslawski to accomplish his special mission.

The Germans complain that the Polish Regular troops massed on their frontier comprise a formidable effective force which is constantly reinforced, viz. 2 army corps of three divisions, 4 brigades of cavalry, 2 flying-corps regiments. But Poland is not restricted by treaties and can do as she will with her army.

The militarization of all the administrative centres of government in the former German provinces should also be noted. All the civilian posts dependent on the Central Government in voivodats, districts and provinces, are filled by officers.¹¹¹

Other matters are not less worthy of note.

On March 1st of last year, the new Starost of Dirschau (Tczew), M. Stachowski, a colonel of aviation, brought together a hundred teachers of the district, and lectured them in a bellicose speech on the "Past and Future of Pomerania". He urged them to forward the military organization of youth in preparation "for the next war against Germany".

"A man is master in his own house", says the proverb. We are willing to grant this, but all these military demonstrations, this "keeping of powder dry", this "sharpening of swords", unhappily recalls to mind a former adventure which, in the course of time, brought to too many unfortunate people a terrible awakening.

PART IV

THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION

En politique il faut avoir de l'avenir dans l'esprit.

CHOISEUL

I

POLISH SUGGESTIONS

THE present state of things gives satisfaction to nobody, whether Pole or German: Poland, as we have seen, has refused to accept the results of the plebiscites of Allenstein and Marienwerder; already she feels herself stifled in her narrow Corridor; her sea front of 76 kilometres, lacking a natural access, seems to her insignificant. The solution which has been imposed upon her is, in her view, a worthless one—provisional, perhaps, but certainly insufficient.¹¹²

Did not Dmowski write, in his celebrated memorandum, "The Corridor is worthless to Poland unless she obtains East Prussia as well"?

Since the conclusion of the Treaty this thesis has been upheld in Poland in all its aspects, with variations which are sometimes of great interest, but without appreciable alteration in the main theme.

Dr. Slawski¹¹³ goes straight to the point in his chapter on the position of East Prussia in relation to Poland.

"It is sufficient", he says, "to glance at the map to realize that East Prussia forms a barrier which keeps Poland from the sea."

Here again historical considerations are brought into play:

"We wish to recall the fact that East Prussia was,

from 1625 to 1657, a principality standing in vassalage to Poland, and that a part of it, namely, Warnia, was an integral part of Poland from 1454 until 1772."

Then follow ethnographical arguments:

"It should be noted that in East Prussia there are also a certain number of Poles established in the valley of the Lower Vistula, in Warnia and in Mazuria."

After hesitating between the annexation of East Prussia and the creation of a Free City of Königsberg, M. Slawski boldly concludes as follows:

"East Prussia, by reason of her geographical situation and her means of communication, is clearly indicated as Poland's access to the sea."

Let us now listen to one of the best Polish publicists, M. Stanislas Bukowiecki.¹¹⁴ He is not one of the extremists of the Right, but is included amid the moderate National Democrats.

The treaties have not satisfied him; he regrets the part of Upper Silesia which was ceded to Germany, the districts of Allenstein and Marienwerder, and deplores the status of Danzig, while yet he admits the strength of Germany's hold over all these districts.

Be that as it may, Poland's access to the sea appears to her insufficient and somewhat insecure. The Corridor should therefore, according to her, be enlarged and Poland given the effectual possession of the mouth of the Vistula.

As to East Prussia, which has remained in the power of Germany, her very existence forms a danger to the Polish State: it projects too deeply into Polish territory, separates Poland from Lithuania and prevents her expansion to the Baltic; it must therefore be united to Poland.

M. Bukowiecki then contemplates the creation of a

new State which would include Königsberg, "the only German region of East Prussia", as well as Lithuania with a part of Latvia and of White Russia, extending "from Königsberg to the Dniepr and to the Düna". This State, nominally independent, would in actual fact be under the control of Poland.

The idea, let us note, is not a new one. In January 1916 William II conceived a grand plan for the territorial remodelling of these regions, which assumed the name of "the Polish-Lithuanian plan". It united the occupied provinces of the Kingdom of Poland to Lithuania, gave them an access to the sea by annexing Courland, and made of all these territories a buffer State linked to Germany by a military and commercial convention.

In the Polish conception, Poland assumes Germany's rôle, but the broad lines of the plan imagined by William II are not sensibly modified. They will reappear in all ulterior plans, the intention of which is to grant Poland compensation at Lithuania's expense, in the event of the restitution of the Corridor to Germany.

It is in any case necessary, continues M. Bukowiecki, to intensify Polish propaganda in East Prussia without waiting for the realization of these great plans; economic facts dictate such a course. The nearest port to Warsaw is not Danzig, but Elbing. Commercial infiltration and the slow and pacific absorption of that region, which would be unable to resist the lure of money and self-interest, must forestall its formal union to the Polish State. If this policy is efficiently conducted he believes that East Prussia will fall into Poland's hands like a ripe fruit.

M. Bukowiecki is representative of moderate opinion

among Polish propagandists. M. Stanislas Grabski will now teach us the point of view of Polish statesmen, and he is, without question, a personage of the first importance. A former Professor of Political Economy in the University of Lemberg, and originally a Socialist, M. Grabski has become one of the most influential leaders of the National Democrats. He presided over the Diet and the Commission for Foreign Affairs from 1919 to 1922, has twice been Minister of Education and even "Vice-Premier". Finally, he controlled for many years an important paper in Lemberg, the *Slowo Polskie*.

M. Grabski is a theorist with a taste for generalizations and for synthetic opinions, and his works are written and arranged according to a classic plan. His best thesis is entitled "Remarks upon the Present Historical State of the Development of Poland".¹¹⁵

The Polish State must grow yet further, for it has the need for expansion. "The question of East Prussia", he says, "has the same significance to-day as it had at the time of Casimir Jagellon." But it is the East which is the true direction in which expansion should take place, according to certain Poles; and in order to obtain tangible results, particularly in the direction of the Ukraine, they seek to assure Germany's benevolent neutrality. But Germany will remain hostile so long as a state of things which she considers intolerable has not been changed, and particularly in regard to the Corridor.

Reference to this doctrine calls to mind a specific fact. During the last Russo-Polish war Marshal Pilsudski attempted to create, in Eastern Europe, two buffer-States—White Russia and the Ukraine—as vassals of Poland.

But, declares M. Grabski, since Poland preferred a united to a federative form of government, she is obliged to pursue a policy tending to re-group and to reunite Polish territories. The goal to be reached in the East is yet very distant; it is better to think of immediate objects, and first of all to reopen the question of the status of the country of the Mazures (the districts of Allenstein, Marienwerder, Ermland and a part of East Prussia). The region of the Mazure Lakes commands the access of the Polish provinces to the Baltic; it is necessary, he considers, to create everywhere Polish societies, to flood the province with Polish literature and, in a word, to arouse the unawakened national sentiment.

The same methods are indicated for Upper Silesia, "of which the majority of the population is Polish as far as the Oder". In this district the Polish element "should wage a war without quarter against the German element".

But the first and essential aim of the Nationalist Polish policy is to regain the whole of the country of the Mazures, which gives access to the shores of the Baltic. "This is the first commandment of Polish history, and is the historic road to power of the Polish people. Sooner or later Poland must come into conflict with Germany for the possession of the shores of the Baltic and of Königsberg", and victory will go to Poland if the ancient Slavonic peoples once again become conscious of their racial traditions.

If we understand M. Grabski aright, it is the whole of East Prussia which must be reunited to Poland, since with the country of the Mazures, Ermland and Königsberg he included the coast-line in his programme of annexation.

After the propagandists and the politicians, let us give the views of the diplomats, for in Poland they are not afraid to discuss outstanding European problems publicly—and are by no means the least bold in doing so.

M. Stanislas Srokowski was Consul-General of Poland in Königsberg from 1921 to 1923, and two years later he published at Posen, under the auspices of the Nationalist Association of the Marches of the West, a book entitled *In the Land of the Black Cross, Some Notes on East Prussia*, which created a considerable stir at the time.¹¹⁶

In 1921, before he came to Königsberg, M. Srokowski had been the delegate of the Polish Government in Upper Silesia. He has told us of his activities there in a pamphlet entitled *Memories of the Third Uprising of Upper Silesia in 1921*,¹¹⁷ which we cannot too strongly recommend for its vividness and its instructive and illuminating qualities.

But let us return to the *Notes on East Prussia*. Poland must, to possess complete independence, have a broad access to the sea. The present Corridor is insufficient, and it is imperative that East Prussia should be annexed at the earliest possible moment. This object is worthy of any sacrifice and it must be pursued by every means available.

Furthermore East Prussia is peopled by barbarians and stagnates at an inferior level of civilization. Have they not, indeed, at Königsberg destroyed the house in which Kant lived?

Such is not, it is true, the opinion of M. Slawski, when he describes the prosperity of East Prussia, even in the time of her isolation.¹¹⁸

“Her former isolation did not prevent Frederick II making of East Prussia a great military centre, thanks

to which he was enabled successfully to wage the Seven Years War against half Europe. The intellectual level of East Prussia was at that time very high (Kant lived from 1724 to 1804), and her isolation did not hinder her development. The same applies to-day, for the cession to Poland of an access to the sea over a length of 76 kilometres in no way prevents East Prussia from enjoying intellectual intercourse with her Fatherland. (Königsberg possesses two opera-houses, and we know that no other provincial town can claim as much.)”

M. Srokowski's opinion is peculiar to him, but it seems a strange one to be held by a diplomat who was able, for two years, thanks to his position, to come into contact with the most cultured elements of the country.

The interests of civilization thus demand that Poland should save East Prussia. Strategic considerations are equally imperative in this, and the author describes with equanimity the possible evolution of the future conflict between Germany and Poland. But in truth these ideas are in our opinion too polemical in character, and in spite of the author's eminence we shall not dwell on them any longer.

To another Polish diplomat, who conceals his personality under the pseudonym of “Consulibus”, we are indebted for a curious suggestion for the partition of Silesia between Czecho-slovakia and Poland, which appeared in an essay entitled *The Experiences and Mistakes of our Foreign Policy with regard to Present-day Problems*.¹¹⁹

This idea of the partition of Silesia between Czecho-slovakia and Poland offers less interest on its own account than because of the exposition of the reasons

which have led to it. They are almost entirely of a strategic order, and are made in contemplation of an armed conflict between Germany and Poland. It is suggested that the German frontier should be brought to the outskirts of Breslau and that all of Lower Silesia should be taken from the Reich.

Nor has M. Casimir Smogorzewski, in his last work upon the Corridor, forgotten East Prussia. He, in his turn, has propounded an ingenious solution, though less radical than that of simple annexation, namely, that of a Customs Union with Poland.

His impartiality must be acknowledged in that he has recognized the difficulties which confront East Prussia.¹²⁰

"Right back in 1919 the difficulties of East Prussia were analysed and foreseen by a German economist, Dr. Fritz Simon, an official of the Königsberg Chamber of Commerce, whose conclusions were as follows:

'Although it is not an attractive thought to Prussians, the idea of a Customs Union of Eastern Prussia with Poland imposes itself as a necessity. Indeed Eastern Prussia would, thanks to such a union, enjoy all the facilities offered by commercial relations with Poland and Germany and neighbouring countries, and would thus abolish all inconveniences resulting for this province from its incorporation in the economic system of the Reich. On the other hand, it would be to the interest of Poland to aid the economic development of Königsberg without directing all her efforts towards Danzig. And it is only by being economically strong that Eastern Prussia will be able to maintain her political union with Germany. . . .'

This ingenious suggestion, made for the benefit of the West, somewhat lessens the apprehensions which

are aroused by the official Polish thesis of the annexation of East Prussia. Does this mean that Polish propaganda wishes to dispel the anxiety which is already being manifested in France, or does it wish to prepare the world, by a skilful graduation of her demands, to fresh territorial annexations? The future will tell us what to think.

We have already drawn attention to the activities of the "Polish Association for the Protection of the Western Marches". This Association defined its programme in a manifesto which was issued on April 11, 1926, in the *Gazeta Gdanska* (the *Danzig Gazette*). The following is its most significant passage:

"The natural frontier of Poland in the West is the Oder, in the East the Middle and Lower Duna. That is why our motto will be 'From Stettin to Riga'. In the meantime, however, we do not want to quarrel with Russia because she has not finally renounced Riga, for, in spite of all, Riga will ultimately be ours. Our present motto is 'From Stettin to Polangen'.¹²¹

"Germany is powerful and we must conduct propaganda with the view to strengthening the Polish Army, and we must issue propagandist literature. Every newspaper should have a weekly supplement, well and copiously illustrated, so that Polish public opinion should be perpetually stimulated by illustrations and letter-press with regard to the Baltic."

On July 15, 1928, there was held in Bromberg the congress of "Poles, Native of the Country of the Mazures, of Ermland and of the district of Marienburg", of which the resolutions were published by the *Gazeta Bydgoska* (the *Bromberg Gazette*). They claimed, on the strength of Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (which they doubtless confused with the same Article

in the Treaty of Versailles) the cession of East Prussia and the constitution of an autonomous republic, arranged in cantons for the three nationalities, the German, the Polish and the Lithuanian, all of which meet there. This State would be a sort of "Baltic Switzerland".

The activities of the intelligentsia, of the Universities and of the Student Associations also deserve our attention. The Student Associations last year published a year-book, at once historical and political, in which the most precise information was to be found on the objects to be sought in the field of foreign politics.¹²²

The "Vistula Society", which was founded at Danzig in 1904, and was granted a University charter on May 28, 1921, has for object "to combat the de-nationalization of Poles at the Technical College of Danzig (Technische Hochschule) and to stimulate Polish national sentiment in the Kashubes".

The "Baltja", a student association of the University of Posen, proposes to "encourage love of the sea among the people, to make the coast of the Baltic Polish in character, and to strengthen the Polish hold on the coast".

At Danzig the "Gedanja" and the "Helanja" set out to "fight against the German element and to extend Polish influence on the shores of the Baltic".

The "Silesia" of Posen is organizing Polish intellectual propaganda throughout German Silesia.

Two student associations concentrate on East Prussia—to wit, the "Grundwaldja" of Warsaw and the "Mazovia" of Posen.

On February 28th last a big German Press agency, the "Telegraphen-Union internationaler Nachricht-

tendienst", issued a confidential Polish memorandum, signed by Zalewski, on the best method of absorbing the Free City of Danzig. M. Zalewski is a diplomat, and in his capacity of Councillor of the Embassy has had occasion to deputize for the Polish High Commissioner at Danzig, M. Strassburger. The memorandum has been declared apocryphal, but the explanations given on this subject by the Polish representative at Danzig¹²³ allow us to conclude that this document, if it is not the personal work of M. Zalewski, expresses in broad outline the opinion of Polish official *milieux*. It is worthy of detailed analysis.

German diplomacy, it declares, obstinately claims the Corridor and Danzig. How is Polish policy to prevent the return of Danzig to Germany?

The position of Poland in these districts is, it is true, still difficult, but time is on her side.

German business houses have ever-growing interests in Poland.

From the ethnographical point of view the German minorities in the former provinces of West Prussia tend to decrease with every year.

If Germany's economic situation were to improve, and if she offered greater opportunities of work, the young generation of Germans would willingly leave their native land and their places could be taken by Poles. Besides which, for the last ten years, the ethnographical factor has appreciably changed in former West Prussia to the detriment of Germany.

Owing to the depreciation of Polish currency, agriculture in Pomerania is in a more prosperous condition than in Germany, and much more so than in the Free City; the former with its mark and the latter with its gulden cannot compete on equal terms. Competition

can only become possible once again if Danzig adopts the zloty.

But one cannot expect the Free City to lose her sympathy for Germany. The "Deutschtum" is too powerful there, and this fact, which has been too long ignored, should determine the attitude of Polish diplomacy.

One should no longer combat Germanism in Danzig, where such a policy has no chance of success. The case is different in Pomerania. Therefore Poland's recognition and respect of the German character of Danzig should be declared on all occasions by the Polish Press and in Polish official circles, and it should be stated that Poland has no thought of imposing herself on the Free City. The railwaymen of Danzig, for example, must no longer be harassed over the language they speak, and incidents from which Germanism could derive benefit must be avoided. If the "Deutschtum" of Danzig is no longer attacked, the principal arguments of the Nationalists of the Free City will disappear. Under these conditions it will also be possible to turn to advantage the antagonism between the parties of the Left and Right.

Polish penetration must be conducted along economic lines. The economic interests of Danzig must be rendered increasingly dependent on Poland.

If, thanks to their commercial relations with Poland, the big business houses of the Free City make larger profits than formerly, they will gradually find themselves linked to the source of their prosperity. Firms of which the sympathies are known should nevertheless be favoured with orders and credit to the exclusion of those houses which, under the pressure of competition, will in time find themselves obliged to adopt a more conciliatory attitude.

The Press of Danzig can be won over by the threat of its prohibition from Polish territory. This policy has already considerably modified the attitude of the *Danziger Neuesten Nachrichten*.

Polish banks in Danzig have not succeeded in supplanting the German banks, which continue, in practice, to hold a monopoly, even as regards transactions with Gdynia.

The difference in currency increases Poland's difficulty in bringing economic pressure to bear on Danzig: the gulden acts as a barrier. It is true that the treaties give to Poland the right of demanding the unification of currency, but this is a delicate matter, and to bring it up prematurely would risk arousing a fresh surge of nationalism. None the less it is right to prepare for this eventuality.

It should be declared, and Polish official organs should be made to declare, that Poland has no special interest in the unification of currency, and the opinion of business circles in Danzig should be probed; it will be suggested to them that a monetary symbol is of small political importance, that the gulden places the agriculturists of Danzig in an inferior position, and that business is complicated in its transactions by the use both of the zloty and the gulden. An important argument to be brought into prominence is that wages, paid in zlotys, will be less onerous to employers than if they were paid in gulden, or still more in marks.

If the commercial circles of Danzig react favourably to these suggestions, a Press campaign will be inaugurated and Poland, after preparing matters in Geneva and in London, will be able to take official initiative with some chance of success. The munition store of the Westerplatte would then be transferred to

Gdynia. Pressure would be brought to bear on the Nationalists while emphasizing that the currency of Danzig is of less importance than the guarantee of her absolute neutrality in case of war.

In the event of a plebiscite being decided upon, the question must not on any account be put in the form of an alternative between being German or Polish, but between being "the Free City of Danzig, or becoming a small German provincial town". Business men of Danzig must be brought to understand that the city's return to Germany would be prejudicial to their interests.

In the conduct of the campaign Poland must utilize to the utmost the antagonisms arising within the realm of Danzig's domestic politics.

It is not desirable to have a Government entirely of the Left at Danzig, for it would allow the Nationalist opposition to utilize the difficulties which would arise daily to discredit the policy of a *rapprochement* with Poland. Thus it would be best for the Nationalists to remain in power.

Poland must not display hostility towards any Government of the Right, so as to allow the Left to attack it with greater effect; she must not openly associate herself with the latter, but must support its actions in Paris, London, Rome and Geneva.

The high official circles of Danzig will, moreover, readily appreciate the dangers of reunion with the Reich, which would result in their losing their privileged position and would reduce them to the rank of subordinate executive agents.

This long memorandum is summarized, not without some pedantry, into twelve clauses which clearly indicate its fundamental theme.

We thus see that all the Polish suggestion must, in the last analysis, be interpreted as schemes of aggrandizement. Far from wanting to modify the question of the Corridor in a manner favourable to Germany, the Poles only dream of enlarging the Corridor zone by annexing, under one guise or another, Danzig and East Prussia. Nor is any mystery made as to the designs on Silesia. "Is it not Polish as far as Breslau?" asks the diplomat whom we have already quoted. In reality it is still Dmowski's plan with which they are concerned.

THE GERMAN CONCEPTION

BUT if Poland still holds to Dmowski's conception, has Germany progressed since 1919?

A preliminary remark must be made: Germany had, by 1919, already profoundly modified her policy towards Poland.

"Recognition of the Polish State is an article of German policy," wrote M. von Rheinbaben.¹²⁴ "In fact, Germany acknowledged her in 1916."

We have ourselves amply proved, in a previous work,¹²⁵ that Poland remained faithful to the Central Powers throughout the Great War.

As we see, Germany had admitted, long before the end of the war, that is to say before the Allies—and this is an incontrovertible fact of history—the necessity for the reconstruction of the Polish State. She understood full well that this State would require access to the sea, and she made formal admission of this at the Peace Conference.

Articles 363 and 364 of the original draft of the Treaty of Versailles stated that Czecho-slovakia would have a right to lease certain portions of the free ports of Hamburg and Stettin. The German delegates, basing themselves on these clauses, entered a protest in June 1919 against the grant of Pomerania to Poland and the creation of the Free City of Danzig. They drew up a counter-proposal in the following terms:

"In view of her principles and in order to abide by her engagements the Government of the Reich is ready to grant Poland *free and assured access to the sea*, to convert the ports of Memel, Königsberg and Danzig into

free ports, and to recognize that Poland has extensive rights within them.

"By means of a suitable agreement it would be possible to guarantee to the Polish State every facility for construction as well as for the use of the necessary equipment in these free ports (docks, quays, warehouses)." ¹²⁶

This text is interesting because it gives satisfaction to the needs of the whole Polish hinterland, "from Stettin to Polangen", to use the expression of the "Polish Nationalist Association for the Protection of the Western Marches".

"Germany", continues M. von Rheinbaben, ¹²⁷ "must and will live in neighbourly relation with Poland. . . . The catastrophe of the Great War has created new conditions in the East. That which was, can never be again."

Nevertheless the leader of the Populist section of the Reichstag adds:

"But the Corridor and the course of the new frontier-line in Upper Silesia (an absurd line which was drawn in contravention of all right and without regard to interior equilibrium) cannot endure."

This reservation having been made—and we shall see that its precise implications are made clear—the Germans endeavoured to find a procedure which would give satisfaction to the legitimate needs of Poland. Endless literature has resulted from this attempt at conciliation.

There were quite evidently a number of genuine ways of giving, assuring and guaranteeing to Poland, as to other countries, full access to the sea, and that without taking territory from Germany and without separating an important province from its Fatherland. ¹²⁸

What, then, were these genuine ways, and what are they still? What are, and what may be, Germany's precise suggestions as regards the northern districts?

First of all, making the Vistula international. This was how President Wilson originally understood Poland's access to the sea; the suggestion is to be found in the first scheme drawn up by the American Research Committee, and it required all the persistent work of Polish propaganda in America, and the skilful and persevering efforts of Dmowski and Paderewski, to obtain the rejection of this solution.

The restoration, by Germany, of the navigability of the lower course of the Vistula would accompany its internationalization. Before the war a veritable fleet sailed on the waters of the German portion; to-day it is deserted, and at Dirschau and Weissenfels and at Kurzebrack sand-banks are flush with the surface of the water. Poland has no funds with which to remedy this state of things, and where the Germans spent twenty million gold marks—twenty million pre-war marks, that is—she allocates the infinitesimal sum of 800,000 zlotys. She is lacking in experts and in machinery. The Germans offer to restore the river to navigability, to bring it back to life and to save the lowlands of East Prussia from floods by deepening its channel. The amelioration thus brought about would no doubt benefit Germany. Would Poland, nevertheless, not derive the most profit? Would not the freight for her goods be lowered, and would she not be returning to normal economic conditions by favouring water-transport rather than rail? The Vistula, which is the backbone of Poland, is to-day completely useless. The Germans desire to reclaim it from its inactivity and again to make of it a useful, vital thoroughfare for

trade, from which all the countries of Central Europe would derive benefit. The necessary funds would be provided by the credits which are now destined for East Prussia.

To Poland's demands for guarantees for her security at the mouth of the Vistula, Germany replies that she proposes that Danzig remain a free port.

The Poles say that Danzig and Gdynia are no longer sufficient for Poland. But the Germans would provide her with free zones in all the German ports, even in that of Hamburg; this city, as is known, is linked to Central Poland by a system of canals, and the American Commission had wished to direct the trade of the new State along this channel. Poland could feel as much at home in Hamburg, Stettin, Elbing and Königsberg as she does in Danzig. But M. Slawski believes that in such a case his country would be reduced to "the humiliating position of being a customer of German ports. . . . Trade would be rendered completely dependent upon the good will of Germany, and she would impose harbour dues and especially railway charges in an arbitrary fashion."¹²⁹

This objection, the Germans reply, has no sound basis. If the ports are made free, if an agreement with international guarantees is in force—and there is nothing to prevent this being the case—the charges will not be left to the arbitrary decision of the conceding Power. Complete security could be given to Poland, both as regards the administration and the use of the zones which would be conceded to her in the ports. It is merely necessary, for this, to find the right avenue of approach, and then, if there is mutual good will and a sincere desire to come to terms, an equitable solution can perfectly well be found.

The railway lines from Poland to the sea could be internationalized where they pass through Prussian territory, between the rectified frontier and the ports. Certain of the lines could even be conceded in their entirety to Poland, in accordance with the formula which was adopted for the safeguarding of Jugo-Slavian interests in the port of Salonika. The trains, it has been said, can be considered as actual mobile territory—as is the case at the present time in the Corridor with regard to the privileged German traffic. Germany is prepared to grant Poland whatever traffic requirements are necessary to her, without limitation in the number and tonnage of the trains. The present situation in relation to Polish traffic running north and south would in no way be changed. The Polish railway companies, being the owners of the lines and independent of all exterior control, would, as before, carry Polish goods to the sea.

But, it may be asked, what of times of war?

We must face this eventuality realistically, and calmly examine the possibilities of the case.

If we have in mind a conflict between Germany and Poland, then the present Corridor is, from the strategic point of view, defenceless. It would be occupied on the first day of hostilities: this is a secret to no one. The Polish Navy cannot hold out before the German Fleet, even with the latter reduced to the extent which was determined by the treaties. The salient position of Pomerania, exposed as it is on both flanks, is untenable, and whatever may be done Poland will be cut off from her access to the sea. The position could be no worse if Pomerania were to be restored to Germany: it would merely be clearer and better defined.

In the event of a conflict between Poland and a Power

other than Germany, two possibilities offer themselves: Either Germany will remain entirely neutral in the event of hostilities, and in that case will allow the passage, over the private lines conceded to Poland, of any munitions which might be sent to her, or she will take an active part, which brings us back to the first possibility which we have examined. In neither case is the Corridor of any strategic value to Poland, for it is at the mercy of Germany. These common-sense considerations show that the military point of view can form no obstacle to an agreement.

It is said that there are Slavonic elements of some importance in the Corridor, both Kashube and Polish, and Germany is prepared to give them special protection, to have their rights assured by the League of Nations, and to allow them to develop their intellectual and national heritage.

Let us now come to the question of Upper Silesia.

In this, the conclusions of German opinion are less unanimous, and the solutions suggested are less universally approved.

One fact is certain: that the Upper Silesian industrial basin forms a single unit, and a commercial and economic system of which the homogeneity must be re-established. A rectification of the frontier in accordance with this would imply certain concessions to Poland.

"In the course of the collective economic work which is being undertaken on an international scale," writes M. von Rheinbaben,¹³⁰ "it would be possible, with regard to the industrial basin of Upper Silesia, to guarantee to Poland an agreed apportionment of raw materials and of the industrial products of Upper Silesia. . . ."

Polish industry desires to be independent ; it wants to own its coal and iron, and to obtain them on advantageous terms. This wish is entirely legitimate and can quite well be satisfied. A sound commercial treaty with special stipulations, preferential treatment, a privileged position—all these conceptions are maturing, becoming crystallized, and agreement will be reached by the exercise of good will.

“Nobody in Germany”, continues M. von Rheinbaben¹³¹, “believes that these matters can be settled from one day to the next. We adopt the motto of the Polish writer, which runs, ‘God and History will decide.’ But we counsel that these things should be done when they are most feasible.”

Certain Germans go still farther. Two districts of Upper Silesia, Pless and Rybnik, showed quite a definite majority for Poland. They possess enormous reserves of coal and mineral ores, which are as yet unexploited, while their forests are the finest of the district. Germany could finally renounce them if the industrial basin were returned to her in its entirety.

We have several times mentioned this suggestion in the course of our inquiry, but we cannot consider that it represents the official German point of view. It shows, however, that German opinion has progressed, that Germany is leaving behind the uncompromising attitude and the bitterness of the past, that she is seeking the most practical solutions and those most capable of realization ; in a word, that she is striving to reach a European outlook.

CONCLUSION

THE points of view which we have expounded seem at first sight very difficult to reconcile.

Germany drew a distinction, at Locarno, between a guarantee of peace and a guarantee of frontiers, and it is the first which she accepted, as M. Briand admitted at Geneva :

"One may recall", he said, "the words of Dr. Stresemann when, as the loyal representative of a great nation, he declared that, by appending his signature to the Treaty of Locarno, he had undertaken that his country would never have recourse to force either in the east or in the west of Europe, and at the same time he emphatically pronounced himself in favour of the security offered by law."

Germany has thus pledged herself by this Treaty to employ none but pacific means for the settlement of any disputes which might arise between herself and Poland.

"In these circumstances", declares M. Lichtenberger,¹³² "Germany can take her stand on Article 19 of the Treaty of Versailles in affirming her right to hope for, and to demand, a partial readjustment of the European situation without showing contempt for the Treaty."

She has put forward, as we have seen, definite and practical suggestions, and she desires to reach a solution which is acceptable to both parties.

But it takes two to make an agreement, and Poland refuses to lend herself to a revision of the treaties. Not only that, but she harbours plans for fresh expansion, and proposes to annex East Prussia and Silesia.

We regret to have to state this fact, but it is indisputable, and we have fully established its reality.

What, then, should be done in face of this situation? Two attitudes are possible: to remain passive or to intervene.

Matters may be left to take their course, and this passive attitude is the easiest solution and the one requiring least effort; but it is also the most dangerous, for it will lead, sooner or later, to a fresh European conflagration. It is often said that Time is a great conciliator and settles all difficulties, that economic needs will triumph over national disagreements, will end by overriding ancient prejudices and obsolete notions, with which nations, owing to their inexperience and their cupidity, have for too long been satisfied. We should like to share this belief, but in reality it has no foundation. These aggressive organizations of the Poles which we see developing within the disputed areas are less than two years old, and it was only at the beginning of this year that the militarizing of the Polish administration was achieved; moreover, it was during the summer of 1928 that, during a trial mobilization of the "Civil Defence Force of the Frontiers", the German station of Garnsee, near Marienwerder, was chosen as the objective. . . . These warlike operations run the risk of ending badly unless Europe puts her house in order. She cannot indefinitely play with fire. . . .

It is necessary to intervene, and promptly, if peace is to be safeguarded. There must be a sincere effort to reach a final and just settlement, humane in spirit and based on Justice, and it must be imposed even at the cost of sacrifices, if these are unavoidable for the realization of harmony.

If peace is sincerely desired, the dangers which threaten it must be removed. There is still time: to-morrow it may be too late.

NOTES

1. Casimir Smogorzewski, *La Pologne Restaurée*, p. 29.
2. A proclamation, signed by William II and Charles I, had been issued on September 13, 1917. It established a Council of Regency which was to be assisted in its work by various elements of the legislative and executive powers. Poland was to become a Constitutional Monarchy with a democratic Parliament.
3. For details of events at this time, see *La Pologne et nous*, by René Martel, p. 47 *et seq.*
4. J. Pilsudski, *Moje pierwsze Boje (My First Battles)*. Biblioteka Polska Edition. Warsaw, 1925, pp. 62 *et seq.*
5. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, p. 26.
6. Lwow, 1908, Paris. French translation from Colin.
7. Dmowski, *Question Polonaise*, p. 306.
8. Dmowski, *ibid.*, p. 307.
9. Dmowski, *ibid.*, p. 331.
10. These essays were collected and published in book form in 1902. Second edition, 1903. Third edition, 1908.
11. Nitti, *Peaceless Europe*, p. 70.
12. Robert Lansing, *The Big Four and Others of the Peace Conference*. Hutchinson, 1922, p. 18.
13. C. W. Recke, *Die Polnische Frage als Problem der europaischen Politik*, Berlin, 1927, pp. 289 *et seq.*
14. Robert Lansing, *op. cit.*, p. 200-201.
15. Robert Lansing, *op. cit.*, p. 198-199.
16. Robert Lansing, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-202.
17. Colonel House and Paderewski, moreover, developed great affection for each other. They took every opportunity of meeting, and House professed the most profound admiration for the eloquence and the political sense of Paderewski. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Vol. IV, p. 272.
18. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Vol. IV, p. 209.
19. Polish diplomats have continually made use, in the course of the various negotiations, of old German maps which had been tampered with. These forgeries were discovered, and have been denounced by Dr. Manfred Laubert in *Nationalität und Volkswille im preussischen Osten*, pp. 46 *et seq.* Breslau, 1925. We refer the reader to this work in which he will find the most conclusive demonstration of the truth of our statement.

20. Mermeix, *Le Combat des Trois*, p. 243.
21. Dmowski, *Polityka Polska*, p. 327.
22. Dmowski, *ibid.*, p. 333.
23. Dmowski, *ibid.*, p. 342.
24. Paris, 1920, pp. 246 *et seq.*
25. Mermeix, *Les Négociations Secrètes et les quatre armistices*, pp. 249, 299.
26. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Vol. IV, p. 273.
27. House and Seymour, *What Really Happened at Paris*, p. 67.
28. Gabriel Hanotaux. First Memorandum or Note sent to G.H.Q. on November 11, 1918, and subsequently to M. Pichon, the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
29. Second Memorandum. Same remarks as previous footnote.
30. Gabriel Hanotaux, *Le Traité de Versailles*. Paris, 1919, p. 200.
31. Robert Lansing, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
32. Robert Lansing, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
33. Robert Lansing, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
34. Mermeix, *Le Combat des Trois*, pp. 233 *et seq.*
35. Mermeix, *ibid.*, pp. 85 *et seq.*
36. Nitti, *Peaceless Europe*, p. 72.
37. Nitti, *ibid.*, p. 72.
38. Nitti, *ibid.*, pp. 112-113.
39. G. Recke, *op. cit.*, pp. 323 *et seq.*
40. Dmowski, *op. cit.*, p. 372.
41. See the chapter which gives an exposition of the Polish point of view.
42. House and Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
43. Dmowski, *op. cit.*, p. 383.
44. Mermeix, *op. cit.*, p. 247.
45. Wickham Steed here commits a considerable error. The settlement concerning Danzig was proposed to the Council by the Territorial Commission.
46. Henry Wickham Steed, *Through Thirty Years*.
47. Karl Friedrich Nowak, *Versailles*, 1919. Translated into French by Samson, p. 88.
48. Kozicki, *Sprawa granic Polski*, p. 67. See also *The Diary of Lord Bertie*, 1914-1918. London, 1924, p. 325.
49. This lengthy essay, generally known by the name of "The Document of Fontainebleau", bears the date March 25, 1919.

50. Tardieu, *La Paix*, pp. 129 *et seq.*
51. Nitti, *Peaceless Europe*, p. 106.
52. From Nowak, *op. cit.*, p. 137.
53. Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
54. Mermeix, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-255.
55. This statement by Wilson thus fully justifies our comments on Paderewski's exposition of the case; we can no longer doubt but that the latter brought conviction to the President of the United States.
56. Dmowski was then Minister for Foreign Affairs.
57. For details of the disputes between Danzig and Poland, see (a) Dr. Stanislas Slawski, *L'accès de la Pologne à la mer*. Paris, Bossard, 1925. (b) Hans Adolf Harder, *Dantzig, Polen und der Völkerbund*. Berlin, 1928.
58. Mermeix, *op. cit.*
59. Mermeix, *op. cit.*
60. See Ludyga-Laskowski, *Materiały po historii Powstania G. Śląskich*, 1919-1920. (Contributions to the History of the Upper Silesian Risings.)
61. For this, see the series of Polish memoranda and official or secret documents published by Olbrich: *Der Leidensweg des Oberschlesischen Volkes*. Breslau, 1929.
62. Nitti, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-177.
63. Nitti, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-178.
64. *The Martyrdom of the Germans in Upper Silesia: Acts of Violence and Atrocities Committed by the Poles during the Third Insurrection in Upper Silesia during May and June 1921*. (Official Publication of the German Government.)
65. *An Ambassador of Peace, Lord D'Abernon's Diary*, Vol. I, pp. 189 *et seq.*
66. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.
68. *Ibid.*, pp. 216-217.
69. The "Deutsche Volksbund" is an Association of intellectual character for the defence of the interests of the German populations of Polish Upper Silesia.
70. Paris. Bossard, 1925.
71. Smogorzewski, *Poland, Germany and the Corridor*. Williams & Norgate, 1930.
72. Smogorzewski, *ibid.*, pp. 19-20.
73. Slawski, *op. cit.*, pp. 40 *et seq.*

74. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.
75. Slawski, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
76. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-25.
77. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-27.
78. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
79. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
80. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.
81. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
82. Slawski, *op. cit.*, p. 47.
83. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-49.
84. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
85. Georges Lacour Gayet, Preface to M. Slawski's book.
86. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.
87. *La Pologne Restaurée*, pp. 103 *et seq.*
88. Speech delivered on January 10, 1927, at the opening of the "Society for International Studies" in Warsaw.
89. Jacques Bainville, *Les Conséquences politiques de la Paix*, pp. 31-32.
90. Gabriel Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, p. 299.
91. *The German Character of Danzig, its National Independence and its Position in the Past*. Photographic Reproductions of Archives of Danzig, published by Dr. Kaufmann, Keeper of the Archives.
92. Quoted from a work by Dr. Johann Fürst, *Der Widersinn des polnischen Korridors*, which tends to refute, point by point, Dr. Slawski's book, *L'Accès de la Pologne à la mer*.
93. Robert Tourly, *Le conflit de demain, Berlin, Varsovie, Dantzig*. Paris, 1928, p. 165.
94. See the books and pamphlets by Dr. Wilhelm Volz, Principal of the Geographical Institute of Breslau University.
95. The word is itself half German and half Slav.
96. W. Volz, *The Upper Silesian Question and its Economic and Geographic Bases*. Breslau, 1921, p. 50.
97. The misrepresentations in the maps used for Polish propaganda were not as yet known.
98. W. Volz appears to commit a rather common error in identifying the Galicians with the Poles; the Galicians are in the majority Ukrainians and not Poles.
99. W. Volz, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.
100. At the present time Upper Silesia receives a considerable number of Germans who have been expelled from Poland. In the City of Hindenburg alone there are 55,000.

101. W. Volz, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
102. H. Stahler, *Die Zerreissung von Oberschlesien*. Berlin, 1929, p. 18.
103. Not to be confused with M. Ulitz, President of the Silesian Groups in the Polish Sejm.
104. Niederle, *La Race Slave*, p. 88.
105. Dr. Lorenz, *Geschichte der Kaschuben*. Berlin, 1926.
106. Nierdele, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
107. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-117.
108. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, p. 113, footnote.
109. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
110. See the *Ilustrowany Kurjer Pomorski*, issue of January 15, 1929.
111. These matters were reported throughout by the Polish newspapers. See, for example, the *Gazeta Grudziaska* of January 17, 1929.
112. Preface to Dr. Slawski's book, *L'accès de la Pologne a la mer*, p. iii.
113. Slawski, *op. cit.*, pp. 108 *et seq.*
114. Stanislas Bukowiecki, *Polityka Polski Niepodległej, Szkic programu (The Policy of Independent Poland: Outlines of a Programme)*. Warsaw, 1922.
115. Stanislas Grabski, *Uwagi o bieżącej historycznej chwili Polski*. Lemberg, 1923.
116. *Krainy Czarnego Krzyża. Uwagi o Prusiech Wschodnich*.
117. Stanislas Srokowski, *Wspomnienia z trzeciego powstania górnolaskiego*, 1921.
118. Slawski, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.
119. *Deswiadczenia i błędy naszej polityki zagranicznej wobec zadań chwili*. Warsaw, 1926. It is generally understood that the name "Consulibus" conceals the identity of Simon Aszkenazy, the great Polish historian and diplomat.
120. Smogorzewski, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
121. Polangen (Palanga in Lithuanian) is the principal coastal resort of Lithuania, situated almost on the Latvian frontier.
122. *Rocznik Korporacyjny*, 1928, in two volumes. Warsaw, 1928.
123. See the verbatim report of the question asked in the Volkstag of Danzig by the deputy Ziehm, and of the reply given by M. Sahn, the President of the Senate.
124. Von Rheinbaben, *Que vise l'Allemagne*. Paris, 1928, p. 30.

125. René Martel, *La Pologne et nous*. Paris, Delpeuch, 1928, pp. 55-105.

126. Counter-proposal made by the German Government in reply to the terms of Peace, 7, Eastern Question, D. Danzig.

127. Von Rheinbaben, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

128. Von Rheinbaben, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

129. Slawski, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

130. Von Rheinbaben, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

131. Von Rheinbaben, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

132. Lichtenberger, *The Search for a Final Solution*. Appendix to the book by Von Rheinbaben.

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